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!ABSTRACT 
 
 
AN EXAMINATION OF DAILY POLITICS AND FACTIONALISM 
 AT THE OTTOMAN IMPERIAL COURT IN RELATION TO 
 THE REGICIDE OF OSMAN II  
 
Çiçek, Fikri 
MA, Department of History  
Supervisor: Assist. Prof. Günhan Börekçi 
 
 
September 2014, 109 pages 
 
This thesis examines the changing dynamics of the practical politics and power 
relations at the Ottoman imperial court in İstanbul before the dethronement and 
murder of Sultan Osman II (r.1618-22) on May 20, 1622, upon a massive military 
rebellion. The regicide of Osman II was in several respect a watershed in the 
seventeenth-century crisis in the Ottoman practical and court politics. Even though 
many academic studies have examined the regicide of Osman II, they overlook the 
role of the daily politics and factionalism at the imperial court prior to the regicide of 
Osman II. This study attempts to provide some new perspectives on these omitted 
aspects of the Osman II’s reign through using hitherto unexamined archival sources 
such as dispatches of the Venetian baili, the ambassadors resident in Istanbul. My 
main argument is that the regicide of Osman II was principally pertained to the 
alienation of imperial soldiers and the common people in the capital against the 
sultan while they were all confronting a serious economic/fiscal crisis. The crisis 
further deepened before the sultan’s imperial campaign against the Polish-Lithuanian 
Commonwealth in 1621. Upon the sultan’s return to capital form the campaign, his 
intervention to the daily economic and social life increased the crisis in the capital. 
The mismanagement of this crisis by Osman II and his court faction soon led to a 
popular uprising directly targeting the sultan and his style of rule. In this thesis, I also 
discuss the accusation of Osman II’s alleged secret plan of recruiting a new army to 
replace the Janissaries and sipahis. I find that this was most probably a rumor that 
!aimed to provoke the neutral soldiers and common people to join in the ranks of the 
rebellion in May 1622. 
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!ÖZ 
 
 
II. OSMAN’IN (s.1618-22) 
KATLİ BAĞLAMINDA OSMANLI SARAYINDA 
 GÜNDELİK SİYASETİN VE HİZİPÇİLİĞİN BİR İNCELEMESİ 
 
 
Çiçek, Fikri 
 
MA, Tarih Bölümü  
DANIŞMAN: Yrd. Doç. Dr. Günhan Börekçi 
 
Eylül 2014, 109 Sayfa 
 
 
Bu tez,  Sultan II. Osman’ın (s.1618-22) 20 Mayıs 1622’de İstanbul’da gerçekleşen 
büyük bir askeri isyan sonucu tahtan indirilişi ve katli öncesi Osmanlı sarayında 
gündelik siyasetin değişen dinamiklerini ve hizipçiliğini incelemektedir. 17. yüzyılın 
siyasi ve içtimai krizlerinde birçok açıdan kritik bir dönüm noktası olan Sultan II. 
Osman’ın katli pek çok akademik araştırmaya konu olmuşsa da, Sultan Osman’ın 
katli öncesi Osmanlı merkez sarayında gündelik siyaset ve hizipçilik göz ardı 
edilmiştir. Bu çalışma göz ardı edilen bu meseleyi inceleyerek, II. Osman’ın katline 
dair yeni bakış açıları sağlamayı amaçlamaktadır. Bu doğrultuda, akademik literatür 
tarafından henüz kullanılmamış olan, İstanbul’da ikamet eden Venedik elçisinin 
raporları, dispacci (tekil, dispaccio) incelenmektedir. Bu çalışmada, II. Osman’ın 
katlinin öncelikle merkez ordusunun (yeniçeri ve sipahilerin) ve İstanbul halkının 
ciddi bir ekonomik/fiskal krizle karşılaşmasından kaynaklanan Sultan Osman’ın 
saltanatına karşı yabancılaşmayla ilgisinin olduğu iddia edilmektedir. Sultan 
Osman’ın 1621 yılında Lehistan-Litvanya Birliğine karşı düzenlediği askeri sefer ise 
mevcut krizi daha da derinleştirmiştir. Sefer dönüşü II. Osman’ın ekonomik ve 
sosyal hayata müdahaleleri bu krizin genişlemesine yol açmıştır. II. Osman’ın ve 
saray hizbinin bu krizi yönetmedeki başarısızlığı kısa bir sürede büyük bir isyanı 
tetikleyip, sultanın ve yönetimin tarzının hedef tahtasına konulmasına neden 
olmuştur. Bu tezde ayrıca, II. Osman’a yöneltilen sözde yeni bir sekban ordusu 
kurup, yeniçeri ocağını kaldıracağı suçlaması da incelenmektedir. İsyan esnasında 
ortaya atılan bu suçlamanın yüksek bir ihtimalle bir şayia olduğunu ve isyan 
!hususunda kararsız kalan askerleri ve halkı kışkırtıp, isyanın saflarına çekmek 
amacını taşıdığı iddia edilmektedir. 
 
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Osman II, Gündelik Siyaset, Hizipçilik, Sultan Katli, Bailo, 
Dispacci. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
  This thesis offers an examination of the changing dynamics of practical 
politics and power relations at the Ottoman imperial court in Istanbul in the years 
immediately preceding the regicide of Sultan Osman II (r. 1618-22) on May 20, 
1622, upon a massive military rebellion. More specifically, it is an attempt to provide 
some new perspectives as well as to introduce some hitherto unexplored primary 
sources on the question of to what extent the daily politics at the sultan’s court and 
the unremitting factionalism among the Ottoman ruling elite in Istanbul played a role 
in the dethronement and murder of Osman II, an incident which marked the first 
regicide in Ottoman history. I maintain that the military rebellion which resulted in 
the regicide of Sultan Osman was primarily related to the sultan’s alienation of the 
rival ruling viziers at his faction-ridden court together with most of the high-ranking 
members of the ulema, the imperial soldiers and the people of Istanbul, at a time 
when the Ottoman Empire was facing a severe economic/fiscal crisis that further 
deepened before the sultan’s imperial campaign against the Polish-Lithuanian 
Commonwealth in 1621. I argue that the mismanagement of this crisis by Osman II 
and his court faction overlapped with a serious famine in the Ottoman capital during 
an abnormally cold winter and that it soon led to a popular uprising directly targeting 
the sultan and his style of rule, which some modern scholars consider to be highly 
assertive.1  
As is well-known, Osman II commanded the aforementioned Polish campaign in 
person, but his imperial army failed to capture the fortress of Hotin, the main target 
of the campaign. Then, five months after his arrival in Istanbul from the campaign, 
Osman II announced that he would undertake a pilgrimage to the holy cities of 
Mecca and Medina with a small retinue. Yet, his intention to leave the capital 
without an imperial army caused a number of rumors against the sultan, for instance, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 For a general evaluation of Osman II’s sultanate, see s.v. “Osman II” by Feridun Emecen, Diyanet 
Vakfı İslâm Ansiklopesi, vol. 33, pp. 453-456 (hereafter DIA). For a more detailed examination of the 
reign and regicide of Osman II, see Baki Tezcan, “Searching for Osman: A Reassessment of the 
Deposition of the Ottoman Sultan Osman II (1618-1622),” unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Princeton 
University, 2001. 
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that Osman II had actually devised a secret plan of recruiting a new sekban 
(mercenary) army in Asia so as to replace both the imperial Janissaries and the 
imperial cavalry soldiers (kapıkulu sipahileri) upon their poor performance at Hotin, 
or that the sultan wanted to move the capital from Istanbul to a different city such as 
Bursa or Cairo. In any event, such rumors triggered a military rebellion on May 18, 
1622, that soon resulted in the dethronement and murder of Osman II. 
While the academic literature on Osman II generally emphasize the failures of 
the Polish campaign and the rumors about his secret plans as the main factors behind 
his regicide, there has been no in-depth discussion of the daily politics at the sultan’s 
faction-ridden imperial court in relation to this important incident, which created a 
new wave of crisis and change in Ottoman imperial and dynastic politics in many 
decades to come.2 Indeed, the political and social instability of this era was such a 
prevalent problem that a total of six sultans were disposed from the throne 
throughout the seventeenth century, among whom two were killed, as a result of the 
incessant rebellions alike.3 In effect, these military rebellions at the center of the 
Ottoman imperial establishment were directly related to the changes and/or new 
dynamics that many scholars today observe in the political, economic, military and 
social make-up of the Ottoman Empire since the 1580s.4 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2 For various assessments of the early modern Ottoman court see, Rifa'at Ali Abou el-Haj, The 1703 
Rebellion and the Structure of Ottoman Politics, (Leiden : Nederlands Historisch-Archaeologisch 
Instituut te Istanbul, 1984); idem, The Formation of the Modern State: The Ottoman Empire, Sixteenth 
to Eighteenth Centuries (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1991); İ. Metin Kunt, The 
Sultan’s Servants: The Transformation of Ottoman Provincial Government, 1550-1650 (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1983); Halil İnalcık, “Comments on Sultanism: Max Weber’s 
Typification of Ottoman Polity,” Princeton Papers in Near Eastern Studies 1 (1992), pp. 49-72; 
Leslie Peirce, The Imperial Harem: Women and Sovereignty in the Ottoman Empire (New York and 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993); Rhoads Murphey, Exploring Ottoman Sovereignty: 
Tradition, Image and Practice in the Ottoman Imperial Household, 1400-1800 (London: Continuum, 
2008); Baki Tezcan, The Second Ottoman Empire: Political and Social Transformation in the Early 
Modern World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010); Günhan Börekçi, “Factions and 
Favorites at the Courts of Sultan Ahmed I (r. 1603-17) and His Immediate Predecessors,” unpublished 
Ph.D dissertation, Ohio State University, 2010. 
3 In this period of imperial crisis, Osman II (1618-22), Mustafa II (1617-18/ 1622-23), Ibrahim I 
(1640-48), Mehmed IV (1648-87), Süleyman II (1687-91) and Mustafa II (1695-1703) were deposed; 
Osman II and Ibrahim I were killed during rebellions.  
4 For different assessments of the Ottoman imperial crisis and transformation in the seventeenth 
century, see Halil İnalcık, “Military and Fiscal Transformation in the Ottoman Empire, 1600-1700,” 
Archivum Ottomanicum 6 (1980), pp. 283-337; Jane Hathaway, ed., Mutiny and Rebellion in the 
Ottoman Empire (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 2004); Rhoads Murphey, “Continuity 
and Discontinuity in Ottoman Administrative Theory and Practice during the Late 17th Century,” 
Poetics Today 14/2 (1993), pp. 419-443; Suraiya Faroqhi, “Crisis and Change,” in An Economic and 
Social History of the Ottoman Empire, eds. Halil İnalcık with Donald Quataert (Cambridge: 
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Accordingly, this study aims to fill a crucial gap in Ottoman historiography on 
the sultanate of Osman II and his regicide. Most importantly, I observe that the first 
popular opposition against Osman II’s sultanate had actually emerged before his 
Polish campaign in that both the imperial soldiers and the people of the capital rose 
in revolt against the sultan and his court faction a few times protesting the miserable 
economic conditions that hit them hard. Furthermore, most scholars overlook the 
reactions against Osman II’s style of rule through his royal favorites, namely, Dilaver 
Pasha, Hace Ömer Efendi, Süleyman Agha and Baki Pasha, whom the sultan 
personally empowered as his chief power-brokers in the business of rule. I would 
argue that these favorites alienated all other ruling grandees in Istanbul and thus 
became the target of the rebellious soldiers as they were accused of mismanaging the 
imperial affairs and misguiding the sultan. It was only when Osman II rejected the 
rebellious soldiers’ demands to get rid of his favorites and to stop his plans regarding 
his announced pilgrimage that the growing discontent against the sultan turned into a 
full-fledged rebellion, now including all the ‘neutral’ soldiers and people of the 
capital, who then jointly toppled the sultan and his favorites from power. 
Moreover, the scholarly literature on this period is predominantly oriented to the 
murder of Osman II while largely following the accounts of the contemporary 
Ottoman writers. That is to say, most scholars have rather an uncritical outlook 
towards this incident as their analyses are closely linked to the observations and 
commentaries of the Ottoman authors, most notably Hüseyin Tûgi, Bostanzâde 
Yahya Efendi, İbrahim Peçevi, and Hasan Beyzâde. As Feridun Emecen and Baki 
Tezcan point out, though, these Ottoman authors essentially represent the views and 
arguments of the rebellious soldiers in order the legitimize their actions against the 
sultan, thus they provide a highly limited or biased understanding of the historical 
problems and dynamics behind Osman II’s regicide.5 In this respect, one of my main 
objectives in this thesis is to shed light on Osman II’s regicide by utilizing a new set 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp. 411-636; Cemal Kafadar, “ Janissaries and Other Riffraff of 
Ottoman İstanbul: Rebels Without a Cause?” in Identity and Identity Formation in the Ottoman 
World: A Volume of Essays in Honor of Normal Itzkowitz, eds. Baki Tezcan and Karl Barbir 
(Madison: University of Wisconsin Center of Turkish Studies, 2007), pp. 113-34. 
5 For the problems of historiographical sources on Osman II’s see, Emecen, “Osman II,” pp. 455-456; 
and Tezcan, The Second Empire, pp. 1-14: idem, “The Politics of Early Modern Ottoman 
Historiography,” In the Early Modern Ottomans: Remapping the Empire, edited by Virginia Aksan 
and Daniel Goffman, pp. 167-98 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007). 
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of primary source, namely, the Venetian ambassadorial reports known as the 
dispacci (singular, dispaccio).  
The diplomatic representatives of the Republic of Venice resident in Istanbul 
were called the baili (singular, bailo), just like in other capitals or courts in Europe. 
One of the chief duties of these Venetian diplomats was to send regular reports to 
their Doge and Senate in Venice in order to inform them about the political 
developments in the Ottoman capital. The baili thus had to keep a track of all-
important figures, power relations, factional struggles and daily politics in Istanbul 
so as to serve the main interests of their Republic. Hence, they wrote detailed reports 
once or twice a week in which they commented on diverse aspects of the daily 
politics and its related actors at the sultan’s court. In this thesis, I examine around 
one hundred and forty dispacci written by Giorgio Giustinian, who served as the 
Venetian bailo in Istanbul between 1620-1627, as well as a few reports penned by 
his predecessor Almoro Nani (1614-1620). The dispatches in question, which cover 
the entire reign of Sultan Osman, yet have bıt been examined by scholars, provide 
highly critical information as well as some new insights on the events and problems 
surrounding the regicide of Osman II. 
 
i. Literature Review 
 
In conventional historiography, Osman II has been seen as a reformer and 
progressive sultan at a time when the Ottoman Empire entered a 'decline' period.6 
According to this literature, Osman II was the first sultan to revert this path of 
imperial decline by reforming the military and financial institutions of the Ottoman 
Empire. Most particularly, in twentieth-century Ottoman historiography, Osman II 
was investigated through the perspectives of the nationalist movement. This 
historiography tried to legitimize the reforms of the period led by Mustafa Kemal 
and his Republic Party by dating them to the period of an Ottoman sultan, that is, 
Osman II. He has been considered as one of the local and national reformists who !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
6 On the question and narratives of Ottoman imperial decline, see Douglas A. Howard, “Ottoman 
Historiography and the Literature of ‘Decline’ of the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Century,” Journal of 
Asian History 22 (1988), pp. 52-77; Cemal Kafadar, “The Question of Ottoman Decline,” Harvard 
Middle Eastern and Islamic Review 4/1-2 (1997-98), pp. 30-75; and Mehmet Öz, Osmanlı’da 
“Çözülme” ve Gelenekçi Yorumcuları (Istanbul: Dergah Yayınları, 1997).   
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aimed to bring radical changes in the military, political and bureaucratic institutions 
of the Ottoman Empire. The republican historians viewed Ottoman-Turkish 
reformation age would have gone back three centuries earlier if Osman II had not 
been deposed and killed during the rebellion in 1622.7 
Recent academic studies suggest that a radical revision of the sultanate of Osman 
II is needed. Among those historians who studied the reign and regicide of Osman II, 
Baki Tezcan offers the most significant such revision while challenging the decline 
paradigm that had been advanced to explain the post-1580 period in Ottoman history. 
Tezcan proposes a new framework for this period and provides a detailed 
examination of the historical background and aftermath of the regicide of Osman II. 
He calls this period, “the Second Empire,” in that it represents a gradual 
transformation in the institutional structures of the Ottoman Empire from a 
patrimonial-bureaucratic dynastic state towards a more absolutist monarchy. 
According to Tezcan, this second empire lasted until the abolishment of the 
Janissaries corps by Mahmud II in 1826.8 
Tezcan challenges the dominant Weberian views of early modern Ottoman 
Empire as he finds them rigid and static, while arguing that the Ottoman polity was 
in fact divided along two main political groups by the late sixteenth century, which 
he names them as ‘absolutists’ and ‘constitutionalists.’ According to Tezcan, the 
‘absolutists’ tried to increase the power of the sultan and his court faction in 
controlling the financial and economic sources of the empire, whereas the 
‘constitutionalists’ attempted to limit the sovereign authority of the Ottoman ruler in 
these matters. Tezcan examines a series of military rebellions from the late 1580s to 
the early 1650s and reads them as fierce struggles between these two rival political 
groups. He shows that the regicide of Osman II in 1622 was in effect the first true 
epitome of this bi-polar struggle in the Ottoman political body at large. Upon 
examining a large pool of archival sources and narratives, Tezcan finds out that 
Osman II’s absolutist or assertive style of rule brought an inevitable confrontation 
with the ‘constitutionalists,’ such as the Janissaries and the Ottoman mevali 
(scholars-jurists).9 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
7  For details, see Tezcan, “Searching For Osman,” pp. 13-23.  
8 Tezcan, The Second Ottoman Empire, pp. 140-141. 
9 Ibid., pp. 156-175. 
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Contrary to conventional historiography, Tezcan refuses to portray Osman II as a 
stubborn or a reformist, progressive sultan. Instead, he depicts Osman II as a “rebel” 
sultan in that he challenged all the alternative foci of power against his intentions. 
Moreover, Tezcan approaches the Janissaries and the mevali as new socio-economic 
actors who tried to limit the sultan’s authority and powers in the business of rule. In 
this regard, Tezcan points out to the growing power of the mevali from the second 
half of the sixteenth century onwards and to the roles they played in the decline of 
the medieval dynastic institutions of the Ottoman Empire.  
Tezcan claims that the gradual socioeconomic transformation of the empire 
began with the years of 1450s and reached its zenith at the years of 1580s. During 
this transformation, the patrimonial regime failed to control the monetary sources of 
the empire. Local ruling elites of the empire instead obtained economic means to 
recruit personal mercenary armies in the provinces of the empire. Moreover, 
commoners began to buy positions in the imperial army from the ruling elites that 
made them acquire fiscal and political patronage and prestige that gradually 
challenged the sovereign authority. On the broader context of early modern history, 
Tezcan derives similarities between the regicide of Osman II in 1622 and the English 
King Charles I in 1648. In both cases, according to Tezcan, the rulers were deposed 
so as to try to limit the sovereign authority upon the fierce political struggle between 
groups.10 
 Gabriel Piterberg analyzes the narratives concerning the regicide of Osman II by 
contemporary Ottoman authors, such as Tûgi, Hasan Beyzâde, Peçevi, Kâtib Çelebi 
and Naîmâ. In his study, Piterberg employs the methods of inter-textuality and 
hermeneutics as advanced by Paul Ricoeur and Hyden White while delineating the 
similarities and differences among these Ottoman writers’ narratives, which he 
argues jointly created a perception of the events that later turned into an “offical” 
historiography. Overall, Piterberg does not examine the daily political events and 
problems at the sultan’s court. 
On the other hand, Sam White suggests an environmental framework for the 
rebellions that took place between the late sixteenth century and the early decades of 
seventeenth century, including the one under Osman II in 1622. He calls this period !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
10 Ibid., pp. 36-43. 
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“Little Ice Age” in Ottoman history in which he observes a climate fluctuation and 
several natural disasters causing periodic shortages in imperial resources that 
occasionally triggered popular unrests including the one against Osman II. White 
claims that the regicide of Osman was actually linked to a “Great Drought” which 
lasted for years in the Eastern Mediterranean. In this period, he also notes, an 
extreme drought and cold weather broke down the Ottoman provision system, 
resulting in famines, epidemics, peasant flights and heavy death tolls.11 In what 
follows, I will try to further enhance White’s arguments about the Ottoman ‘Little 
Ice Age’ by providing some new information on the extreme weather conditions and 
events during the reign of Osman II.  
Inspired by the studies of Tezcan, Tülün Değirmenci offers an examination of the 
power relations at the imperial court under Osman II. Her discussion is based on the 
illustrated manuscripts produced at the Ottoman court in the seventeenth century, 
such as the Şehnâme-i Firdevsî, Şehnâme-i Türkî, Dîvân-ı Nâdirî and Şehnâme-i 
Nâdirî. Değirmenci tries to shed light on the ruling style of Osman II through an 
examination of the production of these manuscripts, which she locates into a broader 
context of power and patronage relations at the Ottoman court. Değirmenci’s 
discussion of the role of the chief eunuchs of the imperial harem in these networks of 
power and patronage especially provides important insights about the power elites 
and factionalism under Osman II, as well as his strategy of rule through his 
favorites.12  
The historiography of seventeenth century portrays Osman II as 'misguided' and 
'inexperienced' under the influence of his ill-will advisors. To be sure, Huseyin bin 
Sefer, his pseudonym Tûgī, occupies an important position in this perception with his 
account, Musibetname.13 He was supposedly a retired bodyguard (solak) of the sultan 
and participated several campaigns in Anatolia and Iran. In his account, Tûgī 
attempted to justify the actions of imperial soldiers in the rebellion. Accordingly, 
Tûgī separated the event into two as (i) the deposition and (ii) the regicide of sultan. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
11  Sam White, The Climate of Rebellion in the Early Modern Ottoman Empire (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2011). 
12  Tülün Değirmenci, İktidar Oyunları ve Resimli Kitaplar: II. Osman Devrinde Değişen Güç 
Simgeleri (İstanbul: Kitap Yayınevi, 2012). 
13Şevket Nezihi Aykut, ed., Hüseyin Tûgī, Musîbetnâme (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 2004) 
[hereafter Tûgī, Musîbetnâme]. 
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In term of deposition, Tûgī accuses Osman II of having a secret plan to recruit a new 
army in Anatolia. According to Tûgī, the sultan’s advisors as he calls “evil 
confidants” had spoken ill of the imperial soldiers. Most particularly, the Chief 
Eunuch Süleyman Agha and the Sultan’s Tutor Ömer Hace played a central role to 
antagonize the sultan against the soldiers under the pretext of their poor performance 
during the Polish campaign. They allegedly misguided Osman II to recruit a new 
army in Anatolia and Egypt and were returning back to the capital so as to eradicate 
the imperial army. However, in terms of the regicide, Tûgī showed an obstinate 
refusal to the accusation against the imperial soldiers of being a prime responsible 
group on the regicide of Osman II. Tûgī claims that the imperial soldiers aimed to 
depose Osman II, not to kill him. Tûgī accuses Mustafa II’s brother-in-law, Grand 
Vizier Davud Pasha of killing Osman II in a dungeon at Yedikule Tower on May 22, 
1622.14 
Hasan Beyzâde Ahmed Pasha served as a high-ranking official in the imperial 
secretariat and the provincial administrations until his death. Hasan Beyzâde 
participated the several military campaigns, including the Polish campaign of Osman 
II. His account has been overwhelmingly favorable to the imperial soldiers in his 
account, Hasan Bey-zâde Tarihi.15 As discussed above, Gabriel Piterberg claims that 
Hasan Beyzâde’s account is near verbatim of the Tûgī’s account, however Tezcan 
shows persuasively that Hasan Beyzâde was not acquainted with Tûgī’s account.16 
On the other hand, similar to Peçevi, Hasan Beyzâde did not mention about the secret 
plan, rather he constructed his narrative on the pilgrimage campaign to Mecca. This 
detail also separates Hasan Beyzâde’s account from Tûgī’s one.17 
On the contrary to Tûgī and Hasan Beyzâde, Peçevi holds a favorable opinion 
about Osman II by disapproving the imperial soldiers’ behaviors in his account, 
Tarih-i Peçevi.18 He spent his career mostly in provincial administration. During the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
14  Ibid. pp. 1-106. For details, see Tezcan, “The 1622 Military Rebellion in Istanbul: a 
Historiographical Journey,” in Mutiny and Rebellion in the Ottoman Empire, edited by Jane Hathaway 
(Madison: University of Wisconsin, Center for Turkish Studies, 2004), pp. 25-43. Also see Gabriel 
Piterberg, An Ottoman Tragedy (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003), pp. 71-91. 
15 Nezihi Aykut, ed., Hasan Bey-zâde Târîhi, 3 vols. (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 2004) [hereafter 
Hasan Beyzâde, I-II-III].   
16 Piterberg, An Ottoman Tragedy, pp. 98-106; and Tezcan, “Searching for Osman,” pp. 7-10. 
17 Hasan Beyzâde, III, pp. 939-950. 
18 İbrahim Peçevî, Târîh-i Peçevî, 2 vols. (İstanbul: Matbaa-i Âmire, 1283/1866) [hereafter Peçevi, I-
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deposition of the Osman, he was the treasurer of governorship of Diyarbakır under 
Osman II’s brother in law, Hafız Pasha. Similar to Tûgī and Hasan Beyzâde, he did 
not call the soldiers as rebels, but described their actions of soldiers as a disorder and 
sedition. Whether consciously or not, Peçevi did not mention the sultan’s alleged 
secret plan of the recruitment, he rather gave voice to the rumor of the sultan’s secret 
plan for the changing imperial capital from İstanbul to Cairo in Egypt. According to 
Peçevi, several inhabitants of Istanbul tried to spread the rumor in the preceding days 
just days of the rebellion. Unlike the rest of the writers, Peçevi did not accuse the 
advisors of the sultan for provoking him to undertake the pilgrimage campaign to 
Mecca. According to Peçevi, the regicide of Osman II was linked to the increasing 
tension between the sultan and soldiers that had been rooted from the Polish 
campaign. Yet, similar to Tûgī, Peçevi indicates that Davud Pasha as the primary 
culprit for the regicide. 19 
Another contemporary writer is high-ranking jurist Bostanzade Yahya Efendi. He 
served in several high-ranking judicial posts, however he had been a retired chief 
judge of Anatolia since 1614. Bostanzade participated actively to the meeting of the 
ulema with the sultan during the chaotic days of the rebellion. According to 
Bostanzade, Osman abolished the retired revenue of the high-ranking ulema, the 
arpalık in the Polish campaign. Apart from them, Bostanzade predominantly accuses 
Hace Ömer Efendi of being an ill-will advisor to provoke the sultan of undertaking 
the pilgrimage campaign to Mecca in his account. His main critics were to the high-
ranking ulema members of Osman’s imperial government. Bostanzade portrayed 
them as evil-confidants of the sultan whom provoked the inexperienced and young 
sultan to do so. Like the ones mentioned before, he too claimed Davud Pasha was 
most responsible for the regicide.20 
The rest of the contemporary sources predominantly construct their narrative 
under the influence of these four accounts. Most particularly, Tûgī’s account has a 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
II]  
19 Peçevi, II, pp. 380-388. Also see Piterberg, An Ottoman Tragedy, pp. 106-112; Tezcan, “Searching 
for Osman,” pp. 8-10; and Diyanet İslam Vakfı Ansiklopedisi [hereafter DİA], s.v. “Peçuylu İbrahim,” 
by Erika Hancz, pp. 216-218. 
20  Orhan Şaik Gökyay, “ II. Osman'ın Şehadeti” in Atsız Armağanı, ed. Erol Güngör (İstanbul, 
Ötüken Neşriyat, 1976), pp. 187-286 [hereafter Bostanzâde]; DIA, s.v. “Bostanzâde Yahya Efendi,” 
pp. 311-313; and Tezcan, “Searching for Osman,” pp. 5-6. 
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great impact on the Kâtib Çelebi and Naîmâ’s accounts in terms of the arguments, 
causes and actors.21 Moreover, Karaçelebizâde’s narrative was similar to Bostanzade, 
both of these members of ulema accuses Hace Ömer Efendi of provoking the sultan 
to the pilgrimage campaign and having extraordinary power with the authority to 
decide on all high level appointments regarding the ulema.22 
 
ii. Sources and Approach 
 
As noted above, the Venetian baili were the diplomats who represented the 
commercial and political interests of the Republic of Venice before the Ottoman 
sultan and his imperial government in Istanbul. 23  During the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries, these seasoned diplomats provided the most regular and 
reliable information flow between the Ottoman capital and the rest of the Europe. 
Thus, their dispatches and reports constitute one of the most important, if the not the 
chief, pool of source of information pertaining to the political, economic and military 
developments in the Ottoman Empire during this period.24  
The Venetian baili not only established close relationships with the leading 
Ottoman political figures, but also relied on an elaborate network of friendships and 
patronage in order to gather information. They also kept in regular touch with 
various other informants, such as the European merchants residing in Galata, the 
dragomans at the Ottoman court, porters and spies.25  
Overall, the baili’s dispatches were sent to the Venice once a week or twice 
depending on importance of the events they reported. Each dispatch typically !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
21 Zeynep Aycibin, “Kâtip Çelebi, Fezleke: Tahlil ve Metin,” unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Mimar 
Sinan University, 2007, pp. 651-683 [hereafter Kâtib Çelebi, Fezleke]; Mehmet İpşirli, ed., Naîmâ,  4 
vols. (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 2007), vol. I, pp. 440-491  [hereafter Tarih-i Naîmâ, I-II-III-IV]. 
Also see, Piterbeg, An Ottoman Tragedy, pp. 114-124; and Tezcan, “Searching for Osman,” pp. 11-
12. 
22  Karaçelebizâde Abdülaziz, Ravzatü’l-ebrâr  (Bulaq: Al-Matba‘a al-Amī riyya, H.1248/1832) 
[hereafter Karaçelebizâde].  
23  Eric Dursteler, “The Bailo in Constantinople: Crisis and Career in Venice's Early Modern 
Diplomatic corps,” Mediterranean Historical Review 16-2 (2001), pp. 2-7 and Emrah Safa Gürkan, 
“Fonds for the Sultan: How to Use Venetian Sources For Studying Ottoman History,” News on the 
Rialto 32 (2013), pp. 22-28. 
24 Dursteler, “The Bailo in Constantinople,” pp. 1-2.  
25 Dursteler, “The Bailo in Constantinople,” p. 3 and Emrah Safa Gürkan, “Fonds for the Sultan,” p. 
24. 
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contains detailed information on the political and social events in Istanbul, the 
factional struggles at the sultan’s court, the diplomatic relations as well as on the 
personal stories of various ruling elites in the empire, mostly in the capital. The baili 
particularly reported about his meetings and/or conversations with diverse Ottoman 
officials and other diplomats in the capital. Hence, the dispacci could be read for an 
examination of different political problems and actors.26  
Once a bailo’s tenure expired, he was asked to write and present in person a final 
report about his embassy to the Senate in Venice. These reports are called the 
relazioni (singular, relazione). Unlike the dispacci, the relazioni were written in a 
highly formal and brief format. In these reports, the baili typically used their already 
submitted dispacci to give a summary of the main political events, actors, and 
problems during their tenure in Istanbul.  
This thesis mainly utilizes the dispacci written by the Venetian bailo Giorgio 
Giustinian. He was born to a wealthy and prestigious Venetian family in 1572. He 
dedicated his life to politics instead of getting married, while his brother continued 
the lineage of their family, which was a common practice in Venice at the time.27 At 
the time of his appointment to Istanbul in 1620, Giustinian was a very seasoned 
diplomat as he had served at different courts of Europe for many years.28 Yet, he had 
some serious health problems at the time. In the event, he remained in the Ottoman 
capital for seven years and witnessed the entire reign of Osman II, including his 
regicide.29 He died in Venice in February 1629 and left a considerable wealth to his 
heirs.30 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
26 Gürkan, “Fonds for the Sultan,” pp. 23-24; and Natalie Rothman, “Between Venice and Istanbul: 
Trans-Imperial Subjects and Cultural Mediation in the Early Modern Mediterranean,” Unpublished 
Ph.D. dissertation, The University of Michigan, 2006, p. 214. 
27 Dursteler, “The Bailo in Constantinople,” p. 12. 
28 For instance, he was appointed to the court of the Duke of Savoy in September 1603 and then to 
England in March 1605. He worked at the English court until 1608. In March 1610, he was elected to 
serve as the Venetian ambassador at the court of France. However, the assassination of King Henry IV 
on 14 May 1610 postponed his position which he assumed a year later in May 1611. After three years 
of service, in January 1614, he was appointed as the ambassador to the Emperor Matthias of Austria. 
While serving in Prague, the Thirty Year’s War erupted in 1618. For further details on Giustinian’s 
career, see Giuseppe Gullino, “Giorgio Giustinian,” Dizionario Biografico degli Italia i (Roma: 
Istituto dell’ Enciclopedia Italiana Fondato da Govanni Treccani, 2001), vol. 57, pp. 229-232. 
29 Dursteler, “The Bailo in Constantinople,” p. 12. 
30 Gullino, “Giorgio Giustinian,” p. 232. 
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In this thesis, I make use of more than 150 dispacci dated between the arrival of 
Giorgio Giustinian in Istanbul on August 20, 1620 and June 28, 1622, a month after 
the regicide of Osman II. During this period, Giustinian wrote a total of 140 
dispacci.31 However, 71 of these dispatches, written between March 22, 1621 and 
February 19, 1622, are not available for the researchers in the Venetian State 
Archives, most probably due to their conditions. Despite this shortcoming, I utilize 
the propri (singular, proprio) which are the drafts of the bailo’s dispatches sent to 
Venice. I am thus able to compensate the lack of those 71 original dispacci with their 
copies. In addition, I use the bailo’s relazione which he presented to his Senate in 
1627 following his return from Istanbul. Likewise, I look into relevant dispatches 
written by Giustinian’s predecessor, Almoro Nani, who served in Istanbul between 
1614 and 1620.32 
As to my methodology, I have tried to employ a critical reading of the dispatches 
in question regarding the political, economic and military problems and events of the 
period. While examining the Venetian dispatches along these lines, I compare them 
with the contemporary Ottoman chronicles, particularly by Tûgi, Peçevi, Hasan 
Beyzâde and Bostanzâde. 
 
iii. Outline of Chapters 
 
This thesis is divided into four chapters. The first chapter focuses on the political 
power exercised by Osman II and his favorites in the daily governmental affairs. My 
discussion covers the period from the succession of Osman II on February 26, 1618 
to the death of the Grand Vizier Ali Pasha on March 9, 1621. It examines the roles 
played in the factional politics of the period by the Chief Eunuch of the Imperial 
Harem, el-Hac Mustafa Agha, and his client, Grand Admiral Ali Pasha. Then, the 
reconfiguration of power relations under Osman II is examined. Most particularly, I !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
31 For the dispacci, Archivio di Stato di Venezia, Venice, Italy. Senato, Dispacci Constantinopoli 
(SDC), Filze 89,90,93. For the propri, Archivio di Stato di Venezia Senato, Venice, Italy. Senato, 
Archivio Proprio Costantinopoli (SPAC) 16, 17, 18. For details on the indexs of Giorgio Giustinian’s 
dispacci, see Maria Pedani-Fabris, ed., Relazioni di ambasciatori veneti al senato, vol. 14: 
Costantinopoli, Relazioni inedite (1512-1789) (Padua: Bottega d’Erasmo, 1996), pp. 40-41. See also 
Selvinaz Mete, “The Ottoman Empire as Reflected to the Relazione of the Bailo Giorgio Giustinian 
(1620-1627),” unpublished M.A. thesis, Fatih University, 2012. 
32 For dispacci indexs of Almoro Nani, see Maria Pedani-Fabris, “Relazioni di Ambasciatori Veneti al 
Senato,” p. 40.   
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discuss the rise of Ali Pasha to the office of grand vizierate within the context of the 
shifting power and changing dynamics among different court factions under Osman 
II. Moreover, this chapter sheds light on the methods employed Ali Pasha to 
eliminate his rivals at the sultan’s court. It is also a close examination of the ruling 
style of Osman II vis-à-vis alternative foci of power in the capital. More specifically, 
it focuses on the priorities of Osman II in imperial affairs, which received harsh 
criticisms from the imperial soldiers and common people who were confronting 
some climatic, fiscal and military problems during these years.  
The second chapter examines the daily politics at the court of Osman II within 
the context of a serious provision crisis, which overlapped with extreme winter 
conditions and a military campaign against Poland. My discussion covers the 
Venetian bailo’s report on the outbreak of the extreme winter conditions on the 
February 9, 1621, to the sultan’s return to the capital from the Polish campaign on 
January 9, 1622. In particular, it examines the provision crisis and the first reactions 
against Osman II and his imperial government.  
The third chapter focuses on the increasing tension between Osman II and the 
imperial soldiers concerning his eagerness to undertake a pilgrimage. As noted 
above, this plan of the sultan triggered not only the imperial soldiers, but also the 
common people in the capital to form a much bigger opposition against the sultanate 
of Osman II.  
The last chapter, finally, examines the accusation against Osman II pertaining to 
a secret plan of recruiting a new army instead of the existing the imperial one. This 
accusation was circulated as a rumor in the capital during the rebellion and it points 
out to the different scenarios invented or narrated by different contemporary writers 
to legitimize the dethronement and the murder of the sultan. More specifically, this 
chapter questions the rumor about whether Osman II actually aimed to leave his 
imperial army at the capital as he decided to realize his Pilgrimage journey. 
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CHAPTER 1 
OSMAN II AND HIS REIGN 
 
In the early seventeenth century, the Ottoman imperial politics underwent a 
severe crisis, which has its origins in the prolonged campaigns against the Habsburgs 
in the West (1593-1606) and the Safavids in the East (1578-90) as well as against the 
Celali rebels in the Anatolian countryside (ca. 1590-1610). These multi-front and 
relatively concurrent wars created no small amount of problems for the Ottoman 
sultan and his imperial government located in Istanbul. Most importantly, constant 
warfare resulted in a rampant inflation, thus in the devaluation of the salaries paid to 
the soldiers of the imperial army, who in turn rebelled against the imperial court 
protesting their payments with debased coinage as well as the mismanagement of the 
military affairs. 
In the meantime, the traditional ways of Ottoman royal succession changed too. 
The ceasing of the tradition of fratricide during the early seventeenth century, which 
hitherto enabled a new sultan to execute all his living brothers upon his succession, 
led to the unusual succession of Sultan Mustafa I, the brother of Ahmed I (r. 1603-
17), on November 22, 1617.33 Since the rise of the Ottoman Empire from a small 
principality in the western Anatolia, over 300 years, it was the first time in Ottoman 
history that the throne did not pass from father to son, but from one brother to 
another. A new principle of seniority was thus introduced. This unusual succession 
marks a new era in the seventeenth-century Ottoman dynastic and political history. A 
series of underage sultans ascended to the throne, necessitating the de facto regency 
of the queen mothers in dynastic and court politics. The increasing role of the muftis, 
the chief eunuchs of the palace and the favorite viziers on the decisions-making 
processes further complicated the power relations and factional struggles within the 
Ottoman polity.34  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
33 ASVe, Senato, Costantinopoli (SDC), filza 84, no. 3a (dated November 22, 1617), fol. 178r: “La 
notte passata mi fu portata aviso della morte del Re, et questa mattina, è stata assunto all’imperio il 
fratello Sultan Mustafa al quale conforme l’ordinario, tutti li vesiri, et altri grandi li hanno baciata la 
veste.” For the details on the unusual succession of Mustafa I, see Tezcan, “Searching for Osman,” pp. 
84-100. 
34 See Günhan Börekçi, “İnkırâzın Eşiğinde Bir Hanedan: III. Mehmed, I. Ahmed, I. Mustafa ve 
17.Yüzyıl Osmanlı Siyasi Krizi,” Divan Disiplinlerarası Çalışmalar Dergisi 26 (2009), pp. 54-56; 
Feridun M. Emecen, “Osmanlı Hanedanına Alternatif Arayışlar Üzerine Bazı Örnekler ve 
! 15!
In this imperial crisis period, often a new sultan was chosen and enthroned by a 
collective decision taken by factional coups within the palace of the period, while the 
imperial army got involved in such factional struggles only to deepen the crisis in the 
seventeenth century dynastic and court politics of the Ottoman Empire. Indeed, on 
February 26, 1618, only three months after the enthronement of Mustafa I, Osman II 
was the first sultan who succeeded to the imperial throne with the help of such a 
palace coup.35 
This chapter examines how Osman II and his favorites projected power in daily 
politics of the Ottoman imperial court by analyzing the dispatches written by the 
Venetian baili resident in Istanbul. My discussion covers the major events and affairs 
from the succession of Osman II on February 26, 1618 to the death of the Grand 
Vizier Ali Pasha on March 9, 1621. While analyzing the dispatches in question, I 
will also compare the Venetian baili’s accounts and narratives regarding the events 
and affairs under examination vis-à-vis the arguments of the existing academic 
literature on Osman II’s reign, thus try to reach at a better understanding of the 
political problems during this period.  
This chapter is divided into four parts. The first part examines the succession of 
Osman II, which is an unusual event within the context of the dynastic and political 
problems that defined much of this era. In particular, my discussion will focus on el-
Hac Mustafa Agha, the Chief Eunuch of the Imperial Harem, and Ali Pasha, the 
Grand Admiral between November 1617 and February 1618, as well as examine 
their roles in the succession of Osman II. The second part of the chapter investigates 
the reconfiguration of power and patronage relations under Osman II. More 
specifically, I look into the rise of Ali Pasha as Osman II’s new grand vizier within 
the context of the changing balances of power among different existing court factions 
and alternative networks of political patronage. The third part then analyzes the 
process of the elimination of all the major power-brokers by Ali Pasha and 
accordingly his unrivalled rise to power in the imperial court under Osman II. This !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
Mülahazalar,” İslâm Araştırmaları Dergisi 6 (2001), pp. 63-76; Tezcan “The Question of Regency in 
Ottoman Dynasty: The Case of the Early Reign of Ahmed I,” Archivum Ottomanicum 25 (2008), pp. 
185-198 [published in 2009]; and Gülru Necipoğlu, Architecture, Ceremonial and Power: The 
Topkapı Palace in the Fifteenth and Sixteenth Centuries (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 
1991). 
35 For the details on the reign of Mustafa I, see Tezcan, ‘Searching for Osman,” pp. 168-175; and DIA, 
s.v. “ Mustafa (I),” by Feridun Emecen, pp. 272-275. 
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part highlights the methods of elimination employed by Ali Pasha against his 
political rivals. The fourth part of this chapter finally studies the assertive ruling style 
of Osman II vis-à-vis the alternative foci of power among his ruling elite in the 
capital. Principally, this part explores the priorities set by Osman II in imperial 
affairs, which eventually would trigger a direct and harsher criticism against his 
sultanate and ruling style by the imperial soldiers (both the Janissaries and the 
sipahis) and the common people in the coming years. 
It is my main general contention is that Ali Pasha’s factional struggles against the 
sultan’s royal favorites and his grandees of the court enabled Osman II to both assert 
his sovereign authority over the business of rule as well as create his own alternative 
court faction among his ruling elites. Accordingly, I observe that with every victory 
that Ali Pasha won over his political rivals, Osman II became more visible and more 
assertive in the daily running of his imperial government. However, this limited 
concentration of power in the decision-making processes by the sultan and his new 
grand vizier, in turn, directly made Osman II accountable for any failures in 
governmental affairs in the eyes of the imperial army and the people in the capital, 
while they were all confronting some serious fiscal, military and climatic problems. 
 
1.1 A Palace Coup: The Succession of Osman II 
 
On Thursday, February 26, 1618, only three months after the unusual succession 
of Mustafa I, the Venetian bailo Almoro Nani reported that Mustafa I was deposed 
for being incapable of ruling the empire. According to the bailo: 
This morning, Sultan Osman, the eldest son of Sultan Ahmed, ascended   
to the imperial throne as the new king and his [Ahmed’s] brother, Sultan 
Mustafa, was deposed, having ruled exactly for three months and three 
days. They locked him in the place where he was before [i.e. the kafes, 
the chamber of the Ottoman princes in the imperial harem]. This 
deposition was the work of the Mufti [Esad Efendi], the Deputy Grand 
Vizier [Sofu Mehmed Pasha] and the Chief Eunuch [el-Hac Mustafa 
Agha].36  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
36 ASVe, SDC, filza 84, no. 35 (dated February 26, 1618, m.v.), fol. 376r: “Questa mattina è stato 
assunto a questo İmperio un novo Re Sultan Osman figlio maggiore del gia Sultan Achmet et deposto 
Mustafa suo fratello, che ha regnato tre mesi e Re giorni appunto, et l’hanno posto serrato nel luoco, 
dove, era prima che fosse creato, tutto cio, propria del Mufti Caimecan et Chislar Agasi.” In the early 
seventeenth century, March marked the beginning of a new year according to the Venetian Calendar. 
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The Venetian bailo further claims that the members of the palace coup invented 
numerous and diverse accusations in order to justify the deposition of Mustafa I in 
the public opinion. They thus circulated the following rumors by word of mouth 
about Mustafa I; girding a simple sword in the palace, wounding wantonly his inner-
court servants, breaking very precious jewels at his whim, demanding alms from a 
crippled ghazi sipahi in the street, and finally, giving the said sipahi a royal writ to 
be delivered immediately to the Habsburg Emperor Matthias (r.1612-19). According 
to the Venetian bailo, el-Hac Mustafa Agha instantly stopped this sipahi and took the 
writ from his hand, preventing a possible diplomatic crisis which would leave the 
empire in an awkward position in the international arena.37  
The Venetian bailo further states that a favorite client of the dismissed Grand 
Admiral Ali Pasha told him at a dinner that, in this writ, Mustafa I mentioned some 
possible changes in the ranks of his government within 10 days. According to Ali 
Pasha’s favorite, whose name is unidentified by the bailo, due to these important 
changes, his patron could be soon reappointed to his former office.38 It was only 
three months ago that Ali Pasha was dismissed from the grand admiralty and 
replaced by Mustafa I’s brother-in-law, Davud Pasha. 39  According to the 
contemporary chronicler Mehmed bin Mehmed, at that time, it was Davud Pasha 
who asked Mustafa I to appoint him in place of Ali Pasha for he was the sultan’s 
brother-in-law.40 Ali Pasha’s initial dismissal might have set alarm bells ringing for 
el-Hac Mustafa Agha, who had been the chief power-broker at the Ottoman court 
under Ahmed I. He was also the patron of Ali Pasha whose career he sponsored from 
early on.41 The dismissal of his chief client Ali Pasha was a sign that el-Hac Mustafa !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
37 Ibid., fol. 376r. For similiar accusations about Mustafa I, see Peçevi, II, pp. 361-362 and Hasan 
Beyzâde, III, p. 927. 
38 ASVe, SDC, filza 84 (dated February 26, 1618, m.v.), fol. 377v: “ha [Mustafa I] scritto in essa 
polizza all’imperator, che dovesse immediate venirsene qui, perché le voleva rinovare il governo sta 
più di dieci giorni, che mi fu detto in gran confidenza da uno molto favorito del Capitan del mare 
deposto, che vere qui a desinare meco, che luna nova si vederebbino gran mutazioni in questo 
governo, et che il suo patrone sarebbe ritornato nel carico.” 
39 Tezcan, “Searching for Osman,” p. 169. 
40 Mehmed bin Mehmed, II, p. 49.  
41 El-Hac Mustafa Agha had served as one of the eunuchs in the imperial harem under Murad III 
(r.1574 95) and Mehmed III (r.1595-1604). After the succession Sultan Ahmed I in December 1603, 
he returned to the capital from Egypt where had been in exile since 1602. Upon his return, Sultan 
Ahmed appointed him as one of his chief musâhibs. He was then promoted to the chief eunuch of the 
imperial palace on November 5, 1605. From then on, he accumulated enormous power under Ahmed 
I, while turning into the chief advisor and chief power-broker of the sultan. Mustafa Agha sponsored 
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Agha confronted with the new court faction under Mustafa I. He was now under the 
threat of losing his all favor and power at the Ottoman imperial court. Indeed, the 
Venetian bailo claims that el-Hac Mustafa Agha allied with Ali Pasha and they 
jointly opposed against the sultanate of Mustafa I in the first place.  
Ali Pasha was in effect one of the masterminds behind the succession of Osman 
II in that he had provided crucial support for the deposition of Mustafa I.42 
According to the French ambassador Baron de Sancy, Ali Pasha had informed Sofu 
Mehmed Pasha, the Deputy Grand Vizier, about Mustafa I’s plan to replace him with 
his brother-in-law. In the meantime, Ali Pasha received a letter from Prince Osman 
promising to keep Sofu Mehmed Pasha in his position as the deputy grand vizier in 
the event of the deposition of Sultan Mustafa and his enthronement instead. 
Moreover, the French Ambassador claims that Ali Pasha made a deal with the 
Segbanbaşı Kara Hasan Agha, the Deputy Agha of the Janissaries, while Hüseyin 
Agha, Agha of the Janissarries, was serving in a campaign against the Safavids. Ali 
Pasha promised Hasan Agha to be promoted to the office of Agha of the Janissaries 
once they successfully manage to depose Mustafa I.43  
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the political careers of many grandees such as Ali Pasha, Hüseyin Pasha and Dilaver Pasha who were 
all appointed grand viziers during the reigns of Osman II and Murad IV. As noted before, Mustafa 
Agha also played an important role on the succession of Osman II, but his client Ali Pasha exiled him 
to Egypt once he found the opportunity on July 14, 1620, as will be discussed below. Upon the 
succession of Murad IV (r.1623-1640), Mustafa Agha was invited back to the capital and resumed his 
position. Yet, he died shortly afterwards in 1624. On El-Hac Mustafa Agha and his career, see 
Değirmenci, İktidar Oyunları, pp. 59-83; and Tezcan, “Searching for Osman II,” p. 166-175. Also see, 
Günhan Börekçi, “Factions and Favorites,” pp.  242-249. For musâhib, see. DIA, s.v. “Musâhib,” by 
Mehmet İpşirli, pp. 230-231 
42 Maria Pedani-Fabris, ed., Relazioni di ambasciatori veneti al senato, vol. 14: Costantinopoli, 
Relazioni inedite (1512-1789) (Padua: Bottega d’Erasmo, 1996), pp. 548 [hereafter Giustinian]: 
“…qualche tempo dopo Alì suo primo visir, quello che fu tanto mal affetto a questa Repubblica, 
huomo perfido et rapacissimo, uno anch'egli degli architetti della depositione del zio et della sua 
assuntione.” See also Mete, “the Bailo Giorgio Giustinian,” pp. 103-104. Ali Pasha was the son of 
Ahmed Pasha, the martyr governor of Tunisia. When he was a child, his father was killed in a battle 
against the Celali rebels in Anatolia. Due to the loyal service of his father, Ali was appointed to the 
governorship of Damietta in Egypt. During the reign of Ahmed I (r. 1603-17), Ali Pasha served in 
several prestigious governorships under the patronage of Mustafa Agha. According to Tezcan, 
İstanköylü Ali Pasha might have become acquainted with el-Hac Mustafa Agha while he was in exile 
in Egypt. At that time, Ali was the governor of Damietta, a coast region of Egypt. Moreover, during 
the campaign against the Celali rebels in Bursa, Ahmed I boarded Ali Pasha’s ship for his journey to 
Bursa on the Marmara Sea. Tezcan asserts that this journey benefited Mustafa Agha and Ali Pasha to 
improve their personal relations. Thus, Mustafa Agha showed his patronage to his client Ali Pasha 
shortly after the latter was appointed to the governorship of Yemen. For a detailed discussion of Ali 
Pasha and his career, see Tezcan, “Searching for Osman,” pp. 167-169; Mehmed bin Mehmed, II, pp. 
46-47; and DİA, s.v. “Ali Paşa, Güzelce,” by İdris Bostan, pp. 424-425. 
43 Tezcan, “Searching for Osman,” pp. 171-172. 
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All the accusations against Mustafa I aimed at revealing his incapacity to rule the 
empire, yet they did not fully serve the plot for his deposition. At this point, el-Hac 
Mustafa Agha tried to propagate the fear of the genealogical extinction of the 
dynasty as a last resort to ensure the removal of Mustafa I from the throne. 
According to the chronicler Hasan Beyzâde, Mustafa Agha sent a common warning 
message to Esad Efendi, the Mufti, Sofu Mehmet Pasha, the Deputy Grand Vizier, 
and other government viziers, urging them to consider that the Ottoman dynasty was 
under a serious threat and that, if not acted immediately, Mustafa I would attempt to 
kill all the Ottoman princes living in the palace. Furthermore, Mustafa Agha and Ali 
Pasha warned other ruling grandees in that Mustafa I appointed several incapable 
men to important offices, implying that their existing posts were actually under threat 
as long as Mustafa I occupied the throne.  
Eventually such warnings about the threat for the genealogical extinction and the 
possible loss of their current offices paid. Esad Efendi and Sofu Mehmed Pasha 
began to support the idea of dethroning Mustafa I and then enthroning of Osman II 
instead.44 In the end, Mustafa Agha, Esad Efendi, Sofu Mehmed Pasha and all other 
ruling viziers gathered in the imperial council under the pretext of discussing the 
issue of payments for the soldiery. During the meeting, Mustafa I were locked in his 
chambers in order to prevent him from intervening the ongoing deliberations. Then 
Osman II entered the council from a different door and succeeded to the throne, 
followed by the allegiance of the viziers to the new sultan. Shortly afterwards, other 
grandees of the court likewise congratulated Osman II on his succession.45 
 
1.2 The Reconfiguration of the Power Relations Under Osman II 
 
The succession of Osman II brought several changes in the ranks of the imperial 
government and the balances of power among the Ottoman ruling elite. Most 
notably, Osman II immediately rewarded those leading figures of the palace coup 
that brought him to the throne by appointing them to top-level positions in the 
imperial government. Meanwhile, as part of this reconfiguration of power positions, 
el-Hac Mustafa Agha manage to have his own clients and close allies promoted to !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
44 Hasan Beyzâde, III, pp. 919-920; and  Naîmâ, II, p. 440. 
45 Peçevi, II, pp. 361-362;  Hasan Beyzâde, III, pp. 917-920; and Naîmâ, II, p. 441.  
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the strategic posts in the imperial administration. For instance, his long-time client 
Ali Pasha was appointed as grand admiral in early 1618.46  
While the reshuffling of the government and court positions were underway, 
those leading figures at the court of Mustafa I, such as Grand Vizier Halil Pasha, the 
Deputy Grand Vizier Sofu Mehmed Pasha, the Mufti Esad Efendi and the Grand 
Admiral Davud Pasha, gradually lost their once powerful positions, which enabled 
Osman II to exert more influence over the business of rule. For instance, Halil Pasha 
was leading a campaign against the Safavids as the commander-in-chief of the 
imperial army (serdar-ı ekrem) at the time of Osman II’s enthronement.47 After Halil 
Pasha returned to the capital, he found a very different political atmosphere. The 
deposition of Mustafa I enabled his chief rival, Sofu Mehmed Pasha, to consolidate 
his power in the imperial government under Osman II in early 1618.48 Shortly before 
leaving the capital with the command of a new campaign against the Safavids, Halil 
Pasha complained to Osman II about Sofu Mehmed Pasha. According to Hasan 
Beyzâde, Halil Pasha accused his deputy of draining the imperial treasury for the 
accession donation of Mustafa I. Accordingly, Halil pasha induced Osman II to 
dismiss Sofu Mehmed Pasha and send him away from the capital as the Governor of 
Sivas on July 9, 1618.49 
Hasan Beyzâde also claims that Osman II considered Esad Efendi as one of the 
influential actors who made the enthronement of Mustafa I possible. Hence the 
sultan restricted Esad Efendi’s authority in the appointments of the ulema hierarchy, 
leaving only the (fetva) authority to the Mufti in place. Meanwhile, Osman II 
empowered his royal tutor, Hace Ömer Efendi, by giving him the authority to decide 
on the appointments concerning the top-levels of the ulema hierarchy in July 1618.50 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
46 Furthermore, el-Hac Mustafa Agha had his client Cafer Agha appointed to the governorship of 
Egypt for his support in the succession of Osman II, see Tezcan, “Searching for Osman,” pp. 171-172.  
47 DIA, s.v. “Halil Paşa, Kayserili,” by Alexander de Groot, pp. 324-326; and Mehmed bin Mehmed, 
II, pp. 44-46. 
48 Hasan Beyzâde, III, pp. 922-925 and İsmail Hami Danişmend, İzahlı Osmanlı Tarihi Kronolojisi, 6 
vols. (Istanbul: Türkiye Yayınevi, 1972), vol. III, p. 274. 
49 Hasan Beyzâde, III, pp. 922-925. 
50 Esad Efendi (1570-1625) came from one of the most powerful Ottoman ulema families in the 
sixteenth century. His father was Hoca Saadeddin Efendi, who was the royal tutor of Murad III and 
Mehmed III and one of the most powerful figures under these sultans. He created a powerful network 
of alliances both in the ulema and the Ottoman ruling elite in the capital. He married his son Esad to 
daughter of the Mufti Bostanzâde Mehmed Efendi (d. 1598). Thanks to the influential position of his 
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Osman II continued to appoint his favorite and trusted courtiers to important 
positions and tanks, while asserting his personal rule vis-à-vis all alternative foci of 
power that he deemed a threat to his sovereign will in the business of rule. With the 
help of Ömer Efendi, Osman II in effect intended to curb the power of Efendi so as 
to strengthen his sovereign authority in the business of rule.51 
Moreover, Davud Pasha was dismissed from the grand admiralty. According to 
the French Ambassador, Baron de Sancy, Davud Pasha expected to be promoted to 
the deputy grand vizierate shortly before the succession of Osman II. De Sancy 
claims that Davud Pasha had offered Ali Pasha his office of grand admiralty in return 
for 50 thousand gold coins, because he expected to be appointed as the deputy grand 
vizier.52 However, upon the dethronement of Mustafa I, Davud Pasha’s aspiration for 
a higher office came to naught; even, he lost his incumbent position as grand admiral 
upon the succession of Osman II on February 26,1618.  
As these changes in the government of Osman II had been taken place, Halil 
Pasha concluded a peace agreement with the Safavids on September 26, 1918.53 
According to the contemporary chronicler Peçevi, upon this development, the royal 
tutor of the sultan, Ömer Efendi, accused Halil Pasha of accepting some unfavorable 
terms of peace while the massive death toll of the Ottoman soldiers during the 
campaigns required different conditions. Indeed, shortly after his tutor’s complaints, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
father, Esad Efendi quickly rose in the ulema ranks and became the judge of Edirne in 1596 and the 
judge of İstanbul in 1599. He was then promoted to the chief judgeship of Rumeli when his elder 
brother Mehmed Efendi became the Mufti in 1608. In 1615, Esad Efendi became the mufti upon the 
death of his brother and kept his position until the regicide of Osman II in 1622. After the regicide, he 
resigned from his position, though, Murad IV reappointed him as the Mufti in 1624. In 1625, he died 
in the capital. For further details of his life and ilmiye career, see Tezcan, “Searching for Osman,” pp. 
116-124; Mehmed bin Mehmed, pp. 109-110; DİA, s.v, “Esad Efendi, Hocazade,” by Munir Aktepe, 
pp. 340-341. 
51 Ömer Efendi was considered one of the most powerful court figures. He began his career under the 
patronage of Mazlum Melek Ahmed Efendi, who was the royal tutor of Sultan Selim II’s sons. Upon 
the enthronement of Murad III in 1574, sons of Selim II were all executed, thus Ömer Efendi went to 
live by his patron Melek Ahmed Efendi who served as the judge of Madina between 1577 and 1580. 
Ömer Efendi returned to the capital in 1582. Afterwards, Vizier Cafer Pasha appointed him as the 
professor of his college in the district of Eyüb in Istanbul. He was then appointed as the preacher at 
the Ayasofya, In January 1609, he became the royal tutor for Ahmed I’s sons, Prince Osman and 
Prince Mehmed. Upon the succession of Osman II in 1618, he turned into a powerful royal favorite 
and functioned as one of the new sultan’s power-brokers at the court. During the rebellion of 1622, 
the he was executed. For further details, see Mehmed bin Mehmed, II, pp. 114-115; Tezcan, pp. 186-
194; and Bostanzâde, pp. 193-196. Moreover, Osman II gave his tutor’s name to his son, Prince 
Ömer. See Karaçelebizâde, p. 549. 
52 Tezcan, “Searching for Osman II,” pp. 170-171. 
53 Danişmend, İzahlı Osmanlı Tarihi Kronolojisi, III, pp. 275-276. 
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Osman II dismissed Halil Pasha and appointed Damad Mehmed Pasha as his new 
grand vizier on January 18, 1619.54  
Shortly after the elevation of Damad Mehmed Pasha to the grand vizierate, the 
newly appointed Grand Admiral Ali Pasha returned to the capital with valuable 
booties, thanks to his successful Mediterranean campaign in December 1619. He 
captured from Venetian and French ships valuable goods and presented them as gifts 
to the sultan as the Ottoman custom dictated. However, according to Hasan Beyzâde, 
Damad Mehmed Pasha was envious of Ali Pasha’s success and accused Ali Pasha of 
hiding a large portion of the booty to himself, while donating only ten percent of it to 
the sultan. Moreover, the new grand vizier complained to the sultan about the booty 
that Ali Pasha did not take away from the enemies, but from the friends of the 
Ottoman Empire such as Venice and France. Furthermore, Damad Mehmed Pasha 
incited the ambassadors of these countries to make an official complaint before the 
sultan. Hasan Beyzâde notes that, in Ali Pasha’s view, Damad Mehmed Pasha 
simply wanted his own share of the booty. Hence, Ali Pasha tried to silence the new 
grand vizier by giving him a share of the booty.55 In the meantime, Ali Pasha secretly 
continued to send regular donations to Osman II.56  
Shortly afterwards, the Grand Admiral Ali Pasha rose to the grand vizierate on 
January 24, 1619. Hasan Beyzâde claims that presenting valuable gifts and money 
impressed Osman II helping Ali Pasha to become the sultan’s favorite minister. 
Tezcan claims that the appointment of Ali Pasha as the new grand vizier could be 
related to his fiscal efforts to fund the imperial treasury. Overall, it is clear that 
Osman II trusted him in dealing with the fiscal problems which had deepened due to 
the recent wars against the Safavids. Moreover, Tezcan notes that el-Hac Mustafa 
Agha and Hace Ömer Efendi played a crucial role in Ali Pasha’s appointment to the 
grand vizierate. Yet, according to the French ambassador Cesy, Ali Pasha’s 
promotion was more of an issue linked to a potential war with Poland.57 
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54 Peçevi, II, p. 381; and Hasan Beyzâde, III, pp. 922-923. For the terms of the peace in question, see 
Danişmend, İzahlı Osmanlı Tarihi Kronolojisi, III, pp. 275-276. 
55 Hasan Beyzâde, III, pp. 923-924; Peçevi, II, pp. 381-382; and Danişmend, İzahlı Osmanlı Tarihi 
Kronolojisi, III,  pp. 276-277. 
56 Naîmâ, II. p. 450. 
57 Tezcan, “Searching for Osman,” pp. 197-198. 
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Upon his appointment as grand vizier, Ali Pasha immediately moved against his 
rival Damad Mehmed Pasha for his previous accusations on the share of the 
campaign booty. Ali Pasha demanded a lump-sum donation from Damad Mehmed 
Pasha in order to get the governorship of Aleppo, a highly lucrative position in the 
provincial administration. This appointment of Mehmed Pasha took place at the end 
of January 1619, but it actually meant for Ali Pasha the removal of a powerful rival 
from Istanbul.58 The ‘exile’ of Damad Mehmed Pasha in this way was only a 
preview of ruling style of the new Grand Vizier Ali Pasha in the coming years. 
 
1.3 Partition of the Court Faction of Osman II: Rising of Ali Pasha with the 
Unrivaled Power 
 
Ali Pasha’s grand vizierate started a new era under Osman II. At the very 
beginning of his reign, Osman II had found himself within a court divided by 
factions and an imperial government functioning on complex networks of political 
patronage. The sultan was thus only one of the contenders for power in this faction-
ridden political environement. Yet, soon, Osman II managed to exert his sovereign 
will and establish a more personal rule through the agency of his royal favorites, 
such as el-Hac Mustafa Agha, Ali Pasha and Ömer Efendi. Yet, empowering new 
favorites and their networks of clients in the business of rule enabled such figures to 
attain much more power within the imperial court. As a consequence, the imperial 
court was further polarized as tensions between different factions increased over 
time. Particularly, Mustafa Agha and Ömer Efendi began to function as power-
brokers in the government of Ali Pasha. These favorites in short time began to 
restrain the power of the grand vizier. In response, Ali Pasha worked to eliminate the 
chief favorites of the sultan through ardently advocating that Osman II should rule 
alone. The sultan, in turn, allowed Ali Pasha to send his rivals away from the court, 
hence allowing him to consolidate an unrivalled political power as a minister-
favorite, while Osman II consolidated his sultanate.59  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
58 Hasan Beyzâde, III, pp. 923-925; Peçevi, II, pp. 381-383; and Naîmâ, II, p. 450.  
59 For a discussion of the minister-favorites in early modern Ottoman imperial court, see Börekçi, 
“Factions and Favorites,” pp. 199-234. For a discussion of European minister-favorites, see Antonio 
Feros, Kingship and Favoritism in the Spain of Philip III, 1598-1621 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2000), pp. 27-47; and Ian A. A. Thompson, “The Institutional Background to the 
Rise of the Minister-Favorite,” in Elliott and Brockliss, eds., The World of the Favourite, pp. 13-25.   
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According to the Venetian bailo Nani, in early July 1618, el-Hac Mustafa Agha 
and Hace Ömer Efendi quarreled in the presence of Osman II about the dismissal of 
the chief gardener of Edirne by the son of Hace Ömer Efendi, Abdullah Efendi, the 
Judge of Edirne. El-Hac Mustafa Agha vehemently opposed to the dismissal of the 
chief gardener of Edirne for he was one of his clients. When the sultan asked the 
reason for the quarrel, el-Hac Mustafa Agha was so much frustrated at Hace Ömer 
Efendi that he suddently left the presence of Osman II without asking any 
permission. Hace Ömer Efendi took advantage of this rude behavior of Mustafa 
Agha and immediately provoked the sultan to dismiss him. He incited Osman II by 
saying that his very powerful chief eunuch was actually very powerful to cause a 
disaster for his sultanate, chiefly because Mustafa Agha had a close relation with 
Kösem Mahpeyker Sultan, the mother of Prince Mehmed, whose age was old enough 
to be enthroned. This veiled accusation apparently convinced Osman II as he 
dismissed Mustafa Agha and then exiled him to Egypt. Mustafa Agha’s wealth was 
also confiscated on July 14, 1620.60  
 The removal of Mustafa Agha from the court and Istanbul no doubt benefited 
Ali Pasha for he was getting increasingly troubled by the power of the chief eunuch. 
Moreover, Ali Pasha also dismissed one of the clients of Mustafa Agha, Dilaver 
Pasha, the Governor of Diyarbakır, for he considered him a potential threat. In fact, 
Ali Pasha’s concern was quite true, because Dilaver Pasha was appointed as the 
grand vizier in the last days of the Polish campaign in August 1621.61 
Ali Pasha continued to eliminate such potential rivals and any opponent voices 
against his vizierate. According to the chronicler Peçevi, for instance, Ali Pasha sent 
Baki Pasha to the dungeon at Yedikule and confiscated all of his wealth simply 
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60 ASVe, Senato, Archivio Proprio Costantinopoli (SAPC), Registro 16, no. 140 (dated July 14, 1620), 
fol.inpage. See also Giustinian, Relazione, p. 600: “Nel bel principio del mio bailaggio, Ali primo 
visir per posseder solo la volontà di sultan Osman, et tirar ogni cosa a sé, lo indusse a levarsi 
dattorno il vecchio chislaragassì et il coza, di grande auttorità, nella sua tenera età, con quel re, il 
quale poi nella maggior divenuto altiero et pertinace, credeva a sé solo, et poco ascoltava alcuno…” 
For details, see Erol Kılıç, and Çevik Mümin, ed., Büyük Osmanlı Tarihi, 10 vols (İstanbul: Üçdal 
Neşriyat, 1992), vol.VIII, p. 198 [hereafter Hammer, I-II-III-IV-V-VI-VII-VIII-IX-X]. I can verify 
this event in Hammer’s reference on the Bailo Nani’s rubricario, original dispaccio was demolished, 
instead of it, I can use proprio in order to read all story. On the other hand, Prince Mehmed was the 
son of Kösem as opposed to the established historiography which still lacks this important attribution 
first noted by Tezcan, see Tezcan, “The Debut of Kösem Sultan’s Political Career,” Turcica 40 
(2008), p. 94; idem, “Searching for Osman,” pp. 351-358. 
61 ASVe, Senato, SAPC, Registro 16, no. 140 (dated July 14, 1620), fol.inpage. 
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because Baki Pasha did not agree with the grand vizier’s fiscal policies.62  Moreover, 
Naîmâ claims that Ali Pasha used to take large amount of money from the dismissed 
statesmen and other grandees in the imperial and provincial administration, but he 
never forgot sharing his wealth with the sultan.63 Ali Pasha utilized remarkably the 
economic tools such as confiscation and donations so as to maintain the sultan’s 
favor and eliminate his rivals at the court of Osman II.  
In this context, Ali Pasha’s final critical move was the dismissal of Hace Ömer 
Efendi. The Venetian bailo Nani claims that the reason behind this dismissal was 
Hace Ömer Efendi’s eagerness to launch a military campaign against Poland. Unlike 
the sultan’s tutor, Ali Pasha approached this idea cautiously. According to the 
Venetian bailo, Ali Pasha considered that Hace Ömer Efendi could easily influence 
the sultan as seen in the dismissal of Mustafa Agha. Similarly, he could possibly 
induce to the sultan to launch a military campaign against Poland.64 However, the 
relevant scholarly literature portrays Ali Pasha as having a warlike stance. For 
instance, Tezcan refers to the French Ambassador Cesy in that the appointment of 
Ali Pasha as grand vizier was related to a potential war with Poland.65According to 
the bailo, though, Ali Pasha was not keen on declaring war against Poland. He 
instead provided every single reason for avoiding a war with Poland. He was thus 
troubled with Hace Ömer Efendi’s warlike tendency and his intervention to the 
imperial affairs, and then he played an important role on his dismissal.66  
Yet, according to the chronicler Tûgī, the dismissed el-Hac Mustafa Agha gave a 
letter of Hace Ömer Efendi to his successor Chief Eunuch Süleyman Agha. In the 
letter, Hace Ömer Efendi spoke ill of Osman II during the enthronement of Mustafa 
I. According to Tûgī, Süleyman Agha delivered the letter to Osman II. After reading !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
62 Peçevi, II, p. 381; Hammer, VIII, pp. 188-189; and Tezcan, “Searching for Osman,” p. 8. 
63 Naîmâ, p. 451; Hammer, VIII, pp. 188-189; and Tezcan, “Searching for Osman,” p. 8.  
64ASVe, SPAC, Registro 17, no. 147 (dated August 22, 1620), fol. 14r: “segui la desmission del Coza 
molto mal affetto a Vostra Serenità et nella causa de Bossinesi tutto contrario, ma piaccia a Dio che 
la sua caduta non sia in maggior stabilimento del Vesir il qual hora restando solo, et assoluto, et 
senza alcun emulo piglierà tanto più ardire et quel che grandemente importa il Cozza voleva la 
guerra di Polonia per ogni modo, et il Vesir la contraria quanto può, onde mentre la cosa sta in 
questa pendenza, è gran prudenza andar destreggiando seco per non dar occazione al suo pessimo 
animo, et a quei evitamenti, che in un Re giovane, et come si vede di presta, et prima impressione 
ponno far colpo.”  
65 Tezcan, “Searching for Osman,” p. 197. 
66 ASVe, SPAC, Registro 17, no. 147 (dated August 22, 1620), fol. 14r. The Bailo Nani and Giorgio 
Giustinian began to write dispaccio together, with advent of Giorgio Giustinian on August 22, 1620. 
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the letter, Osman II decided to dismiss his tutor.67 However, we can assume that as 
being Mustafa Agha’s court creature, Ali Pasha could have persuaded Süleyman 
Agha to deliver letter to the sultan. In any event, Osman II also dismissed Hace 
Ömer Efendi and ordered his exile to Mecca on August 15, 1620.68  
The Venetian bailo claims that, after these dismissals, Ali Pasha reached the 
zenith of his power as grand vizier and in running the imperial affairs. However, as 
Ali Pasha tried to eliminate all power-brokers and his political rivals in the imperial 
government, he needed to establish new alliances to substitute old ones. For 
example, after the dismissal of Hace Ömer Efendi, the charge for the appointments 
of the top-level appointments in the ulema hierarchy was reassigned to the Mufti, 
Esad Efendi. The Venetian bailo Giorgio Giustinian notes that Esad Efendi was 
assuming more power over Osman II and Ali Pasha at this time. Both the sultan and 
his grand vizier did not take any action without first seeking the Mufti’s advice 
concerning any significant government affair.69 As a matter of fact, Ali Pasha might 
have accepted the rising power of Esad Efendi, because, as the Venetian bailo 
claims, Esad Efendi did not intervene in the imperial affairs as much as Hace Ömer 
Efendi. 70  Moreover, according to the bailo, Ali Pasha dismissed the grand 
chancellor, Nişancı, a client of Hace Ömer Efendi, for he ill-spoke about Ali Pasha in 
relation to the dismissal of his powerful patron Ömer Efendi. Instead of Hace Ömer 
Efendi’s client, Ali Pasha appointed one of his own clients to the office of grand 
chancellorship upon taking with 20.000 gold coins for this promotion.71 Hence, 
according to the bailo, Ali Pasha held all the power in the government while every 
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67 Tûgī, Musîbetnâme, pp. 116-117. 
68 ASVe, SPAC, Registro 17, no. 146 (dated August 22, 1620), fol. 486v:“Nel medesimo giorno che 
l’Eccessimo signore Giustiaino fece la sua entrata più privatamente, che fu a 15 del presente fu 
deposto l’Hogia del Re.” According to the bailo, Ömer Hace did not leave the capital city. He 
mentioned his old age as an excuse for such a challenging sea or land voyage to Mecca. See ASVe, 
SPAC, Registro 17, no. 150 (dated September 24, 1620), fol. 26r. 
69 ASVe, SDC, filza 90, no. 11 (dated December 26, 1620), fol. 228v: “crescendo ogni giorno piu 
l’autorità col Re, et col Vesir et non si potendo senza il suo assenso, o intervento risolvere cosa 
alcuna importante.” 
70 ASVe, SDC, filza 90, no. 15 (dated January 15, 1621, m.v.), fol. 274v: “viveva con non poco 
travaglio d’animo, poiche il Mufti non s’ingerisce fuori del suo carico, se non viene ricercato, et 
quelli dentro del Seraglio tutti dipendono da esso Vesir nella sola potestà del quale consiste tutto 
questo governo.” 
71 ASVe, SPAC, Registro 17, no. 149 (dated September 9,1620), fol. 20v.  
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political figure at the sultan’s court now depended on his discretion.72  
According to the Venetian bailo Giustinian, Ali Pasha knew the tight-fisted and 
ambitious nature of Osman II very well. The bailo notes that Ali Pasha never failed 
to present large sums of money to the sultan every two weeks, delivering Osman II 
half of the income that he received from bribes and confiscation.73 For instance, Ali 
Pasha donated the sultan numerous gifts in relation to the Ramadan Festivities in 
1620. According to the bailo’s count, he presented the sultan 17 horses, 18 beautiful 
slave girls, and 46 bundles of garment, various types of fruits, 40.000 gold coins, 30 
gold-gilded clocks and 10.000 new coins, all of which made Ali Pasha maintain the 
royal favor of Osman II. 74   
  However, it was not easy to deal with ambitious nature of Osman II who 
wanted to personally lead an imperial campaign against the Polish Commonwealth. 
Ali Pasha could not divert his sultan’s eagerness on the idea of a campaign. While 
shattering his hopes, the news of upcoming envoy of Poland for the peace talks 
gratified Ali Pasha. He might have considered the upcoming envoy as a last resort, 
because Ali Pasha detested launching an imperial military campaign against 
Poland.75 The Venetian bailo Giustinian claims that the underlying reason behind the 
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72 ASVe, SDC, filza 90, no. 15 (dated January 15, 1621, m.v.), fol. 274v: “viveva con non poco 
travaglio d’animo, poiche il Mufti non s’ingerisce fuori del suo carico, se non viene ricercato, et 
quelli dentro del Seraglio tutti dipendono da esso Vesir nella sola potestà del quale consiste tutto 
questo governo.” 
73 ASVe, SDC, filza 90, no. 1 (dated september 10, 1620), fol. 80r: ”cosi manifeste sono l’estorsioni et 
le tirranie di quest’huomo (ali pasha) che ogni ragion vorria che non dovesse durare se ben egli 
astutissimo conoscendo la natura del re molto avara et avida al danaro talle a tutti per presentar a lui 
solo col qual solo mezo si come s’è sin hora mantenuto cosi s’assicura di mantenersi per lungo tempo 
havendo anco per tal effetto usato tanta perfidia che ha fatto cacciar et depuner il chislar agassi et il 
coza auttori et protettori della sua grandezza rimeritandoli di questo modo et perche restando hora 
come resta nell’auttorità et assoluto commando solissimo tutto l’oro che veniva compartito negl’altri 
col asse in lui solo che donato poi da lui al re viene ad assicurarsi di continuar del presente suo 
assoluto commando.” In fact, the bailo accused Ali Pasha of being a tyrant should be looked as a 
political trope, which comes from bailo’s own worldviews. This criticism of Ottoman politics and 
society is conditioned by their own preoccupations, see Lucette Valensi, The Birth of the Despot: 
Venice and the Sublime Porte (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993). However, in the case of 
Osman II, the bailo frequently exemplifies his accusations to the sultan of being “thight-fisted nature 
and ambitious nature” as will be seen in the following parts. 
74 ASVe, SPAC, Registro 17, no. 149 (dated September 9,1620), fol. 19r. 
75 ASVe, SAPC, Registro 17, no. 148 (dated August 29, 1620), fol. 15r: “Per opera del Vesir presente 
qual come anco vien detto è stato causa della depositione del Coza, per non voler compagnia nel 
commando, onde sempre piu l’autorittà sua si fa maggiore. é capitato aviso che di Polonia venghi a 
questa porta un ambasciator grande con ogni maggior autorità per mantener la pace poiche l’altro 
ché partito non è venuto qui per altro, che per portar la ratificatione d’un capito lo della pace già 
seguita. Questa nova ha dato gran contento al primo vesir, sperando con la venuta di detto 
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opposition of Ali Pasha to the war was his lack of experience on any ground of war. 
Osman II was fixated to lead the imperial army in person.76 The Venetian bailo 
purports that Osman II actually thought of dismissing the Grand Vizier Ali Pasha on 
the grounds of his inexperience in military affairs and that the Grand Admiral Halil 
Pasha might be the best candidate for the grand vizierate. In order to support his 
presumption, the bailo claims that Osman II sent an order to Halil Pasha to return 
immediately to the capital. However, Ali Pasha continued sending large sums of 
money to the sultan, which helped Osman II ignore Ali Pasha’s inexperience at the 
dawn of the Poland campaign.77 According to Tezcan, Osman II also considered that 
the funding of an imperial campaign was more important than leading the army in 
person. 78 For this possible consideration, he might have decided to keep Ali Pasha in 
his office for a while. 
While Ali Pasha was enjoying his unrivalled position in the government, a fiscal 
crisis erupted in the capital. As will be discussed in the next chapter, a famine broke 
out in Istanbul on the eve of the campaign against Poland, which coincided with the 
cash shortage in the imperial treasury. This crisis brought the end of Ali Pasha as he 
was further and further dragged into the troubles pertaining to the monthly payments 
of the Janissaries, the sipahis and rest of the soldiers in the Ottoman imperial army, 
preparing for the upcoming campaign against Poland. According to the Venetian 
bailo, the sultan’s tight-fisted nature accustomed not to spend but to collect from his 
grand vizier. On Wednesday January 24, 1621, Ali Pasha reported the payment crisis 
to Osman II in the Arz Odası (the sultan’s chamber of petition) in the Topkapı 
Palace, but the sultan did not reply him. The sultan did not even grant a robe to Ali 
Pasha to show his favor to the grand vizier as usual occasions. It was a clear sign of 
the sultan’s displeasure with Ali Pasha for the payment crisis. According to the bailo, 
Ali Pasha feared for his own life because the sultan started to kill with the fratricide 
of Prince Mehmed on January 15,1621, as will be further discussed below. For the 
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ambasciator fuggir l’occazione d’andar in persona alla guerra di Polonia da lui grandemente 
abborita.”  
76 ASVe, SDC, filza 90, no. 5 (dated October 22, 1620), fols. 123r-124v. 
77 Ibid., fol. 124v.  
78 Tezcan, “Searching for Osman,” p. 198. 
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fear of being killed, insomuch as Ali Pasha visited several shrines of saints in the 
capital for praying to procure a help to his soul against his death risky trouble 79 !
The following day, Ali Pasha once again submitted to Osman II. This time, the 
sultan informed Ali Pasha to subsidize the military payments with 120.000 gold 
coins that were to be derived soon from Aleppo.80 A few days later, Osman II 
summoned Ali Pasha at the palace gardens and invested him a robe with some words 
of praise, which was a sign of his royal pleasure. Osman II also ordered 120.000 gold 
coins to be delievered from his personal treasury to the grand vizier so as to thwart a 
potential military uprising due to the remaining unpaid payrolls of the soldiers.81 
However, according to the bailo, the payment crisis did not end with the sultan’s 
subsidy. The treasury needed an extra 400.000 gold coins to pay the Janissaries, let 
alone the sipahis and ordinary soldiers. Due to Ali Pasha’s absence in the last two 
meetings of the imperial council, a rumor was spread that Ali Pasha pretended to be 
sick so as to escape the wrath of the sultan. His dismissal was murmured in the 
imperial court. Many expected that Halil Pasha would be promoted to the grand 
vizierate.82 However, Osman II continued to favor Ali Pasha.83  
The reason why Osman II did not dismiss Ali Pasha might be related to the 
sultan’s aggressive fiscal policy.84 As the Venetian bailo Giustinian reports, the 
sultan was “tight-fisted by nature and used to not spend but to collect from the Grand 
Vizier Ali Pasha.” 85 Osman II took his grand vizier’s efforts in financial matters as a 
priority, because Ali Pasha could still provide the sultan large sums of cash while 
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79 ASVe, SDC, filza 90, no. 17 (dated January 26, 1621, m.v.), 293r-294v.  
80 Ibid., fol. 294v. Moreover after the death risky trouble, the Grand Vizier Ali Pasha donated 
sacrificed cow and visiting holy shrines of the capital, see ibid., fol.294v. 
81 ASVe, SDC, filza 90, no. 20 (dated February 9, 1621, m.v.), fol. 325r:. 
82 ASVe, SDC, filza 90, no. 24 (dated February 25, 1621, m.v.), fol. 361r. 
83 Moreover, according to this report when the Grand Vizier Ali Pasha was a sick, the sultan sent his 
personal doctors to him with a two bottle of sherbet and saying a lots of appraising words, see ASVe, 
SDC, filza 90, no. 20 (dated February 9, 1621, m.v.), fol. 325r.  
84 Tezcan claims that the Grand Vizier Ali Pasha pursued of the aggressive fiscal policy in the empire, 
but I contend that he was most ardent implementer of aggressive fiscal policy of Osman II, because 
the aggressive fiscal policy came from the tight-fisted nature of Osman II, who continued the policy 
after the death of the Grand Vizier Ali Pasha, even the aggressive fiscal policy crystallized during the 
war of Poland under Osman II, see Tezcan, The Second Ottoman Empire, pp. 133-134. 
85 ASVe, SDC, filza 90, no. 17 (dated February 9, 1621, m.v.), fol. 293r: “che gli fosse porta al Re 
avaro per natura, et avezzo dal medesimo vesir a non spender, ma a incassar.” 
! 30!
Halil Pasha could not. 86 Accordingly, I would argue that Ali Pasha had a certain 
impact on the tight-fisted nature of Osman II who continued to pursue an aggressive 
fiscal policy. An account by the Venetian bailo is further revealing in this respect: 
It should be noted that Osman II would continue such an aggressive fiscal policy 
after the death of Ali Pasha on March 9, 1621. The sultan was to appoint Hüseyin 
Pasha as his next grand vizier who would approach the financial problems like the 
deceased Ali Pasha used to do. Indeed, as the Venetian bailo observed, Hüseyin 
Pasha promised the sultan to donate him frequently.87 On the other hand, the 
Venetian bailo claims that the sultan expected the rest of the members of his imperial 
government to donate him as much as they could. Accordingly, they ranged always 
in spending money for the sultan; otherwise, Osman II could doubt them whether 
they were stealing money from him.88 While asserting his sovereign will in this way 
and on such an important problem, the sultan’s aggressive fiscal policy hung like a 
sword of Damocles over not only the members of the imperial government, but also 
to the capital: 
They do not find an asper [akçe] not because of the extraordinary scarcity 
of money, now runs here, but it is caused by the great avarice of the 
sultan. He collects all money, and does not to give anything out. There 
may have left much less to the sultan for the war.89  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
86 ASVe, SDC, filza 90, no. 24 (dated February 25, 1621, m.v.), fols. 362r-363v. 
87 ASVe, SPAC, Registro 18/III, no. 25 (dated March 9, 1621), fol. 39v: “Cussain ha fatto ogni sforzo 
per ottenerlo, credendosi che habbi promeso al Re di seguitar il medessimo stile d’Ali nel presentarlo, 
et che non potendo in altra maniera, et essendo povero sia per mangiar et espilar come l’altro 
quant’è di buono che egli partira presto la guerra.” In fact, as if Ali pasha did not die, he would 
highly possible continue his office. Moreover, Osman II cried for him, he was grateful to his late Ali 
Pasha see, Ibid., fol. 37r: “Questa mattina Ali Primo Vesir é morto da retention di orina dalla quale 
da pochi giorni in qua com’avissasimo, si trovava aggravato et si puo dir con gusto d’ogni uno fuori 
che del Re, il qual ha pianto la sua morte, et nell’infermità ha mostrato verso di lui segni di 
benevolenza grande, non havendo mai tutto che le provisioni della guerra, et tutt’i negotij patissero 
molto, voluto far in suo loco, concessogli gratia di far testamente et molti altre favori, tutti segni che 
se la morte non lo levava dal carico era per continuarci gran tempo.” 
88 ASVe, SDC, filza 90, no. 24 (dated February 25, 1621, m.v.), fol. 362v: “essendo il Re gravido 
della detta mossa, et impetuoso, dubita il Bassa, che vedendo il mancamento si sfoghi contro di esso, 
onde ha proposto a Calil di cambiar il primo vesirato col capitaneato del mare, ma quello huomo 
vecchio, et savio non gli ha dato orechie, et veramente il Vesir ha usato tanto male il Re, col 
presentarlo spessimo di grosse somme di danari, espilate da questo, et da quel che par non si trovi chi 
ambisca piu tal carico conoscendo non poter sodisfar a Sua Maesta col far il medessimo, ne meno 
esso lo puo piu far perché tutti temendo della sua ingordigia, vanno nel spender, et in tutto cose molto 
ristretti, dubitando d’esser da lui espilati, da che anco in gran parte nasce la strettezza del negozio et 
del danaro, la maggior che da gran tempo in sia più stata.” 
89 ASVe, SPAC, Registro 18/IV, no. 29 (dated April 6, 1621), fols. 7r-8v: “non trovano un aspro, non 
essendosi per l’estraordinaria strettezza di danaro, che hora qui regna, causata dalla gran avarizia 
del Re, che l’incassa tutto, et non ne da fuori niente, delli detti effetti alcun spazzo, et molto meno vi 
sarà partita che sia la Maesta Sua per la guerra.” 
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In the meantime, severe winter conditions plagued the capital, increasing the 
price of the foodstuffs in the market and creating further financial problems. For 
instance, the Venetian bailo notes that there had been an extraordinary scarcity of all 
goods and money at the market in the capital for a long time.90 The sultan’s 
aggressiveness in fiscal matters was not beginning to show its impact. Hence, Osman 
II tried to limit the governmental expenses while increasing the income in imperial 
treasury by pursuing the aggressive fiscal policy as discussed in detail previously.  
Severe fiscal troubles were not seen for the first time under Osman II. Since the 
1580s, the Ottoman economy had been experiencing serious monetary problems, 
thus the devaluation of the akçe, the main currency, became almost a norm.91  
Between November 1617 and February 1618, the imperial treasury faced even 
heavier burdens due to the accession donations of Mustafa I and Osman II that paid 
to the Janissaries and the sipahis within three months.92 Shortly after the succession !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
90 ASVe, SDC, filza 90, no. 24 (dated February 25, 1621, m.v.), fol. 362v:“da che anco in gran parte 
nasce la strettezza del negozio et del danaro, la maggior che da gran tempo in sia più stata.”  
91 In the years of the fluctuations of the currency, the imperial government faced the problem of the 
ratio of silver content in the defective and substandard coins because the imperial government had 
serious difficulties with the defective coins against the stable Venetian ducat and other European coins 
at the market exchange rates. Daily and monthly changeable exchange rates led the ratio of silver 
content into the extreme fluctuations of currency. In the year of 1623-1624, the silver content of the 
akçe was to be devalued almost one third, less than two decades later, 1638-1640, it was to be debased 
about half of its content. However, the frequent fluctuations of the currency brought the deterioration 
of the content silver of akçe to the exchange markets. For that reason, the imperial government 
applied the system of the tashih-i sikke (correction of coinage) by returning to the old standard or 
installing a new standard to the exchange market. The government was to resort to the tashih-i sikke in 
years of 1600, 1618, 1624 and 1640, see Pamuk, Monetary History, pp. 138-140. Also see Tezcan, 
“The Monetary Crisis of 1585,” pp. 30-83. 
92  According to Hammer, within 6 months 6 million gold were spent due to the frequent 
enthronements, see Hammer, VIII, p. 180. Beyzâde, III, p. 922. On the other hand, the debasements 
and fiscal troubles coincided with the sıvış or leaps year of the treasury, which was related to the 
timing of the Ottoman fiscal system. In this system, the imperial government collected revenues from 
variety of taxes such as agricultural sources and tax-farms based on the solar calendar, however it 
used to pay the payrolls of the soldiers based on the Islamic lunar calendar as four times in a lunar 
year. But, the solar calendar was 11 longer than Islamic lunar calendar. So then, once every 34 years 
Islamic calendar leapt a year as called sıvış year in fiscal system. A year of the solar started in March. 
The imperial government took revenue twice in March and in August. It skipped one more year, for 
instance every following 7 or 8 years, the treasury had to pay once more time, in other words every 7 
or 8 years imperial treasury had to pay five times due to the leap year. The first payment of I.C 1064 
had to pay in the year of 1063 (1654) before the arrival of the revenue of 1064. The expenditures were 
to start in 1070 six months early, in 1079 nine months early, in 1087 almost a year early before the 
arrival of the their revenues. These meant that the following 7-8 years after the leap year of the 
imperial treasury, the imperial government had to two methods: the first method was to delay the 
payments for 3 months in the first payment, then 6 months for the second payment, after then for 9 
months in the third payment, finally for 12 months in the fourth payment. See Halil Sahillioğlu, “Sıvış 
Year Crises in the Ottoman Empire,'' in M. A. Cook (ed.), Studies in the Economic History of the 
Middle East (London: Oxford University Press, 1970), pp. 230-249. 
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of Osman II, the imperial government resorted to debase the value of the silver 
content in coins on December 19, 1618. The new standard coins began to circulate in 
the markets. For a while, the imperial government suspended circulation of the old 
standard coins, however it was one of the reasons for the scarcity of money in the 
markets. Later on, the imperial government allowed the circulation of the old 
standard coins in the markets.93 Yet, the aggressive fiscal policy of the sultan, the 
famine, severe climatic weather and expenditures of the Polish campaign maximized 
fiscal troubles, which were like fiscal time bombs for the imperial treasury.  
 
1.4 Osman II Asserting His Sovereign Authority vis-à-vis Alternative Foci of 
Power 
 
On Wednesday, January 10, 1621, Osman II suddenly returned to his palace from 
Davutpaşa, one of the royal hunting grounds and a military halting-station (menzil) in 
Rumeli. He was supposed to come back a week later.94 On the following day, Prince 
Mehmed, the son of Kösem Mahpeyker Sultan, the favorite concubine of Ahmed I, 
was strangled in the imperial harem.95 The Venetian bailo notes that this fratricide 
came quite unexpectedly:  
Yesterday, the sultan ordered to strangle his brother Mehmed, whose age 
was little different from the sultan. He was buried in the new mosque 
[Sultan Ahmed Mosque] with accompanying viziers and also the Mufti 
[Esad Efendi]. Three other brothers have been left. The eldest did not 
arrive 8 years old. This occasion has been very unexpected. No one 
knows whether it came from the sole resolution of the sultan or advice of 
others, but as it is, it is an evident sign that the sultan must go to the 
war.96 
The sudden execution of Prince Mehmed represents a visible change in Osman 
II’s assertive attitudes. According to Hasan Beyzâde, Osman II asked the Mufti Esad 
Efendi for an affirmative legal opinion to execute his brother. However, Esad Efendi !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
93 Naîmâ, II, p. 448. 
94ASVe, SDC, filza 90, no.14 (dated January 12, 1621, m.v.), fol. 261r. 
95 Tezcan, “Debut Kösem,” p. 94. The Venetian bailo corrected the age of the princes, see ASVe, 
SDC, filza 90, no. 15 (dated January 12, 1621, m.v.), fol. 271r: “..era di età poco differente da quella 
di Sua Maestà   essendo restati 3 altri   fratelli, il maggior de quali non arriva a 8 anni.” 
96 ASVe, SDC, filza 90, no. 15 (dated January 12, 1621, m.v.), fol. 271r: “Il Re hieri fece strangolare 
Mehemet suo fratello, et fu sepolto nella Moschea nova accompagnato dalli Vesiri, et dal Mufti 
ancora, era di età poco differente da quella di Sua Maestà essendo restati 3 altri fratelli, il maggior 
de quali non arriva a 8 anni. Questo successo è stato molto improviso, ne si sa per ancora se 
provenghi da sola risolutione del Re, o per consiglio di altri, ma come si sia questo è segno evidente, 
che il Gran Signore debba andarsene alla guerra.” 
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refused to issue legal opinion. The Chief Judge of Rumeli Kemaleddin Efendi 
instead affirmed the execution of the prince.97  
The bailo Giustinian claims that Kemaleddin Efendi gave 6.000 gold coins in 
order to be appointed as the chief judge of Rumeli. Yet the Venetian bailo was 
surprised because he expected Hüseyin Efendi to be appointed to the position. The 
bailo further asserts that it might be related that Hüseyin Efendi did not spend 
enough money like Kemaleddin Efendi.98 However, his appointment was evidently 
linked to the execution of Prince Mehmed. Kemaleddin Efendi most probably 
promised to confirm the execution if he was appointed as the chief judge of Rumeli. 
 On the other hand, Tûgī asserts that the new Chief Eunuch of the Imperial 
Harem, Süleyman Agha, together with Hace Ömer Efendi, provoked the sultan to kill 
his brother.99 However, Hace Ömer Efendi was in exile during the fratricide of 
Prince Mehmed on January 11, 1621. He was to return from his exile two weeks 
later, on the fratricide on January 24, 1621. The Venetian bailo asserts that Osman II 
executed his brother so as to show his resolute to lead personally the imperial army 
against Poland. Under the light of all claims, we can assert that Osman II did not 
want to take the risk of leaving a potential rival brother for the throne in the capital 
while he was on the campaign.100 That is to say, Prince Mehmed could pose a threat 
to his sultanate at the earliest opportunity. He could be enthroned by a palace coup 
just like Osman II was brought to the throne. So, Osman II had a good reason to get 
rid of his brother in the eve of his planned campaign.  
Indeed, during the Polish campaign, a serious military uprising broke out in the 
army camp due to the delayed salary payments on November 23, 1621. In this 
uprising, a rumor was spread among the soldiers that the people of capital enthroned 
Mustafa I once again. Osman II immediately ordered all payments to be made so as 
to thwart the uprising from turning into a direct challenge to his sultanate. Indeed, if 
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97 Hasan Beyzâde p. 927; Tûgī, Musîbetnâme , p. 116; and Naîmâ, II, p. 460. 
98 Ibid., fol. 273r: “è stato deposto il Cadileschier della Grecia et fatto in suo luogo Chiemal Efendi di 
con donar 6 mille cechini al Bassa contro l’espettatione di ogn’uno che stimava dovesse riuscire 
Cussein Efendi huomo da bene et molto affetionato alla Republica ma questo non havendo da 
spender, non è stato abbracciato dal Vesir.” 
99 Tûgī, Musîbetnâme , p. 116. 
100 For details, see Tezcan, “Searching for Osman,” pp. 199-203. 
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Prince Mehmed had been not killed, his name would have most probably spread with 
the rumor.  
Osman II empowered new royal favorites such as Süleyman Agha, the chief 
eunuch of the imperial harem, and Bebr Mehmed Agha, the chief gardener, so as to 
have them act as his power-brokers among the Ottoman ruling elites. In doing so, 
Osman II in effect took precautions against the unrivalled power of Ali Pasha. Most 
particularly, on the eve of Hotin campaign, Osman II re-assigned his tutor Hace 
Ömer Efendi to the imperial court once again so as to challenge the unwillingness of 
Ali Pasha against Polish campaign. Ali Pasha tried his best to dissuade the sultan 
from his idea of personally leading the military campaign. Even, as a last resort, the 
grand vizier negotiated with Polish envoy to cancel the campaign.101 However, 
Osman II showed an obstinate refusal to the negotiations. His grand vizier’s 
unwillingness to the Polish campaign, Osman II called his tutor Hace Ömer Efendi, a 
warlike power-broker, to the Topkapı Palace. The sultan gave him a robe in order to 
indicate his renewed royal favor to his tutor on Wednesday, January 24, 1621.102 
According to The Venetian bailo, by asserting his royal tutor to the ruling body, the 
sultan aimed to persuade the imperial government for the war and keep it secure. 103 
Yet, the Venetian bailo Giustinian notes that after returning to the grace of the sultan, 
Hace Ömer Efendi would make an all-out effort to take revenge from Ali Pasha for 
he caused his dismissal back on August 14, 1620. 104  This was in fact a severe blow 
to Grand Vizier Ali Pasha. Hace Ömer Efendi could now act against him as the tutor 
regained the confidence of the sultan. He could, for instance, undermine Ali Pasha’s 
standing or get him dismissed by using his regular access to the sultan. Ali Pasha, on !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
101 ASVe, SAPC, Registro 17, no. 148 (dated August 29, 1620), fol. 15r.  
102 ASVe, SDC, filza 90, no. 20 (dated February 9, 1621, m.v.), fol. 326v-r. 
103 Ibid., fol. 326v-r : “sin hora tutto che il tempo sia molto inanzi non resta per anco pubblicità, ne 
inalborata la Coda come è solito per l’alienatione del Primo Vesir dalla detta guerra, ma essendo il 
Re tanto fisso in essa, et il Coza tornato il gratia persuadendola, si tiene per sicuro, che il vesir non 
potrà sturbarla.” 
104 ASVe, SDC, filza 90, no.17 (dated October 26 January, 1621, m.v.), fols. 294v-295r: “quanto il Re 
l’istesso giorno chiamo a se il Coza, lo accarezzo et vesti di una veste, mostrando di voler rimetterlo 
in gratia che per esser stato deposto a instigatione del Vesir, se vi ritornerà, vorrà vendicarsi, et 
procurerà quanto potrà la sua rovina et è stata buona fortuna, che questa remissione del Coza sia 
seguita doppo l’accomodamento del negozio de Bossinesi poiche se fosse stata prima non si saria 
certamente concluso coll’avantaggio et sodisfattione, che s’é fatto, essendo egli tutto per loro, io 
procurerò coi i soliti mezi guadagnarlo, et supplico Sua Serenità scrivermi la quantità, se ben sarà 
difficile, essendo per quanto intendo huomo avarissimo, incapacissimo nemico di christiani et mal 
impresso di sua serenità.” 
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the other hand, cared little about the return of Hace Ömer Efendi to the sultan’s 
favor.105 What occupied him at the time was the military campaign against Poland. 
He threw his weight behind the peace with Poland rather launching a military 
campaign against them. He might have considered that the upcoming war could be 
his ruin rather than that of Hace Ömer Efendi. 
In the meantime, Hace Ömer Efendi quickly attained his former powers and 
influence over the sultan. Osman II ordered all judges to congratulate and respect to 
his tutor Hace Ömer Efendi, which was an indication of his return to Osman II’s 
grace. Once again in royal favor, Hace Ömer Efendi lost no time in brokering for his 
clients and family members. For instance, he wanted to appoint his son Abdullah 
Efendi to the judgeship of Galata. However, some high-ranking members of the 
ulema first went to Ali Pasha instead of Hace Ömer Efendi, but Ali Pasha continued 
to concern less about the rising power of Hace Ömer Efendi in the appointments of 
the ulema.106 In the end, Abdullah Efendi was appointed as the judge of Galata.107 
On the other hand, Osman II initiated his own court faction to be led by Ömer 
Efendi, Süleyman Agha ve Bebr Mehmed Agha, whose powers were immediately 
recognized by the Venetian bailo. Shortly before Osman II inserted Hace Ömer 
Efendi into the imperial government as a power-broker, the bailo Giustinian reported 
to his senate that he had gained the friendships of the Mufti Esad Efendi and the 
Grand Admiral Halil Pasha, but he also needed to gain the favors of those inside 
palace for the interests of Venice. These people were none other than Bebr Mehmed 
Agha and Süleyman Agha. The bailo notes that Bebr Mehmed Agha and Süleyman 
Agha were the ears of the sultan, to whom the sultan had an inclination and affection. 
For this reason, the bailo suggested his senate that these two figures should be used 
to serve for the interest of the Venice so as to make a good impression on Osman II. 
Accordingly, it was possible to stop the “greediness” of Ali Pasha, who always 
demanded money from Venice. However, the bailo Giustinian admitted that the new !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
105 ASVe, SDC, filza 90, no. 20 (dated February 9, 1621, m.v.), fol. 325r: “è vero che l’haver il Re 
ritornato il Coza nella sua gratia è stato con gran colpo al Vesir, et uno cattivo segne poiché farà 
quanto potrà per vendicarsi, et farlo depor come gli ha a lui fatto, tanto piu che a Maesta Sua mostra 
molta buona volonta verso esso Coza, havendo voluto che tutti i Cadi vadino a rallegrarsi seco, et 
honorarlo come prima, et fatto suo figliolo Cadi di Galata, vanno pero il visir, et lui dissimulando 
l’ochio quanto (?).” 
106 Ibid., fol. 325r:  
107 Tûgī, Musîbetnâme , pp. 66-67. 
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favorites of the sultan had not fully established their grandeur and power. Their 
friendships might be acquired with generosity of Venice to both of them just before 
establishment of their sovereignty in imperial affairs. According to the bailo, if they 
established their power without knowing the generosity of Venice, it would be more 
expensive to gain their support for the interest of the Venice.108 All of these accounts 
by the bailo testify to the formation of a new court faction under Osman II. 
On the other side, Esad Efendi likewise recommended the bailo that he should to 
quickly gain the support of Bebr Mehmed Agha and Süleyman Agha as well as other 
servants of the sultan inside the palace, as they were similarly important advisors for 
the sultan. Since they were close to the sultan, the Mutfi noted, they could move 
away any adverse impression of the Venice in the minds of the sultan, while at the 
same time undoing any other officers in their opposition against the interests of 
Venice.109  
However, before the Polish campaign began, Ali Pasha died on Friday, March 9, 
1621.110 After the unexpected death of Ali Pasha, it became relatively easier for 
certain alternative foci of powers to increase their influence over the sultan, most 
notably, the sultan’s new royal favorites. Indeed, as the Venetian bailo observes, 
Osman II showed an extraordinary affection and trust to Bebr Mehmed Agha above 
all others. Only with Bebr Mehmed Agha, Osman II made incognito visits in the 
capital night and day. Meanwhile, Süleyman Agha emerged and began to function as 
another chief power-broker in court politics.111  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
108 ASVe, SDC, filza 90, no. 9 (dated Novembre 22, 1620), fol. 206v. 
109 ASVe, SDC, filza 90, no. 11 (dated December 26, 1620), fol. 228v:“il qual mufti mi ha di piu 
consigliato che stante la mala impressione del Re, che ho sopradetto facci ogni opera per guadagnar 
l’animo di doi, o di quei di dentro, che hanno l’orecchia et grazia di Sua Mesta come il Chislar Agasi, 
il Bustangi Bassi et qualche altro Agalar, acciò possino andargli levando la predetta mala 
impressione,opporsi alli mali uffitij d’altri, et favorir li numeri interessi” However, the new chief 
eunuch Süleyman Agha was to make a contact with the bailo in those days see ASVe, SDC, filza 90, 
no. 17 (dated December 26, 1620), fols. 293v-299r. 
110 ASVe, SPAC, Registro 18/III, no. 25 (dated March 9, 1621), fol. 37r. 
111 Before the death of Ali Pasha, the Venetian bailo could deal with him the problems of the business 
in Aleppo without having consent and will of the new Chief Eunuch of the Palace, Süleyman Agha. 
Procuring the assent of the deceased Ali Pasha had been sufficient to deal with the business problem 
in Aleppo. The Venetian bailo destined a gift to the purse of sultan, so there would no need of doing 
anything else. As it was seen at the edicts obtained by his predecessors, they did little frame of the 
terms, the business was reduced in the terms, which was seen, procuring all necessary things to gain 
Süleyman Agha and his consent. The bailo sent a robe as gift to him, but he did not want to accept it, 
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Conclusion 
 
The exisiting academic literature overwhelmingly focuses on the Polish 
campaign and its aftermath. It overlooks the changing dynamics and shifting power 
relations in the daily politics at the imperial court under Osman II before the Polish 
campaign. The Venetian bailo provides detailed information on the court politics 
under Osman II that enables us to highlight the predominantly overlooked period in 
the reign of Osman II. By utilizing hitherto unexamined archival sources of the 
Venetian bailo’s dispatches, I have tried to demonstrate how Osman II and his 
favorites assert their power in the daily politics at the imperial court. I hope that, at 
least partially I have illustrated the changing dynamics and shifting power at the 
imperial court under Osman II, covering the period of the succession of Osman II on 
February 26, 1618 to the death of Ali Pasha on March 9, 1621. 
 At the outset of his sultanate, Osman II had to rule in an imperial court divided 
by intense factionalism. Yet he soon managed to consolidate his power and authority 
vis-à-vis alternative foci of power among his ruling elite. At the beginning of his 
sultanate, his chief eunuch of the harem, Mustafa Agha, and his tutor, Hace Ömer 
Efendi, played crucial roles in advancing the sultan’s personal rule, while they 
inserted their own clients into important power positions at the court. However, such 
overwhelming influence of Mustafa Agha and Hace Ömer Efendi in turn led to more 
factionalism at the center of the Ottoman political establishment. Perhaps more 
importantly, they attempted to curb the power of new grand vizier of the sultan, Ali 
Pasha, who was the most ardent supporter of Osman II’s assertive policies. Indeed, 
as I tried to demonstrate, Ali Pasha discovered this nature of the sultan and then he 
further tried to make Osman II to adopt an aggressive fiscal policy by delivering 
Osman II half of the income that he received from bribes and confiscation so that he 
could maintain his powerful and unrivalled position at the imperial court. Ali Pasha 
thus tried to eliminate his rivals and/or any powerful figures at the imperial court, 
including Mustafa Agha, Hace Ömer Efendi and Damad Mehmed. Eventually, Ali !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
rather he preferred money in order to give his consent for it, see ASVe, SPAC, Registro 18/IV, no. 29 
(dated April 6, 1621), fol. 6r. 
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Pasha’s success in getting rid of such powerful favorites and court grandees made 
Osman II act more dominantly in the daily politics of the empire.  
 However, the sultan eagerness to lead the imperial army against Poland 
challenged the grand vizier’s intentions and political agenda. Due to his inexperience 
in actual military confrontations, Ali Pasha was very reluctant to undertake a 
campaign against Poland. He presented to the sultan every possible reason to avoid 
such a campaign.  
In response to Ali Pasha’s unwillingness to go to war, Osman II inserted his tutor 
Ömer Efendi in court politics, for he favored the idea of war. Ömer Efendi’s such 
rise as one of the favorites of the sultan challenged the standing of Ali Pasha and 
helped to sultan to diminish his influence over the business of rule. However, Osman 
II did not dismiss Ali Pasha from office, because he prioritized Ali Pasha’s fiscal 
efforts in procuring money for the Polish campaign, thus did not care much about his 
military inexperience. Nonetheless, during this period, the sultan and his government 
faced with some serious fiscal problems. For a long time, the scarcity of all goods 
and money had been prevailed in the capital. According to the dispatches written by 
the Venetian bailo Giustinian, these problems were a result of the tight-fisted nature 
of the sultan who was not accustomed to spend money, but rather used to collect it. 
On the other hand, the total expenditures of the Polish campaign were to deepen 
financial troubles of the empire in the midst of the scarcity of money and famine 
hitting the capital, problems which the next chapter will examine in details. 
 !!
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CHAPTER 2 
THE ALIENATION OF THE IMPERIAL ARMY AND COMMON PEOPLE 
AGAINST OSMAN II 
 
This chapter focuses on the daily politics under Osman II, covering the period from 
the Venetian bailo’s report on the outbreak of the extreme winter conditions on 
February 9, 1621, to the sultan’s return to his palace from the Polish campaign on 
January 9, 1622.  I claim that the provision and payment crisis of the imperial army 
must be seen as visible failures of Osman II in his management of the fiscal affairs. 
This fiscal mismanagement in turn alienated the people and imperial soldiers against 
Osman II’s sovereign authority and his imperial government. 
This chapter is divided into two parts. The first part looks into the provision crisis 
in terms of the public and military opposition against Osman II in the capital. The 
second part examines the Polish campaign that created a serious alienation among 
the imperial soldiers against Osman II in person due to his aggressive fiscal policy 
that directly affected the Janissaries and the imperial sipahis. !
2.1 A Serious Provision Crisis 
 
In 1621, Osman II and his imperial government faced a provision crisis due to 
harsh winter conditions in Istanbul and its periphery, including several weeks of 
snowfall and extremely icy winds.  During this time the Bosphorus was frozen solid, 
enabling one to walk over the ice.112 According to the Venetian bailo, the extreme 
winter conditions made the people to be stuck their home and close their workshops. 
Many dead wanderers were found at the sea and land due to the hard winter 
conditions. In those days, the palace servants found an abandoned vessel on the 
Black Sea, which its entire sailors froze to death except its helmsman.113 Under these !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
112 For details see Peçevi, II, pp. 384-385; Hasan Beyzâde, III, pp. 928-929; Kâtib Çelebi, Fezleke, p. 
651; and Naîmâ, II, p. 459.  
113 ASVe, SDC, filza 90, no. 20 (dated February 9, 1621, m.v.), fol. 330v: “Da alcuni giorni in qua 
regnano fredi con neve, et giacci tanto eccessivi, che tengono le persone sequestrate in Casa, chiuse 
le botteghe, et sospeso ogni negotio, essendosi aggiacciato questa Canale, che non v’è memoria, che 
sia piu seguito, et per quanto si dice trovati molti viandanti in mar, et in Terra morti dal fredo, si 
spera pero che habbi a servir per estinguer il mal contagioso, che andava crescendo. Siamo per senza 
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extreme weather conditions, the daily life and economic activities in the capital came 
to a halt, cutting Istanbul’s vital links with its periphery off. Even shipmen were 
frozen in their vessels. As contemporary accounts testify, the Iskender Strait in the 
north, close to the Black Sea, was also closed due to extreme winter conditions. No 
ship could enter Istanbul from the Black Sea.114 However, this was just the beginning 
of a larger crisis: the cold and ice soon triggered a severe provision crisis for the 
Ottoman imperial center.  
One of the Ottoman imperial government’s priorities was to ensure the supply of 
necessary foodstuff and goods for the capital as part of its “provisionist 
mentality.”115 According to this understanding, the goods must be ample, in high 
quality and cheap. When local demands were met, then all the remaining goods were 
transferred into other regions so as to meet the needs of the local armies and the 
imperial palace. Afterwards, a part of the surplus food was dispatched to the capital 
for the needs of guilds and residents.116 The imperial government orchestrated this 
provision system of basic foodstuff by setting a fixed price and quantity on sale 
items, while providing security during transportation and distribution of goods and 
products into the diverse parts of the empire. Supplying grain needs of the empire 
was the most essential priorities of the Ottoman provision system.117 The deltas of 
the Nile, the Danube and the Black Sea region were the primary sources for the 
imperial government particularly in grain provision. Local governments could send 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
lettere di Vostra Serenita, et le piu fresche sono de 22 Gennaio passato, et dubitiamo assai, che 
gl’huomeni, che portano le nostre per lei non perischino per il detto fredo, o almeno ritardino a 
gionger a Cattaro assai piu dell’ordinario....et li Agiamoglani del Seragglio del Gran Signore soliti 
sopratuta, un vascello di mar negro, che andava in abbandono, trovorno tutti li marinari morti di 
fredo, eccetto il timoniero, che stava per sperare, essendo nevicato, per 12 giorni contunui con furia 
grandissima de venti.” The bailo reports about the threat of plague in ASVe, SDC, filza 90, no. 15 
(dated January 12, 1621, m.v.), fol. 274r: “La peste d’alcuni gironi in qua si fa non poco sentire, et in 
questo numero vicinato si sono infettate alcune Case, ne si puo far altro che pregar il Vostra Dio, 
che, ne ci liberi da questo flagello. Di questo male il Re ne ha qualche timore, onde disegnava per 
questo rispetto di fermarsi per qualche giono ancora a Davut Bassa ma il fredo, et la Neve, ch’e 
sopragionta le ha fatto mutar proposito.”  
114 Hasan Beyzâde, III, p. 928 and Peçevi, II, pp. 383-385. 
115 For further details on the early modern Ottoman economic mentality, see Mehmet Genç¸ Osmanlı 
İmparatorluğunda Devlet ve Ekonomi (Istanbul: Ötüken, 2000), p. 69. On the provisioning of the 
Ottoman Istanbul, see Rhoads Murphey, “Provisioning Istanbul: The State and Subsistence in the 
Early Modern Middle East,” Food and Foodways 2 (1988), pp. 217-261.  
116 Genç, Devlet ve Ekonomi, p. 47. 
117 Ibid., pp. 43-52. See also Sam White, The Climate of Rebellion in the Early Modern Ottoman 
Empire, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), p. 23. 
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their surpluses in agricultural production as taxes and tributes to wherever the 
imperial government ordered. With these local food resources, the imperial 
government was able to supply the ad hoc needs of the army and/or the capital. For 
instance, Egypt annually sent foodstuffs to the imperial capital and Hejaz, where 
Islamic holy cities such as Mecca and Medina are located. Particularly, the imperial 
government used to receive thousands of tons of grain each year from this fertile 
region. However, when the Nile overflooded, it caused a big deficit in the grain 
supply for the provision of the Hejaz and the capital.118 Moreover, in the years of 
1619 and 1621-1622, Egypt was plagued with famines and epidemics.119 This 
problem in Egypt particularly deepened the breakdown of the imperial provision 
system for Istanbul under Osman II. 
However, at the dawn of the seventeenth century, the Ottoman Empire was not 
the only state to face such severe climatic troubles. The same was true for England, 
France, Central Europe, Russia, India and China. Extreme cold and droughts 
hampered agricultural activities in these regions as well. In the ensuing extreme 
climatic conditions, the famine and some epidemic diseases followed in quick 
succession. Russia, for instance, faced the “Time of Troubles” at a time when 
extreme cold triggered a severe famine in the country. The number of domestic 
migrations greatly increased due to insufficient harvest. In the meantime, European 
peoples began to suffer under the bloody battles of the Thirty Years’ War. For 
example, a considerable proportion of the German population died due to violence, 
famine and severe weather conditions that plagued the region simultenaously.120   
It should be noted that in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, harsh 
climate played a critical role in the deepening of the Ottoman political and military 
crisis of this period. The abnormal drought and cold brought the Ottoman provision 
system to a breaking point, forcing the imperial government to struggle with extreme 
famines, epidemics, peasant flights and heavy death tolls. In the face of 1590s, the 
provisioning system of the imperial government was confronted with the problem of 
the rapid increase in the population of the cities and number of soldiers in the 
imperial army, whose demands for provisions during the prolonged military !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
118 White, The Climate of Rebellion, pp. 33-34. See also Murphey, “Provisioning İstanbul,” p. 221. 
119 White, The Climate of Rebellion, p. 193. 
120 Ibid., pp. 5-8.  
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campaigns both in the Eastern and Western fronts were not sufficiently met. Yet, in 
order to meet such high levels of demand in provisions, the Ottoman imperial 
government frequently ordered the provincial governors to transfer their local 
resources to those regions troubled by food shortages as well as imposed 
extraordinary burdens over the taxpayer subjects, such as the avarız.121  
Similar to the abovementioned period of the 1590s and 1600s, the imperial 
capital suffered from a drastic shortage of provisions in the face of severe winter 
weather once more in 1621, which coincided with the preparations for the Polish 
campaign. The academic literature on the regicide of Osman II overlooks this 
particular provision crisis and the overlapping severe winter conditions. Scholars 
rather focus on the undisciplined behaviors of the imperial soldiers and Osman II’s 
criticisms against them about the failure in the siege of the fortress of Hotin, the main 
target of his Polish campaign, while pointing out to Osman II’s secret plans to recruit 
a new army to replace the existing imperial one. However, in order to properly 
understand the origins of the alienation between Osman II and his imperial soldiers 
and the people of the capital, one must investigate the aforementioned provision 
crisis and the sultan’s aggressive fiscal policy together in the first place. 
For instance, Osman II received the most direct protest regarding the incessant 
provision crisis on his route to a mosque in March 1621 in İstanbul. The Venetian 
bailo provides a rare glimpse into this provision crisis: 
The sultan went to the mosque on Friday. Some poor men showed the 
sultan his bread and its price. This was very displeasing to the sultan. He 
showed he regretted what happened with gestures and words to his Grand 
Vizier [Hüseyin Pasha]. The sultan committed the Grand Vizier to 
compensate in any way, he rides every day to the city, and does as much 
as he can, but until now Grand Vizier did it without getting result.122 
Protesting Osman II with bread revealed the true magnitude of the provision 
crisis that had been now prevailing in the capital for close to two months. The 
provisions reserved for the capital had been transferred to the Polish frontier so as to !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
121 For further details see White, The Climate of Rebellion, pp. 123-227. 
122 ASVe, SPAC, Registro 18/III, no. 27 (dated March 22, 1621), fol. 51r-v: “et terzo giorno andando 
il Gran Signore alla Moschea da alcuni poveri huome gli fu mostrato il pane, che mangiavano, et il 
suo costo, cosi che dispiacque molto a Sua Maesta, la quale se ne dolse con gesti con parole col 
primo vesir gl’era vicino, commettendogli che rimediasse ad ogni modo, egli cavalca ogni giorno a 
tal effetto per la citta, et fa gianto puo, ma sin hora senza frutto.” 
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meet the needs of the imperial army in the upcoming campaign. Hence, the amount 
of grain was drastically reduced in the capital, while the quality of the bread rapidly 
decreased and its price dramatically increased.123 
Grand Vizier Hüseyin Pasha, in the face of such provision crisis, looked for 
every possible solution, but the Ottoman provision system was already crippled 
under the extreme whether conditions as mentioned above. As the preparations for 
the Polish campaign were underway, according to the bailo, Hüseyin Pasha urgently 
sent some galleys into the Black Sea to seek for and, if found, to bring all the grain or 
grain-loaded ships to the capital, however the bailo considered that it was absolutely 
not possible to meet the grain needs of more than three hundred thousand people who 
were living in the capital at the time. 124 On the other hand, because Eastern 
Mediterranean was under a serious threat by the presence of a Spanish navy, 
provisions sent from Egypt to Istanbul were transferred slowly. Therefore, the 
Ottoman government divided its imperial armada that year and did not call local 
galleys from ports such Alexandria, Cyprus, and Rhodes so as to protect their local 
regions from the attacks of the Spanish warships.125  
Meanwhile, the Cossacks posed a similar problem in the Black Sea. They 
invaded and plundered the Ottoman coastal cities in the Black Sea with the support !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
123 Ibid., fols. 50r-51v: “La prima operazione di questo primo Vesir è stata di porger qualche rimedio 
all’esorbitantissima carestia, anzi mancamento di pane, che qui hora si prova, essendosi stati alcuni 
giorni senza trovarsene con gran mormoratione del Popolo et pericolo solevatione, perché essendo 
tutti li grani, che erano soliti venir qui per il bisogno della citta ordinati di passar a confini di 
Polonia per bisogno delll’esercito, s’è ridotta in tal mancamento, et carestia, che hora mangiamo il 
pane a ragion di 14, al staro venetiano, et cativissimo, et cosi la biada da cavallo, et tutte l’altr’a 
proportione, et medesimamente ogn’altra cosa, che si regola conformi il valor d’essere grano, onde 
se il vostro dio non provede non so come potremo, et io doppo che regna la detta carestia convegno 
dar ogni giorno buona quantita di pane a Turchi, che me lo vengono a ricercare, ne si puo 
negarglielo, et medesimamente, la tavola ad assai piu numero di loro di quello, che venivano prima, il 
che apporta una gran spesa.” 
124 Ibid., fol.51v: “hanno spedito alcune Galere in questi contorni per far venir qua li Vascelli, che 
trovasse grani et si stanno con somma ansietà aspettando, se sperò se ne troverà, ne è possibile 
imaginarsi tra sua ragione simile alla loro di tener una citta ripiene d’infinito Popolo senza alcuna 
minima provisione, rimettendo la vita di tanto gente alla descrittione de l’vento, et del caso.” On the 
other hand, the transportation of the goods was another barrier for the provision system in the early 
modern empires. They had to overcome the geographical, political and climatic obstacles in secure 
transportation. In the Ottoman Empire, the greater part of transportation of the grain was occurred at 
sea. Whether state-owned shipments or private shipments cost a fortune for the supplier, the expense 
of the transportation comprised of 15 percent to 25 percent of total value of the shipments. For details 
see White, The Climate of Rebellion, pp. 33-34. Moreover, Rhoads Murphey refers to Evliya Çelebi’s 
account of the total amount of bread needed for the capital, that is, 54.000 tons annually and 160 tons 
daily. For the population of İstanbul, see Murphey, “Provisioning İstanbul,” pp. 229-231. 
125 ASVe, SPAC, Registro 18/IV, no.30 (dated April 6, 1621), fols. 10r-11r. 
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of the Polish government which was now in war against the Ottoman Empire.126 In 
short, the Ottoman provision system for Istanbul also failed under the maritime 
conflicts in the early 1620s. Overall, throughout this provision crisis, Osman II 
witnessed an ever growing discontent against himself and his imperial government 
while they were equally blamed for mismanaging the political, economic, financial 
and military affairs.127 
 
2.2 The First Plot against the Sultan 
 
The Polish campaign brought quite a heavy burden on the imperial treasury as it 
had to pay the salaries of tens of thousands of soldiers and the entire provisions for 
such a large imperial army. According to the Venetian bailo Giorgio Giustinian, the 
size of the army exceeded 600.000, of which 200.000 were the soldiers from the 
Crimean Khanate, a vassal state of the Ottoman sultan. 128  But, the English 
Ambassador Thomas Roe doubts on this reported size of the Ottoman army. He 
instead estimates it at 300.000.129 The Ottoman contemporary sources, on the other 
hand, are mostly silent about the strength of the Ottoman army in the Polish 
campaign. For instance, one of the contemporary authors, Halisi, claims that the 
Crimean soldiers numbered about 150.000, but according to Naîmâ, they were 
merely 50.000 thousand soldiers.130 Although the authors obviously exaggerated the 
size of the Ottoman army, they (or their accounts) still indicate quite a large army 
mobilized for the Polish campaign. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
126 For details, see Naîmâ, II, p. 459, Peçevi, II, pp. 378-380 and Tezcan, “Searching for Osman,” pp. 
188-189. 
127 The Ottoman grand viziers of this period were afraid of any protests while accompanying the 
sultan in his Friday prayers as much as they were afraid of being punished by the sultan while 
submitting him petitions about the imperial affairs. See, for instance, .Giustinian, Relazione, p. 545. 
128 ASVe, SPAC, Registro 18/V, no. 40 (dated June 2, 1621), fol. 7v: “che gli prestano fede in vanno 
con di mostramento li molto disgusto et discontento cio non ostante continuano perli efficaci ordini 
del Re a passar di qua verso il Campo quelle d’Asia et d’altre parti in gran numero si che l’essercito 
tara numerossimo di 400 et piu mille person oltre i Tartari che passeranno 200 mille.”  
129 Thomas Roe, The Negotiations of Sir Thomas Roe in his Embassy to the Ottoman Porte (London: 
Society for the Encouragement of Learning, 1740), pp. 11-13: “ The Grand Signore hauing gathered 
his army of foot and horse about 300,000 men, though reported 600,000 and arriued at the confines of 
Poland, attempted firft the fortrels of Hottini, a caftle belonging to the prouince of Moldouia.”  
130 Yaşar Yücel, ed., II. Osman Adına Yazılmış Zafer-nâme (Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi Dil ve Tarih 
Coğrafya Fakültesi Yayınları, 1983. VI), p. 80 [hereafter Halisi]; and Naîmâ, II, p. 464.  
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In fact, the Polish campaign was a step towards extreme fiscal troubles for the 
imperial treasury. The imperial government had difficulties in meeting the 
tremendous needs of provision for the imperial army in the midst of a serious famine 
and lack of finance in the capital. Despite these problems, Osman II ordered his 
imperial army to march towards Edirne without any further delay so as to reach the 
Polish frontier on time. He knew that the campaign march could have coincided with 
the winter season of the region that would have made it very difficult to wage war 
against Poland. However, his order impetuosity irritated the soldiers, who demanded 
a few more days to complete their provision. The Janissaries publicly opposed the 
sultan’s order regarding the departure from the capital without any postponement as 
they considered that without proper provisions, they could surely suffer in the midst 
of severe weather conditions in early 1621.131 On the other hand, the imperial 
soldiers did not receive their salaries in full. This payment crisis soon turned into a 
riot against the departure of Osman II from the capital. According to Venetian bailo, 
the bombardiers also rioted against the departure of the sultan from the capital due to 
the lack of the payments. They refused to accompany the sultan without being 
paid.132 While the ringleaders of this soldiery riot were punished, Hüseyin Pasha 
issued orders for the completion of the preparations for the Polish campaign as 
planned.133 Yet, the government viziers insisted that Osman II should not to lead the 
imperial army in person, but rather appoint Hüseyin Pasha as commander-in-chief. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
131 ASVe, SPAC, Registro 18/IV, no. 34 (dated May 4, 1621), fol. 31r: “gionti padiglioni piantati 
com’ho detto presso Daut, fece intimar, et pubblicar per il giorno seguente la mossa verso Adrinopoli 
con maraviglio, et disgusto di tutti, che mancando di molte provisioni per cosi improvisa uscita, 
convenivano senza esse patir molto, et si sentirono pubbliche voci de Giannizzari di non voler, ne 
poter per il detto giorno in alcuna maniera seguitarlo, per la quali il loro Aga temendo di qualche 
solevatione li persuase di far Arz a Sua Maesta, che forse con un poco di dilatione li haveria 
compiaciuti, il che havendo essi essequito, fu lei costretto contra sua volontà ardentissima nella detta 
mossa a prolungarla per 10 o 12 giorni ancora, con severissima intimatione d’esser all’hora in 
pronto senza alcuna scusa.” For the provision problem of the soldiers, also Hasan Beyzâde, III, p. 
929. Moreover, some Janissaries defected by claiming that they were exempt from the duty to go to 
war. Kadir Kazalak and Tufan Gündüz, “II. Osman’ın Hotin Seferi (1621),” Ankara Üniversitesi 
Osmanlı Tarihi Araştırma ve Uygulama Merkezi Dergisi (OTAM) 14 (2013), p. 133.  
132 ASVe, SPAC, Registro 18/IV, no. 34 (dated May 4, 1621), fols. 31r-31v: “Anco all’uscita dalla 
Maesta Sua dalla Citta li bombardieri per mancamento di detti paghe tumultuorno, ricusando 
d’accompagnarla sopradetta non erano sodisfatti, il che fatto fa hora la Maesta Sua punir 
secrettamente molti di loro auttori di tal solevatine.” 
133 Ibid., fol. 31r: “tra tanto si trattiene il Re, Primo Vesir et altri grandi che devono seguitarlo, a 
quali non ha voluto conceder di tornarsene nelle Citta, sotto li padiglioni, passando alle a Daut, dove 
il Vesir va espedendo molti negotij, et ordini per la guerra senza intermissione alcuna.” 
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However, Osman II ignored this advice by his ministers.134  The sultan was fixated 
wih the idea of leading his army personally and he even refused to consider the peace 
offer by the Polish envoy. Yet, the imperial soldiers continued their insolence in the 
capital.135 This obvious tension between the army and the imperial government made 
all concerned parties uncomfortable. However, the sultan ignored the fact that the 
tensions escalated to an alarming state. As a last resort, the government viziers tried 
to stop the sultan to undertake a military campaign under cover of the possible 
outbreak of rebellion and disorders during his absence in the capital.136  
The imperial government of Osman II not only struggled with financial 
problems, such as salary payments, but also had to deal with the extreme weather 
conditions that often impeded the ongoing preparations for the Polish campaign. In 
many instances, they had to abort their logistical-strategical planing due to the 
shortage of oxens and camels. The cold weather killed thousands of such war-
animals and put the logistics of the imperial army at peril. The imperial government 
in turn tried to re-supply these animals, but this problem soon put the grand vizierate 
of Hüseyin Pasha under the threat of dismissal. Yet, the sultan’s tutor, Ömer Efendi 
defended Hüseyin Pasha against the provisional causalties, so that the grand vizier 
managed to escape from the fury of Osman II.137 As discusssed before, Hace Ömer !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
134 ASVe, SPAC, Registro 18/V, no. 40 (dated June 2, 1621), fols. 6r-7v: “Gionse il Re in Andrinopoli 
a 20 del passato dove non havendo trovato giunte ancora le militie d’Asia et d’altre parti, che hanno 
ordine di ridurcisi et carestia grande de viveri, s’è molto alterato col primo Vesir, et è stato 
necessitato a fermarcisi qualche giorno, doveva pero partir domani o sabbato alla più lunga, non 
havendo potuto i Vesiri con tutti li efficaci ufficij farlo fermar in quella Citta, et lasciar andar il primo 
vesir coll’essercito alla guerra.”  
135ASVe, SPAC, Registro 18/IV, no. 34 (dated May 4, 1621), fol. 33r: “Tra tanto non lasciano di 
sparger voce che Polachi col mezo del Bogdano ricerchino con gran offerte la pace, ma che 
essendole cose passate tant’oltre et fatte tante spese, il Re non voglia concedergliela.” 
136 For detail, see ASVe, SPAC, Registro 18/III, no. 27 (dated March 22, 1621), fols. 52r-53v: “Il Re 
solecita grandemente la speditione della sua mossa per la guerra, et voleva andarsene in Adrinopoli 
senza maggior dilatione, et lasciar qui il Vesir a fenir provisioni che mancano, ma i vesiri con 
allegarli esser necessario rimetter gran numero de proprij camelli di sua maestà morti per i fredi, 
l’hanno fermata, et hora per quant’intendemo, vogliono tentar di novo se potessero fermarla del tutto 
sotto pretesto, che per cosi gran carestia potria il Populo nella sua absenza tumultuar, et seguir 
qualch’importante disordine, et che bastava per castigar Polachi et farli venir all’accordo la 
missione coll’essercito del primo Vesir solo senza che la maesta sua si movesse in persona a una 
guerra, et contra paese, nel quale non essendovi fortezze disort’alcuna non puo sperar gloria di qual 
che celebre espugnatione, et coso tali, che come si crede piu tosto irriteranno, che persuaderanno Sua 
Maestà, et seguitano tutta via le militie, et provisioni ad incasisarsi a quei confini alla volta di 
Belgrado, continuando pur sotto questo vesir la rissolutione fatta sotto l’altro di aqiutar et assister a 
Betelen Gabor.” See also Halisi, pp. 70-71 and Naîmâ, II, p. 461. 
137 ASVe, SPAC, Registro 18/IV, no. 38 (dated May 19, 1621), fols. 50r-51r: “Nel campo che è con 
Sua Maestà e ben di poca gente caminando il sforzo per altra strada c’è carestia grandissima, sopra 
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Efendi had a warlike stance that made him confront with Ali Pasha at the very 
beginning of the Polish Campaign. Even his warlike’s tendency caused his dismissal 
from his imperial court in August 1620. The sultan asserted him in February 1621 
once again in the ruling body in order to declare war against Poland in spite of his 
grand vizier. However, upon the unexpected death of Ali Pasha, Hace Ömer 
improved his relation with Hüseyin Pasha who at least did not oppose the war like 
Ali Pasha. On the other hand, it is highly possible that Hüseyin Pasha did not object 
to the alternative role of Hace Ömer Efendi as well as Ali Pasha. Unlike Ali Pasha, 
Hüseyin Pasha probably cared about the opinion of Hace Ömer Efendi, in particular, 
in the court politics and imperial affairs. 
However, Hüseyin Pasha’s position was still in jeopardy.138 Other government 
viziers seemed to be aware of the mounting troubles and they insisted that Osman II 
should appoint his grand vizier to the command of the army. They tried to convince 
the sultan by pointing out to a potential riot and disorder during his absence in the 
capital, because not only the viziers, but also the people of the capital feared about 
such an imminent riot. Indeed, the imperial soldiers would rise in a general revolt 
within the following days.139  
Moreover, the viziers considered that the conquest of Hotin was almost 
impossible, for it was one of most formidable strongholds in Poland. Until the last 
moment, they strived to persuade the sultan to let Hüseyin Pasha command the 
imperial army to Poland so as to assist his vassal the King of Hungary, Betlen Gabor. 
However, Osman II’s leading of the imperial army would provide an opportunity to 
increase his sovereign authority just like Mehmed II (r. 1451-81) did in the past by !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
tutto di Camelli, et cavalli per servizio dell’artigliaria, et delle bagaglie, che convengono perciò 
molte volte restar a dietro, da che sdegnato il Gran Signore col primo vesir è stato in gran pericolo 
d’esser desmesso, ma il Coza l’ha diffeso gettando la colpa sul morto, a cui trovava far tal provisione 
et parendo esso, Vesir confuso, et sopra fatto del peso, et poco corrisponde all’espettione, che 
s’havea del suo valore, si tiene non durerà molto in questo carico, nel qual si ragiona assai, che sarà 
surrogato il Bustangi Bassi gratissimo a Sua Maesta che l’ha dichiarato Vesir, et compartitagli 
l’auttorità del governo col Caimecan, si che senza lui non può questo far cosa alcuna. İo lo visiterò, 
et presenterò com’è ordinario, et com’ho fatto esso Caimecan, dolendomi, assai che per tanti 
accidenti, et cosi spesse elettioni, et mutationi si convien moltiplicar in presenti et in molte spese, per 
risparmio delle quali ne con rissoluto di non presentar il Re, com’ altre volte nelle loro gita, et 
ritorno dalla guerra è stato fatto, ma aspettar il suo ritorno per farlo con maggior frutto, et spesa 
minore, et medessimante il Coza, considerando, che per esser quasi decrepito potrà per li patimenti 
delviaggio lasciarvi la vita, et saria spesa gettata.” 
138 Ibid., 50r-51r:  
139 ASVe, SPAC, Registro 18/III, no. 27 (dated March 22, 1621), fols. 52r-53v. 
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his conquest of Constantinople in 1453. After this great success, Mehmed II 
consolidated his rule vis-à-vis all the aristocratic rivals in the empire.140  
On the other hand, the Venetian bailo claims that Osman II sought to imitate his 
great grandfather Süleyman I by wearing his armor and commanding the imperial 
army in person. Regarding Osman’s imitation of Sultan Suleyman I (r.1520-66), his 
very powerful favorite, the Chief Eunuch Süleyman Agha played a greater role than 
Hüseyin Pasha. Although the Venetian bailo did not explain how Süleyman played 
this role, we can assume as Değirmenci points out in the case of el-Hac Mustafa 
Agha, Süleyman Agha could have used the illusrated manuscripts and a kind of tools 
that would have an impact on the imitiation.141 Hence, as the Venetian bailo also 
observes, Süleyman Agha could easily influence the sultan as he was one of chief 
advisors whose opinions Osman II favored.142 Like Süleyman Agha, the royal tutor 
Ömer Efendi was also in favor of Osman II. Ömer Efendi regained his powers after 
the death of the Grand Vizier Ali Pasha in March 1621, as noted before. The royal 
tutor was an ardent supporter of a campaign against Poland. Thus, Osman II 
empowered him with the privilege to attend the general council convened to discuss 
the campaign plans on February 4 1620, house of the Grand Vizier Ali Pasha. Even 
though this council resulted with a strong recommendation of considering peace talks 
with Poland as already suggested by the deceased Grand Vizier Ali Pasha, Osman II 
cared little for the recommendation and instead showed, once again, his resolution by 
insisting to go to war.143  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
140 Baki Tezcan, “Khotin 1621 or How the Poles Changed the Course of Ottoman History,” Acta 
Orientalia Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae 62 (2009), p. 189. 
141 ASVe, SPAC, Registro 18/VI, no. 54 (dated August 31, 1621), fol. 26r: “il Gran Signore vuol 
saper et sopra intender a tutto et veste una voglia che Sultan Soliman era solito usar in guerra, delle 
cui attioni si professa gran imitatore, poco si serve del Primo Vesir, et molto del Chislar, il qual 
s’avanza sempre piu di gratia et autorità.“;  Değirmenci, İktidar Oyunları, pp. 59-83  Osman II was 
to make a peace agreement with Poles under the same conditions of the peace agreement that was 
approved by Süleyman I, see Naîmâ, II, p. 472; and Ziya Yılmazer, ed., Topçular Katibi Abdulkadir 
(Kadri) Efendi Tarihi, 2 Vols. (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 2003), pp. 599-600 [hereafter 
Abdülkadir Efendi, I-II].  
142 ASVe, SDC, filza 90, no. 84 (dated January 6, 1622, m.v.), fol. 15r: ”Si trova il detto Chislar 
cresciuto tanto di auttorita et di gratia appresso il Re che per confessione di tutti sapera di lunga 
quella di ogni altro, et guida et regola assolutamente la volontà di Sua Maestà.” Almost all Ottoman 
contemporary writers portray Suleyman Agha as an influential figure. See, for instance, Peçevi, II, p. 
353 and Naîmâ, II, pp. 473-74. Kâtib Çelebi, Fezleke, pp. 664-665.  
143 According to the bailo’s reports, the participants of the General Council were eight viziers from 
imperial court, the Mufti Esad Efendi the Chief Judges of Rumelia and Anatolia, and the 
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On August 17, 1621, the Janissaries, who were charged with providing order and 
security to the capital, started a riot against the Deputy of Grand Vizier Ahmed 
Pasha, on the grounds that they did not receive their salaries. The rebellious soldiers 
marched towards Ahmed Pasha’s palace and asked him to give assurance about their 
salary payments. In response, Ahmed Pasha treated them with prudence, uttered kind 
words, and promised to resolve this payroll problem.144 Yet, on August 22, 1621, the 
Janissaries once again rioted; and this time it was truly a tumultuous rebellion. 
Accordign to the bailo, the rebellious soldiers forcibly dismissed the elected Agha of 
Janissaries, Nasuh Agha. They elected their own agha from their ranks. The Deputy 
Grand Vizier Ahmed Pasha had to accept it so as to moderate their fury.145 However, 
at this time Ahmed Pasha could not calm entirely the Janissaries, thus he urgently 
sought for extra funds to make the salary payments and avoid this life-threatening 
rebellion.146 According to the Venetian bailo, more than 10.000 Janissaries remained 
in the capital and did not participate in the campaign. Meanwhile, the imperial 
sipahis similarly posed a threat for the deputy grand vizier.147  
On August 31, 1621, this time at the military camp in Poland, the Janissaries 
rebelled and protested Grand Vizier Hüseyin Pasha in front of his tent about their !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
Yeniçeriağası,.the Sultan’s Tutor Hace Ömer Efendi, see ASVe, SDC, filza. 90, no. 20 (dated 
February 9, 1621, m.v.), fols. 325v-326r.  
144 ASVe, SPAC, Registro 18/VI, no. 54 (dated August 17, 1621) fol. 27v-r: “li Gianizzari che in 
qualche numero sono restati qui alla guardia della Citta l’altri giorno per mancamento delle paghe 
cominciorno a tumultuare, et già prese l’armi s’acciaccano alla casa del Caimecan per costringerlo 
con la forza a tal pagamento, ma egli con la sua prudenza, et buone parole et promesse li ha per hora 
aquietati.” 
145 ASVe, SPAC, Registro 17, no. 55 (dated August 22, 1620), fol. 27v: “Il moto che scrissi esser 
stato li giorni passati suscitato da Gianizzeri restati alla guardia di Costantinopoli per mancamento 
delle paghe, et acquietato per all’hora con buone parole dal Caimecan, è finalmente riuscito in una 
manifesta solevatione, per la quale andati in gran numero alla casa di esso Caimecan, et usato con 
parole, et fatti molti insolenze s’egli con la fuga non dava loco, correva manifesto pericolo, passando 
la solevatione tant’oltre che deposto tumultuariamente l’Agà eletto, et speditogli dal Campo dal Gran 
Signore, n’hanno eletto un altro del loro numero, il quale ricusando tal carico, bisogno che il 
Caimecan per temperarla lor furia, lo esortasse ad accettarlo.” 
146 ASVe, SPAC, Registro 18/VI, no. 57 (dated September 14, 1621), fol. 35v: “Il Questa settimana il 
caimecan mi ha fatto reiterate grandissime instanze, che trovandosi in necessita di soldar uno di 
questi giorni li Giannizari delle loro paghe, perle quali nacque l’ultima solevatione con tanto 
pericolo della sua vita.” 
147 ASVe, SPAC, Registro 18/VI, no. 56 (dated August 31, 1621), fol. 33v: “Questo militia de 
Giannizzari se ben caduta assai dall’antico valore, et numero, non trovandosene nell’essercito piu di 
10 mille ritiene pero la pristina ferocità, che passata anco col loro essempio in quelle de Spai molto 
più numerosa succedono spesso in ambedoi di questo pericolose solevationi.” Also see Kazalak and 
Gündüz, “II. Osman’ın Hotin Seferi,” p. 133, for those Janissaries who managed to avoid participating 
the campaign. 
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unpaid payrolls. In order to calm them down, Huseyin Pasha had to pay the 
Janissaries much more than their normal salaries. Upon this rebellion, on the other 
hand, Osman II made some changes in the government. For instance, he dismissed 
the Chief Treasurer, Hasan Pasha, and appointed him to the governorship-general of 
Rumeli, which had been held by Davud Pasha, Mustafa I’s brother-in-law.148  
As Hüseyin Pasha was having hard times to handle the fiscal, military and 
provision problems, Dilaver Pasha asked the sultan to appoint him to the grand 
vizierate because of his personal wealth that could be used to partially cover the 
unpaid salaries of the soldiers. Osman II accepted this offer of Hüseyin Pasha and 
appointed him as his new grand vizier in October 1621.149 Moreover, the sultan 
appointed Baki Pasha as Chief Treasurer, who had been dismissed back in 
September 1621.In addition, the Chief Treasurer Yusuf Pasha was appointed to the 
governership of Bagdad and the Agha of Janissaries as governor of Damascus while 
Kapıcıbaşı Mustafa Agha became the Agha of Janissaries.150  
As the Ottoman imperial army was besieging Hotin, official news arrived in the 
capital, giving the details of the difficulties confronted by the sultan and his soldiers 
during the war. The news clearly exaggerated the suffering and casualties of the 
Polish side so as to give the sultan and his imperial army a proud outlook. However, 
the reality was precisely the opposite. The Polish army had greatly defended Hotin. 
Casualties were less than expected while those of the Ottomans were high. The bailo 
Giustinian writes that the Ottoman imperial army lost around 80.000 soldiers, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
148 ASVe, SPAC, Registro 18/VI, no. 56 (dated August 31, 1621), fols. 32r-33v: “La solevatione de 
Gianizzari nell’essercito, che scrivo nelle precedenti fu per mancamento delle paghe, per il qual 
corsero armati, et con gran tumulto al padiglione del Primo Vesir che corse anch’egli molto pericolo, 
et per aquietarli oltre l’esborso delle dette paghe il Re ha deposto il Defterdar grande, et sorogatogli 
il Beglierbei della Grecia, et nel loco di questo Daut Bassa.” Some Ottoman contemporary writers 
claim that it was a ordinary donations in order to detect deserters of the imperial army, see Peçevi, II, 
p. 376; Hammer, VIII, p. 205; Halisi, pp. 90-91; and Naîmâ, II, p. 465. 
149 ASVe, SPAC, Registro 18/VII, no. 67 (dated October 26, 1620), fols. 11r-16r:“ et avviato 
all’essercito chimato dal Gran Signore per farlo Primo Vesir in loco di Cussein deposto, et riponer 
sulle sue spalle il poco delle guerra ridetta in gravi difficolta, Dilavert Bassa di Mesopotamia, ricco, 
per le guerre di Persia venuto in riputatione di buon soldato, s’offerte a Sua Maesta servir in tal 
carico, non solo con la Persona, ma col danaro ancora, per dar una paga alla militie, per 
mancamento delle quale era principalmente segiuta la depositione di Cussein, a instanza dei spai, che 
ne fecero richiamo al Gran Signore, il qual accettata l’offerta gli diede il sigillo, et lo creo Primo 
Vesir.”Also see Kazalak and Gündüz, “II. Osman’ın Hotin Seferi,”, p. 139. 
150 Ibid., fol. 15r: “A Dilaver nel Bassalich di Mesopotamia è stato sostituito Yusuf era Defterdar, et a 
questo Bachi, che l’ha ancor essercitato, et Mustafa Capigi Bassi all’ Aga de Giannizari predetto.” 
See also Abdülkadir Efendi, I, p. 753. 
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including some leading statesmen like Karakaş Mehmed Pasha, the Governor of 
Buda.151 According to Halisi, the Ottomans captured 300.000 slaves and killed 
100.000 Polish soldiers.152 All these numbers are clearly exaggerated so as to portray 
that the imperial campaign had devastating effects on the enemy.  
However, after 39 days, the Osman II ordered to end the siege of Hotin on 
October 7, 1621. Thus this first imperial campaign led by a seventeenth-century 
sultan had failed at the trenches of Hotin. But Osman II seemed not to embrace the 
failure of the siege; rather he was fixated on waging a new war against Poland in the 
following year.153 At the outset, the sultan refused to make peace with Poland, but 
there were some dissenting voices in his imperial government. Osman II consulted 
Ömer Efendi and Süleyman Agha, his chief advisors, on the conditions of a peace 
with Poland. Both advisors recommended the sultan not to accept a peace with 
Poland while Grand Vizier Dilaver Pasha and other government ministers disagreed 
with the sultan’s two advisors. Instead, they advocated the idea of starting the peace 
talks with Poland as soon as possible. They also tried to dissuade the sultan from 
spending the winter in Edirne.154 However, Osman II decided to stay in Edirne to 
launch a new military campaign against Poland. This decision of the sultan was not 
welcomed in the capital. According to the bailo: 
The sultan was resolve to spend the winter in Edirne. The army in the 
countries informed regretting to be there generally. Numerous merchants 
fear for the ruin in all business. They have experienced an intolerable 
famine of food and many other inconveniences in the absence of the 
sultan. They have been already doing nothing for many months. They 
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151 ASVe, SPAC, Registro 18/VII, no. 65 (dated September 12, 1622, m.v.), fol. 6r. Some Ottoman 
writers accuse Hüseyin Pasha on the death of Karakaş Mehmed Pasha for he did not help him in the 
battlefield. For details, see Peçevi, II, p. 376 and Hasan Beyzâde, III, p. 934. 
152 Halisi , pp. 180-186. 
153 ASVe, SPAC, Registro 18/VII, no. 67 (dated October 26, 1621), fol. 13r: “Per questo, et altre 
difficolta, che sarà lungo a scrivere, scinta(vinta) l’ostinazione del Gran si intendeva per gli ultimi 
avvisi dei primi del corrente aver egli pubblicata la levata, che doveva seguir subito, ma per quanto 
dicono questi ministri con la solita istanza, con gran risoluzione, et minacci di ritornarsene l’anno 
futuro tanto per tempo.” 
154 ASVe, SPAC, Registro 18/VII, no. 79 (dated December 21, 1621), fol. 51r: “Il Primo Vesir, gli 
altri ministri, dal Coza, et Chislaraga in poi, che si trova in somma gratia del Re, et le militie ancora 
per l’avaritia di Sua Maesta, molto mal sodisfatte desiderano la pace, la qual adherendo ai consigli 
di questi doi conformi al suo proprio; si mostra sin hora risoluta di non volerla se non con le 
conditioni avisate.” See also Roe, Negotiations, p. 19.  
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hope with the sultan’s return with his court and the army and restoring 
somewhat the business.155 
On the way back to Istanbul from Hotin, the imperial army had already been 
concerned of the tight-fisted nature of the sultan and his aggressive fiscal policy. 
While the imperial army camped near the Danube, Osman II offered his soldiers to 
increase their salaries by one akçe, instead of a donation of 1000 akçe at once as their 
campaign bonus (bahsis). But the soldiers refused the sultan’s offer. Instead, they 
wanted to receive their bonuses. In the end, according to the bailo, the sultan had to 
agree on giving 1000 akçes to hundreds of thousands the imperial soldiers.156   
But during the Polish campaign, the sultan refused to reward those soldiers who 
had not arrived at time to the imperial camp in Isakçı, known today as Isaccea in 
Romania. 157  By doing so, Osman II actually made a census of the soldiers 
campaigned with him. This census, however, caused great discomfort among the 
soldiers. It was a sign of the sultan’s mistrust of the officers in the imperial army.158 
The sultan then decreased the amount of the rewards for every killed Polish soldier 
from two gold coins to one, resulting in further reactions by the soldiers, because 
they were accustomed to receive such rewards much more than the sultan granted. 
This problem played an important role in discouraging the soldiers to fight against 
the Polish soldiers.159  
Besides, during the Polish campaign, Osman II abolished the arpalık, a revenue 
which the high-ranking ulema used to receive towards their retirement or while 
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155ASVe, SPAC, Registro 18/VII, no. 66 (dated October 26, 1621), fols. 9r-10v: “Questa rissolutione 
del Gran Signore di svernar egli in Adrinopoli, et l’essercito nei Paesi avisati dispiace qui 
generalmente ad ogn’uno, provandosi per la sua absenza una carestia de viveri intolerabile, et 
molt’altri inconvenienti et temendo i numeri mercanti la total rovina del negozio, che non facendo gia 
molti mesi cosa alcuna, sperano col ritorno della Corte et dell’esercito di restorarlo alquanto.” Also 
see Roe, Negotiations, p. 12. 
156 ASVe, SPAC, Registro 18-VI, no. 51 (dated August 3, 1621), fol. 9r. Also see Naîmâ, II, p. 466; 
Peçevi, II, p. 376; and Tûgī, Musîbetnâme , pp. 15-16. 
157 Tûgī, Musîbetnâme , p. 16. 
158 Peçevi, II, p. 376. 
159 Naîmâ, II, p. 477; Hammer, VIII, p. 212; Halisi, p. 56; and Baki, “Searching for Osman”, pp. 200-
201. 
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waiting for an appointment to a post. The abolishment of the arpalık revenues 
articulated the grievances of the high-ranking ulema for the sultan.160  
While Osman II was determined to pursue such aggressive ideas and actions, the 
first plot against his sultanate was hatched on November 23, 1621, six months before 
his regicide. The Venetian bailo provides an account on this plot: 
In fact, one of these days a very dangerous rebellion broke out against the 
sultan in the favor of his deposed uncle Mustafa I. This happened due to 
delays in the payments, he wanted to postpone them. A voice arose from 
the army that claimed in Constantinople the foresaid Mustafa I has been 
returned to the imperial seat by the people. It was heard and expanded 
with grand applause. It committed incredibly to the mind of the sultan 
who immediately ordered to do the payments so as to obtain that 
degree.161 
The Venetian bailo also reports that the sipahis from the Anatolian provinces 
returned to their home in miserable conditions. The famine killed most of their 
horses; thus a great number of the sipahis had to return home on foot. They all 
accused the sultan’s tight-fisted nature for the serious disorders in the army. The 
sultan was considered extremely tight-fisted in the military payments and donations. 
This made the soldiers refuse 'dicing with death' by fighting against the Polish 
soldiers. Most of the Janissaries returned back over the bridge of Danube, as they did 
not want to 'fight to die'. Particularly after the death of the governor of Buda Karakaş 
Mehmed Pasha, the undisciplined behaviors among the soldiers became evident, 
eventually culminating to a major military rebellion against Osman II.162  
As seen in the above-quoted dispatch, the soldiers exclaimed favoring the 
sultan’s uncle, Mustafa I, because they considered that Osman II wanted to delay 
their impeding salary payments. Meanwhile, a rumor spread among the imperial 
soldiers that the people of the capital had enthroned Sultan Mustafa. According to the 
bailo, this rumor angered the sultan so much that he immediately ordered to make !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
160 Bostanzâde, pp. 203-204;.Tezcan, “Searching for Osman”, p. 265, refers to Hibri’s account in that 
the sultan allegedly wanted to burn the registers which included the names of his household soldiers. 
161 ASVe, SPAC, Registro 18-VII, no. 73 (dated November 23, 1621), fol. 30v: “Anzi un giorno con 
pericolo di una universal solevatione contra la Maesta Sua a favor del deposto Mustafa suo zio, 
poiche soprastando il tempo dalle paghe, et volendo lei differirle, si levo tra le militie una voce, che in 
Costantinopoli il detto Mustafa fosse stato dal Popolo ritornato nella sede regale, la qual sentita, et 
ampliata da esse con grand’applauso, commesse incredibilmente l’animo del Gran Signore, che 
immediate fece le paghe, per ottener quel grado.”See also Roe, Negotiations, p. 12. 
162Ibid., fol. 30v. 
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the payments of the imperial soldiers. Moreover, on the same day, he accepted the 
peace with Poland with the same conditions hitherto concluded under Süleyman I.163  
Overall, the military rebellion during the campaign of Hotin was the first attempt 
against the sultanate of Osman II and it signaled the enthronement of Mustafa I once 
again. The imperial soldiers had already proposed Mustafa I as the candidate for the 
Ottoman throne, instead of Osman II’s eldest brother, Prince Murad. In fact, it could 
be seen as a rehearsal of the rebellion of May 1622 which would end the sultanate of 
Osman II. As will be discussed in next chapter, Mustafa I was actually re-enthroned 
not only by the Ottoman army, but also with public support. 
However, Osman II failed to learn his lesson from the plot of November 1621, 
and increased his aggressiveness towards the imperial soldiers. When he arrived in 
Edirne, for instance, he abolished the pensions of the retired Janissaries, known as 
the çerağ oturak.164 According to Tûgī, a total of 2000 pensions were cut off by 
Osman II. 165 For the sultan, this was a very risky attempt in that it could easily 
increase the alienation of the imperial soldiers who had been already annoyed by 
other fiscal actions of the sultan. I should also note that Osman’s such aggressiveness 
alienated not only the soldiers, but also his governement viziers and other high-
ranking officials at the imperial court. According to the bailo: 
I can tell much about it that the alienation for the most dissatisfaction of 
the avarice of the Sultan is not only from the leading ministers but also 
all the soldiers from the said war. They have suffered hardships in the 
campaign from the famine and many other aspects that reigns in all parts 
of the empire. Countless animals have been lost in the campaign. 166 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
163 ASVe, SPAC, Registro 18/VII, no. 72 (dated November 23, 1621), fols. 24v-30v. Also see 
Hammer, VIII, pp. 207-208; Roe, Negotiations, pp. 12-13; Naîmâ, II, p. 472; and Abdülkadir Efendi, 
I, pp. 599-600. 
164 ASVe, SPAC, Registro 18/VII, no. 79 (dated December 21, 1621), fol. 51r: “per la quale si dice 
esser pensiero nella Maestà Sua di regolarli, essendosi con quest’occasione certificata, che tra 
Cervagi, Otturach et altri di loro inabili, viene a sborsar dodici mille paghe l’anno senza alcun frutto, 
ma essendo stato in tutt’i tempi il metter mano a tal regolazioni molto pericoloso, si tiene che vi 
penserà ben premia.”  
165 Tûgī, Musîbetnâme , p. 41. 
166 ASVe, SPAC, Registro 18-VIII, no. 83 (dated January 6, 1621), fol. 12r: “Tra tanto posso dirle che 
per l’alienatione non solo di questi principali ministri, ma di tutte le militie ancora dalla detta guerra 
malissimo sodisfatte del Re per la sua avaritia, per li patimenti che hanno sofferto in essa, per la 
carestia che per tutte le parti di quest’imperio regna maggiore che da molto tempo in qua sia stata 
per la perdita d’infiniti animali morti nell’esercito et per altri molti rispetti.”   
! 55!
In sum, Osman II could not stand against the great opposition on spending winter 
in Edirne. He unwillingly accepted to return back to the capital. However, his return 
did not diminish the tension between him and his soldiers and the people of the 
capital, but rather visibly increased it, particularly when he announced his eargeness 
to make the Pilgrimage in Mecca.  
 
Conclusion 
 
As I have tried to demonstrate, Osman II came under criticism both at the 
beginning and the end of his campaign against Poland. In spite of the objections for 
waging war against Poland, the sultan was fixated on personally leading his imperial 
army. Accordingly, he re-inserted his tutor Hace Ömer Efendi into his imperial 
council as a power-broker so as to have a support for his war plans. However, the 
sultan’s plans were objected by his viziers and grandees on the grounds that the there 
had been a severe provision and monetary crisis in the capital.  Indeed, the Ottoman 
capital witnessed extreme winter conditions that halted daily economic activities and 
even cut the logistical links between the capital and its periphery due to icy winds 
and the frozen Bosphorus. In the meantime, the limited grain supplies of the capital 
were transferred to the Polish frontier so as to meet the needs of the imperial army. 
During this period, accordingly, Osman II faced with a direct protest by the poor 
people of the capital, who used bread as a symbol for their grievances, thus the 
provision crisis. I argued that this ‘bread-protest’ was a clear sign of the fiscal 
mismanagement of Osman II in the eyes of the people in the capital. 
While people had been affected by food shortages and rampant inflation in daily 
goods, the Polish campaign deepened the fiscal crisis of the imperial treasury and 
larger economic crisis in Istanbul markets. In the midst of a famine, scarcity of 
money and extreme climatic conditions, the imperial government tried to handle 
serious troubles in the payments, provision and logistics of the overcrowded imperial 
army during the Polish campaign. From the beginning of this campaign onwards, the 
imperial army protested their unpaid salaries, a problem which, on November 23, 
1622, turned into the first plot for the deposition of Osman II.  That is to say, the 
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sultan’s aggressive fiscal policy and actions alike throughout the Polish campaign 
increased the alienation of the imperial soldiers from his sultanate. 
In the meantime, Osman II created his own court faction under the leadership of 
his new Chief Eunuch of the Imperial Harem, Süleyman Agha, his tutor Hace Ömer 
Efendi and the Chief Gardener Bebr Mehmed Pasha. These figures became more 
visible and more powerful in imperial affairs in short time. Like in the case of Osman 
II, these figures as new foci of power at the imperial court would be targeted by the 
imperial soldiers and the public at large, who would demand their executions in the 
first days of the rebellion in May 1622. 
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CHAPTER 3 
INTO THE STORM: THE REGICIDE OF OSMAN II 
 
This chapter examines the increasing tension between Osman II and his 
imperial army and the people of Istanbul following the announcement of the sultan’s 
plans to make a pilgrimage journey to Mecca in 1622. My discussion covers the 
period between the sultan’s return to the capital from the Polish campaign on January 
9, 1622 and his regicide on May 20, 1622.  During this period, I would argue, a 
general public and military opposition came into being against Osman II and his 
pilgrimage plans. Moreover, the economic and provision problems prevailing in 
Istanbul further sharpened this public opposition, which soon turned into an open 
rebellion against Osman II and his sultanate once some unfounded rumors about the 
sultan’s secret plans to recruit a new army under the pretext of pilgrimage began 
circulating in the capital. However, at this point, the main aim of the rebellious 
soldiers and common people was not the deposition of Osman II, but rather the 
execution of his royal favorites who were accused of misguiding the sultan and 
intervening in the business of rule. The Janissaries and the imperial sipahis started to 
openly pronounce the deposition of Osman II only when the sultan refused to turn 
over his favorites to the rebels. Accordingly, the rebels attacked the imperial palace 
in order to find and execute the sultan’s favorites, namely, Süleyman Agha, Hace 
Ömer Efendi, Dilaver Pasha, Baki Pasha and Nasuh Agha. Once they were inside the 
palace, however, the mutinous soldiers pledged their allegiance to Osman’s uncle, 
Mustafa I, and declared him as the new sultan. The following day, the deposed 
Osman II was killed at the Yedikule dungeon.  
In what follows, I will look into these critical developments while providing 
some hitherto unknown details regarding the daily events and affairs at the Ottoman 
imperial center. As we shall see, the Venetian bailo’s dispatches are highly important 
in reaching a better understanding of the problems immediately preceding the 
deposition and murder of Osman II.   
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3.1 Osman II’s Return to the Capital 
 
On January 9, 1622, Osman II entered Istanbul through an elaborate military 
procession while his viziers and other court grandees accompanied him on 
horseback.167 The sultan was no doubt expecting the people of his capital to crowd 
the streets and welcome his return cheerfully. However, according to the Venetian 
bailo: 
I believe that the sultan has little pleasure in not finding the applause in 
faces and voices of people as it is usual in such occasions, but the 
majority of them went obstinately silent as a sign of discontentment with 
the sultan. The people and the soldiers have attributed his avarice, having 
much experienced, to the greatest famine and the mismanagement of war. 
It is publicly said that it is not remembered such a tight-fisted and less 
loved ruler between the Ottomans.168  
Osman seems to have paid little attention to his subject’s growing discontent 
against himself, particularly in relation to his tight-fisted nature. Instead, soon after 
his arrival, he ordered a three-day festival in order to celebrate his return from the 
campaign as well as the recent birth of his son, Prince Ömer. One night during this 
festival, he travelled incognito in the streets of his capital, but he was much 
displeased to see some people consuming wine and tobacco excessively.169 Hence, 
the following day, he issued a royal decree prohibiting the use of tobacco and wine in 
Istanbul. The Venetian bailo informed his Senate on the repercussions of this 
prohibition as follows:  
The sultan travelled incognito in the night that displeased people, which 
could have known his dissatisfaction in the festivals. The sultan 
increased the severe prohibition of tobacco and wine much more by 
declaring immediately. The use of them is now being greatly found in !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
167 ASVe, SPAC, Registro 8/VIII, no. 86 (dated January 20, 1622, m.v.), fol. 20v. 
168 Ibid., fols. 20r-21v: “cred’ho con poco suo gusto, non scoprendo nei volti, et nelle voce del Popolo 
di quelli appalusi, che li suoi maggiori in occazioni tali con stati soliti, ma andare ostinato silentio, 
segno di discontento, et di mala soditisfatione causata della sua avaritia alla quale il Popolo 
attribuisce la carestia grandissima, che già tanto prova, et le militie la mala riuscita di questa guerra, 
in modo che pubblicamento si dice, che si come non n’è memora tra gl’Ottomani di Principe piu 
avaro, cosi non n’è anco del meno amato di questo.” 
169 Ibid., fol. 21v-r: “si senti una salva grande d’artellaria, et furono per tre giorni, et notti ordinati 
fochi per la citta, che consistono nell’addobbamento, et illuminatamente delle botteghe, et nel 
concorso del Popolo per vederle, essendovi anco di notte andata incognita la maestà sua, che dato 
poco gusto del Popolo nelle dette feste havera potuto conoscer la sua mala sodisfattione.” 
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Turkish sales. Traders cannot bear it, if they do not know except tearing 
out money with the renovation of the concession. They have encountered 
the great famine of bread and all other things for a long time. Although 
the people hoped from the sultan’s arrival, they feel and show a great 
discontentment but not remedy.170 
As the sultan was following such an aggressive policy towards the daily 
economic and social activities in the capital, the people’s and soldiers’ alienation 
from himself and his sultanate were equally increasing. As noted in the previous 
chapter, the famine and the scarcity of money had already struck the markets in the 
capital so hard. The merchants and the consumers were now suffering under a true 
economic depression.   
Nonetheless, Osman continued his aggressive interventions and actions, more so 
particularly after the accidental death of Prince Ömer, who was born in the imperial 
harem on October 20, 1621, while Osman II was waging war against Poland. The 
bailo reports that the mother of the prince was Mehlika Sultan, the sultan’s favorite 
Russian concubine. Mehlika was originally a slave of Kuyucu Murad Pasha, the 
former grand vizier under Ahmed I between 1606-and 1611. When Murad Pasha 
died, his wife presented her to El-Hac Mustafa Agha, by then the chief eunuch of the 
imperial harem, who in turn embraced her like his own daughter and soon liberated 
her from her slave status, thus Melika became a free Muslim woman. Later, Osman 
II wanted Mehlika to be his concubine, but it was not an option anymore. According 
to the Islamic law, a freed slave woman could not be made a concubine again. 
Hence, Osman II had to take Mehlika as an official wife, but he still treated her like a 
favorite concubine, haseki.171 At the time, this official marriage of Osman with a 
former slave received criticism from the ulema and the public at large.172 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
170 Ibid., fol. 21r: “essendovi anco di notte andata incognita la maestà sua, che dato poco gusto del 
Popolo nelle dette feste havera potuto conoscer la sua mala sodisfattione, la qualé cresciuta anco 
tanto piu per la prohibitione molto severa del tabaco, et del vino, che subito gionto fece pubblicare, 
nell’uso de quali trovandosi Turchi hormai grandemente smerci, non potriano sopportarla, se non 
sapessero ella esser fatta a solo fine di cavar danaro con la rinovatione della concessione, ne 
vedendosi all’incontro sin hora alla lunga, et grande carestia del pane, et di tutte le cose, come pur 
sperava il popolo dalla sua venuta, rimedio alcuno, ne sente, et mostra un sommo discontento.” Many 
shops had been closed because of the scarce of money. Ibid., fol. 23r: “Sono hormai, in gironi 
dall’entrata di Sua Maesta et a questi numeri mercanti non apparisse lume alcuno del miglioramento 
del negozio, come speravano, continuando piu che mai la strettezza del danaro senza alcun spacio.” 
171 ASVe, SPAC, Registro 18/VII, no. 66 (dated October 26, 1621), fol. 10v-r: “che essendo la notte 
di 20 del Corrente nato a Sua Maesta il figliolo primogenito et suo successor all’imperio et 
speditogliene immediate in somma diligenza l’aviso che lo troverà per camino mutasse risolutione et 
si conferisce qui per goder personalmente di tal successo et visitar la Madre chiamata Melica 
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Meanwhile, on February 5, 1622, the four-month Prince Ömer died under most 
unexpected circumstances. According to the Venetian bailo, when Osman II and 
Mehlika Sultan, together with their son and other female members of the dynasty, 
were watching a re-enactment of the sultan’s Polish campaign organized as a big 
show at the palace, one of the acemioğlans playing the role of a Polish soldier 
discharged his gun and caused a ricochet. His stray bullet found and killed Prince 
Ömer instantly.173 This was a great trauma for Osman. He was not only devastated, 
but started to display a more brutal character. It is reported that, during first three 
days after he lost his son, the sultan did not speak a word and remained aloof from 
the public while contemplating in deep grief. Then, he resumed his incognito travels 
in the capital in the company of a small retinue and began literally praying on any 
wrongdoer. For instance, he busted the taverns and the chambers of the Janissary 
officers (yasakçı odaları), where he severely punished all the soldiers and common 
people whom he found in the company of prostitutes or drinking wine.174 Overall, 
after this tragic event, the sultan developed a more hot-tempered and intolerant 
nature, a problem which the academic literature on Osman II typically overlooks. 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
(Milicha), la quale Russia di natione di bassa nascita, presa da piccola fanciulla, et fatta schiava di 
Amurat (murat) Primo Vesir, fu doppo morte di lui seguita in Persia donata da sua moglie al deposto 
Chislar Agasi, dal qual amata come figliola, et fatta libera, veduta un giorno dal Re, et invaghitosi 
della sua bellezza, che dicono esser molto rara, la ricercò adesso Chislar, che si scuso non poter per 
la legge essendo fatta libera, dargliela se la Maesta Sua non la sposava, il che havendo lei effettuata 
gli mostro sempre sopra l’altre su danne segni di molt’amore, et hora per questo parto, con che all’è 
divenuta, et sara nell’avvenir trattata come Regina per esser Madre del successore, si può creder 
crescerà tanto piu, con universal opinione che sia ella per haver grand’autorità col Re, et per indurlo 
ancora a richiamar il detto chislar, del quale riconosce ogni sua grandezza.” For details of the 
haseki, see Peirce, Imperial Harem, pp. 91-99. 
172 Peirce, The Imperial Harem, pp. 106-107; and Hammer, p. 211.  
173 ASVe, SPAC, Registro 18/VIII, no. 92 (dated February 5, 1622, m.v.) fol. 40v-r: “Una di queste 
passate notti fece il Re a instanza della Regina et dell’altre Sultane rappresentar in con Cortile del 
Seraglio un finto spettacolo della passata guerra di Polonia con l’oppugnatione di trincere fabricate 
di tavole nelle quali era hora numero di Acamogliani vestiti, et armati alla franca per la diffesa, et 
altri di fuori alla Turchesca per il offesa, tra seguirono molti simulati assalti, scaramunie contiri di 
moschetti, con morte anco d’alcuno dell’azamoglani predetti, et se bene per non causar troppo 
strepita non fu sbarata l’artellaria, non fu pero si poco, che non cagionasse la morte del Principino 
figliolo di Sua Maesta, il quale per li patimenti del viaggio si trovava indisposto, sentita con molto 
dolare da lei che per tre giorni stete retirata senza parlar con alcuno, doppo i quali ritornata ai suoi 
modi di predetta va la notte vagendo per la citta accompagnata da pochi per spiar, et castigar 
capitalmente li trasgressori dei suoi ordini, particolarmente li bevitori del tabacco, com’è seguito 
d’alcuno.” 
174 Tûgī, Musîbetnâme, pp. 13-15. Yasakçı is a janissary officer responsible for public order. See 
İsmail Hakkı Uzunçarşılı, Osmanlı Devleti Teşkilatında Kapukulu Ocakları, 2 volumes (Ankara, Türk 
Tarih Kurumu, 1984), vol. I, p. 197. 
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3.2 Osman’s Plans for Pilgrimage !
As these events were unfolding in the capital, the rebellion of Fakhr al-Din Ibn 
Ma‘n, the Druze emir in Lebonan, erupted and began occupying the agenda of the 
Ottoman imperial government. The Deputy Grand Vizier Ahmed Pasha informed 
Osman II that Ibn Ma‘n had long been in alliance with some European princes for 
many years, but he could not succeed in obtaining their full support. However, the 
vizier noted, the Polish campaign provided him the opportunity in that he recently 
managed to occupy several cities in the region as the Ottoman local forces were 
serving at the Polish frontier. The Venetian bailo claims that, upon learning the 
gravity of the situation, Osman II immediately sent 40.000 imperial Janissaries and 
sipahis to suppress this revolt.175 As mentioned in the last chapter, Ibn Ma‘n’s revolt 
was used by government viziers to dissuade the sultan from his idea of spending the 
winter in Edirne and accordingly undertaking a new campaign against Poland the 
following season. However, the vizier’s strategy failed in that, as Giustinian notes, 
Ibn Ma’n was in alliance with the Polish king, and also possibly with the Safavid 
shah, in his war against the Ottomans. Hence, the sultan had no option but to launch 
a campaign in the Eastern front, which meant the division of the Ottoman imperial 
forces into two, thus a much smaller army for a possible Polish campaign.  
As Osman II focused on the suppression of the rebellion by Ibn Ma‘n, one of 
the allies of the Druze emir and the chief enemy of the Ottomans, the Spanish king 
planned to send his armada into the Mediterranean, to make a joint attack with the 
Cossacks from the Black Sea.176 Nearly six months into the rebellion of Ibn Ma‘n, 
Osman II declared his will to personally lead an imperial army in order to punish Ibn 
Ma’n and thus dropped his intention to renew his campaign against Poland. Osman 
had already announced his plans for making a pilgrimage journey to Mecca and visit 
several major cities along the way. Now, his pilgrimage plans were mixed with an 
imperial campaign against Ibn Ma’n.  
For this reason, on January 29, 1621, an extraordinary council was called at the 
palace with the participation of the Mufti, Esad Efendi, and the sultan’s tutor, Hace !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
175 ASVe, SPAC, Registro 18/VI, no. 56 (dated August 31, 1621), fols. 33v-r. See also Roe, 
Negotiations, p. 14. 
176 ASVe, SPAC, Registro. 18/VII, no. 67 (dated October 26, 1621), fol. 15v. 
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Ömer Efendi, in order to plan the sultan’s pilgrimage and campaign in the east.177 
The following day, 150.000 gold coins were taken from the inner treasury for the 
preparation of the so-called Pilgrimage Campaign, which seemed to have aimed Ibn 
Ma’n in the first place. Only after the sultan successfully suppressed this critical 
rebellion in Lebanon, he could go to Mecca and make his pilgrimage. However, the 
amount allocated for his campaign indicate that it was for the pilgrimage journey 
rather than a full-fledged military campaign. 
 For his campaign against Ibn Ma‘n, Osman II did not take the majority of the 
imperial Janissaries and the sipahis with him. He instead preferred a small and 
inexperienced army. According to the contemporary sources, for instance, there were 
3.000 Janissary novices (acemioğlans).178 The Venetian bailo notes that the reason 
behind this choice of the sultan was related to the poor performance of the imperial 
army at the failed siege of Hotin during his Polish campaign and that Osman sought 
to restore his reputation by undertaking a new campaign in the eastern front, yet 
without the same army.179 Osman also knew that the Janissaries could pose a threat 
during his campaign as they already rose in revolt once about their unpaid payrolls 
during the Polish campaign. That is to say, Osman II might have thought that his 
imperial army could stage a similar rebellion during the long Pilgrimage campaign. 
Hence the sultan seems to rely on newly recruited sekbans from Anatolia and the 
acemioğlans from his imperial household rather than potentially rebellious 
Janissaries and sipahis.  
At this moment, the Janissaries and sipahis opposed openly the sultan’s 
pilgrimage campaign and they threatened the government viziers in that the sultan 
should not pass over Asia and move against Ibn Ma‘n.180 The campaign-weary 
soldiers were evidently unwilling to begin a new campaign immediately following 
the Polish one. Moreover, they were alienated from their sultan mainly because of 
Osman’s tight-fisted nature, that is, his aggressive fiscal policy, as discussed before. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
177 ASVe, SPAC, Registro 18/VIII, no. 91 (dated February 5, 1622, m.v.), fols. 36r-37v. 
178 Ibid., fols. 39r-40v: “Tenne anco la Maesta Sua li passati giorni una Porta grande, che cosi 
chiamano quando dal suo, et altri seragli manda fuori di quei giovani che si allevano in essi, 
facendoli passar megl’ordini militari di Muzafer Aga, che son lancie spezzate, Giannizari, spai, et 
altri, et ne sono usciti un numero di tre mille, con che riempendosi li predetti ordini è indicio di 
guerra, et già più di dieci anni che non s’era fatto.”  
179 Ibid., fols. 37v-r. 
180 ASVe, SPAC, Registro 18/VIII, no. 86 (dated January 20, 1622, m.v.), fol. 22r. 
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In addition, they had problems in receiving their payrolls, suffering from lack of 
provisions and other critical logistical needs. According to the Venetian bailo, all the 
Ottoman provinces had been suffering the famine, most particularly the lack of grain. 
The sultan had experienced the lack of provision had an adverse impact on the 
military campaign in the midst of extreme winter conditions.181  
Despite all these problems, Osman II ordered his grand admiral, Halil Pasha, to 
build eighty new galleys in anticipation of a war against the joint Spanish-Cossack 
attacks in the Mediterranean and the Black Sea.182 It is interesting to see that despite 
his well-known tight-fisted nature, the sultan spent a quite a large sum for the 
construction of these new warships.183 Overall, Osman II was concerned in that, 
while he was fighting against Ibn Ma‘n, his imperial navy should have provided 
security for the sea routes and prevented any financial or military aid from European 
allies of the Druze emir.184  
As his war plans were underway, three of the most powerful figures of the 
imperial government, namely, Grand Vizier Dilaver Pasha, the Mufti Esad Efendi 
and the royal tutor Ömer Efendi, together tried to change Osman II’s mind regarding 
his pilgrimage to Mecca. 185 The opposition of these three powerful advisors of the 
sultan convinced Osman. However, In the last days of the March 1621, he announced 
again that he aborted his pilgrimage campaign, which would be highly risky given 
that the Polish and Spanish forces in the West could easily threaten the stability of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
181 ASVe, SPAC, Registro 18/VIII, no. 91 (dated February 5, 1622, m.v.), fols. 38v-r. 
182 ASVe, SDC, filza 93, no. 114 (dated April 16, 1622), fol. 171v: “Quest’inverno in diversi de suoi 
arsenali 80 galee nuove per far l’anno futuro armata di 150, ne ancora si puo penetrar con qual 
disegno ben si sa essersi mosso a dar il predetto ordine quando tornato dalla querra et parlando col 
Capitan Bassa del numero che patria uscir quest anno.” See also Roe, Negotiations, p. 21. 
183 ASVe, SDC, filza 93, no. 120 (dated May 11, 1622), fols. 236r-237v. 
184ASVe, SPAC, Registro 18/VIII, no. 96 (dated February 19, 1622, m.v.), fol. 51r: “Di mi per le 
cause scritte stanno in sospetto, disegnando assediarlo da Terra, et da mar con parte dell’armata per 
impedirgli l’aiuto de Principi Cristiani, et il salvarsi nei stati loro con 4, Bertoni.” 
185 Ibid., fols. 52r-v: “La Maesta Sua sia per andargli contra in persona per le disuasioni del Primo 
Vesir, Coza, et Mufti, che dicono havergli di mostrato non convenuto alla sua grandezza moversi per 
un impresa di poca importanza, ne alli suoi interessi partirsi d’Europa mentre la pace con Polachi 
non è ancor sicura, et l’Ongharia travagliata dall’armi dell’imperatore dicendosi pero, che la Maesta 
Sua commettera il carico di quest’impresa a Cussein deposto hora di Bassa del Cairo con qualche 
parte delle militie d’Asia senza servirsi di quelle d’Europa, che per li patimenti, et danno sofferti 
nella guerra d’Polonia, et disgustate grandemente del Re difficilmente in passeriano, et quanto 
all’armata pascerà una parte di essa in quei mari al fine predetto, et con l’altra s’opponeranno alla 
Spagnola per in spedir i suoi dissegni col tenerle militie d’Europa pronte per le cose di Polonia, et 
per quelle d’Ongharia ancora secondo ricercherà l’occasione, mandandole sotto il Primo Vesir, o 
altri senza moversi Sua Maesta.“  
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the empire given while the sultan was away from his capital for another campaign 
which would take place at least for twenty months.186 Ömer Efendi and Esad Efendi 
recommended the sultan to construct a mosque as an indicator of his religious 
devotion which would merit in God’s sight as much as going to Mecca.187 
The abortion of his pilgrimage campaign allowed Osman to focus on his 
marriages. Mehlika Sultan had fallen from being the favorite concubine of the sultan 
soon after the death of her son Prince Ömer. Her haseki title was taken back.188 In 
her place, Osman did not take another concubine, but rather he wanted to marry the 
grand-daughter of Pertev Pasha, born from an Ottoman princess. In doing so, Osman 
acted against the established Ottoman dynastic tradition of marrying women from 
inside the imperial harem. According to the Venetian bailo, his viziers opposed the 
sultan’s will and warned him about some risks in marrying with a distant cousin. 
They tried hard to change the sultan’s mind in this matter, but the sultan insisted.189  
Leslie Peirce notes that such royal marriages between the Ottoman sultans and 
the daughters of Ottoman ruling viziers paid the way for the emergence of some 
powerful vüzera families and of court factions. These families formed alternative 
foci of power among the Ottoman ruling elite, which in turn challenged the sovereign 
authority of the sultan.190 However, in the case of Osman II, he did not just want to 
marry one woman. He considered three Muslim wives, all of whom came outside of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
186 ASVe, SDC, filza 93, no. 108 (dated April 1, 1622), fol. 105r. 
187 ASVe, SDC, filza 93, no. 101 (dated March 5, 1622), fol. 36v-r: “havendo il Mufti, et Coza per 
divertirlo dal viaggio della Mecca fattolo certo, che con la fabrica della detta Moschea acquiterà 
appresso iddio molto maggior merito, et se lo adempirà sarà di grandissima spesa.” 
188 ASVe, SDC, filza 93, no. 99 (dated March 5, 1622), fol. 21v-r: “hora essendo alla perla morte del 
Principe caduta dal titolo di Regina, et per le varole sopragiontegli dalla gratia del Re, non occorre 
verso di lei far altro, et con questa nova delle qualità, che ho scritto, se ben si dice essergli molto in 
gratia, loderei per il mio riverente senso non far spesa alcuna, se prima alla non si vede stabilita in 
essa col parto del Principe, et col titolo di Regina, che deriva da esso.” 
189 ASVe, SPAC, Registro.18/VIII, no. 96 (dated February 19, 1622, m.v.), fol. 53r: “Per la morte 
dell’unico figliolo di Sua Maesta ha lei preso con altra moglie, non delle sue schiave del seraglio, 
com’è stato sempre solito dei suoi maggiori, ma una fuori nepote del già Portavi Bassa, che 
discendendo da Sultana, ha dispiaciuto assai ai Vesiri per esser cosa in solita, et di male 
consequenze, et hanno fatto molto per rimoverlo, ma essendo la Maestà Sua molto tenace del suo 
proposito, ha voluto eseguirloet si dice ne piglierà dall’altre senza pero solennità alcuno.” Moreover, 
the bailo mentioned also the reasons of the opposition “numero 108 dell’altre risolutioni fatte senza 
costume et ragione vedendosi in molte cose allontanarsi egli assai dal costume suoi maggiori de quali 
sogliono li Ottomani esser molto tenaci et particolarmente nelle amogliarsi con donne libere fuori del 
seraglio che da loro non è stato mai fatto et puo nell governo causar delle alterationi.” See also Roe, 
Negotiations, p. 20. 
190 Peirce, The Imperial Harem, p. 143. Tezcan, “Searching For Osman,” pp.  p. 377, n. 93. 
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the imperial harem. One of these wives was Akile, the daughter of the Mufti Esad 
Efendi, whose family, the Hocazades, was one of the most powerful ulema families 
in Ottoman history.191 At first, Esad Efendi refused the sultan’s intention to marry his 
daughter, because such a marriage would constitute a serious break in the Ottoman 
dynastic tradition.192 The bailo Giustinian notes that Osman II was considered to be 
capricious and immature in the eyes of his people and that he acted without first 
consulting his advisors. Moreover, according to the bailo, these marriages were seen 
as new practices that could harm the well-being of the empire.193  
Meanwhile, the government viziers were concerned in that the sultan’s marriage 
to the daughter of the mufti could disrupt the delicate balance of power in the 
imperial court for it would enable Esad Efendi to exert more influence over the 
sultan, thus emergence of an alternative focus of power among them. In the end, 
despite his initial refusal, Esad Efendi complied with the sultan’s demand to marry 
his daughter. As the wedding dowry, Osman II gave 600.000 gold coins to his new 
father-in-law. The marriage was celebrated in the Old Palace with fireworks in 
March 1622.194  
The Venetian bailo comments on this marriage by saying that Esad Efendi had 
accepted it simply to dissuade Osman II from undertaking the Pilgrimage 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
191 Tezcan, “Searching For Osman, “ pp. 116-124; and DIA, s.v.“Hoca Sâdeddin,” by Şerafettin 
Turan, vol. 18, pp. 196-198. 
192 ASVe, SDC, filza 93, no. 101 (dated March 5, 1622), fols. 36v-r: “Il Re oltre la moglie, che ha 
hora sposato, disegna sposare 3 altre come la loro legge gli permette, tra quali una figliola del Mufti, 
che sia hora si scusa di dargliela, come cosa non mai usata da suoi precessori di sposar altre che le 
sue schiave, et di male conseguenze, et essempio che fa accrescer anco quel poco gusto, che par che 
la Maesta Sua tenga verso di esso.” Peirce, The Imperial Harem, pp. 69-71. 
193 ASVe, SDC, filza 93, no. 101 (dated March 5, 1622), fols. 36v-r. 
194 ASVe, SDC, filza 93, no. 108 (dated April 1, 1622), fols. 105r-v: “Ma in un Prencipe cosi grande, 
giovine et capriccioso può vedersi questa, dell’altre risolutioni fatte senza consiglio, et ragione, 
vedendosi in molte cose allontanarsi egli assai dal costume de suoi maggiori, de quali sogliono li 
Ottomani esser molto tenaci, et particolarmente nelle amogliarsi con donne libere fuori del seraglio, 
che da loco non è stato mai fatto, et puo nel governo causar delle alterationi, per ciò il Mufti ha fatto 
sin hora quanto ha potuto per non gli dar la figliola, ma finalmente potendo resister alla sua volonta, 
ha convenuto dargliela, et la Maesta sua mandatogli il Chibini di 600 mille cecchini per dote, terzo 
giorno la fece trasferir nel serraglio vecchio, dove lei si ritorna consumando seco il matrimonio, et 
celebrandolo con solennità di feste, et di fuochi, ad mettendo poi la mattina seguente li Visiri a 
baciargli la veste, et rallegrarsene, col mezzo della quale, se riuscirà, et saprà farsi grata a sua 
maesta, e da creder, che il Mufti acquisterà seco grande autorità, et sara molto servitio della Serenita 
Vostra per la sua buona continuata affettazione verso di lei.” 
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campaign.195 As noted in the last chapter, Esad Efendi had similarly tried to change 
Osman’s mind towards not waging a war against Poland, but he was not successful at 
that time. This time, as the sultan’s father-in-law and a long-time advisor, Esad 
Efendi managed to convince Osman not to leave the capital for another uncertain and 
dangerous campaign. 
While Osman himself got married with Muslim women and establish close 
relations with the highest-ranking ulema, he also married his two sisters with two 
viziers, thus formed political alliances among his ruling elite. These brother-in-laws 
were known as the royal damads.196 In late March 1622, the sultan married Ayşe 
Sultan, the ex-wife of former Grand Vizier Nasuh Pasha, to the Governor of Van, 
Hafız Ahmed Pasha, and his other sister, to the Governor of Damascus, Murtaza 
Pasha.197  
On the other hand, back in February 1622, Osman made some important changes 
in the administrative ranks. He appointed his royal favorite, Chief Gardener Bebr 
Mehmed Agha, to the governorship of Egypt and replaced Mere Hüseyin Pasha 
therein. As seen before, Bebr Mehmed Agha had been charged with the duty to 
providing the security of the capital during the Polish campaign. Upon Osman II’s 
return to Istanbul, he presented him a new royal barge, which he constructed out of 
his personal wealth for a small fortune.198 As a royal favorite, Bebr Mehmed clearly !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
195 Ibid., fol. 106v-r: “et che l’invecchiata prudenza del Mufti divenuto suo suocero, habbia a servir 
per moderar con i suoi consigli l’ardente giovinezza del Re, divertirlo particolarmente dal viaggio 
predetto.” 
196 On Ottoman royal damads, see Peirce, Imperial Harem, pp. 65-67; and DIA, s.v.“Damad,” by 
Özdemir Nutku, vol. 8, pp. 434-435; Tülay Artan "Royal weddings and the Grand Vezirate: 
Institutional and Symbolic Change in the Early Eighteenth Century", Royal Courts in Dynastic States 
and Empires: A Global Perspective,eds. Duindam, Jeroen and Artan, Tülay and Kunt, Metin (Leiden: 
Brill 2011), pp. 339-399. 
197 ASVe, SDC, filza 93, no. 108 (dated April 1, 1622), fol. 106r: “Continua tuttavia la Maestà sua 
gia molti giorni nel detto serraglio, dove ha dissegnato maritar in diversi, soggetti 200 di quelle 
donne che vi habitano, havendo anche concluso matrimonio di due sue sorelle; una fu moglie di 
Nasuf, in Cafis Bassa di Van, che hora si trova in viaggio di ritorno, et fu gia capitan del Mare, et 
l’altra minor nel suo Tornacchi, che è un capo de Giannizzeri, di quelle, che hano cura delle Grue di 
sua maesta, et di quella caccia un'altra ne voleva dar al figliolo, che fu Cemecogli, ma egli sin hora si 
scusa con la povertà, riuscendo il matrimonio con le Sultane ne per la molto spesa, et per il loco 
predominio sopra i mariti, peso granissimo, et intollerabile dai Bassa di conto mai procurato. é stata 
la maestà sua questa settimana piu d’una volta incognita nell’Arsanele, per veder se si sollecita il 
lavoro, et ha donato al Capitan Bassa doi Veste a tal effetto, il quale affretta hora grandemente 
quello delle galee per mar negro, che saranno venti fra pochi giorni all’ordine per partir.” See also 
Tezcan, “Searching for Osman,” p. 334, n. 58. 
198 ASVe, SPAC, Registro.18/VIII, no. 86 (dated January 20, 1622, m.v.), fols. 23v-r: “Il Chiosco co 
he nell’absenza del Re ha egli fatto fabricate e riuscito alla Maesta Sua molto grato poi che quando 
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knew how to influence his master or how to ask for new royal favors. For instance, in 
order to secure his appointment to Egypt, he promised the sultan a total of 300.000 
gold coins as a downpayment for the annual tribute of Egypt, which was worth over 
one million gold coins. According to the bailo, it was typically the sword-bearer of 
the sultan who were used to get appointed to the governorship of Egypt, but this 
time, it was granted to Bebr Mehmed Pasha, because the power of his weath was the 
only measure in the eyes of Osman for appointments rather than the power of 
sword.199 
Tezcan claims that the appointments of Bebr Mehmed Agha to the governorship 
of Egypt, and of the sultan’s brother-in-laws, Chief Falconer Murtaza Agha and 
Hafız Pasha, to the governorships of Damascus and Diyarbakır, respectively, were all 
related to the sultan’s secret plan to recruit a new army with which he aimed to create 
a secure zone in Egypt and the Levant.200 However, the Venetian bailo’s reports 
suggest a different scenario. First of all, these appointments were related or noted to 
the sultan’s secret plan by any contemporary source. In the case of Bebr Mehmed 
Agha, as mentioned above, his appointment was evidently a result of the sultan’s 
interest in procuring more cash and funds for his personal treasury, whose chief 
source was the annual tribute of Egypt. Moreover, Murtaza Agha was most probably 
appointed to the governorship of Damascus only after the aforementioned sultanic 
marriages took place at the end of March 1622, that is, there was not enough time to 
create a secure zone in the region. Moreover, according to Bostanzâde Yahya Efendi, 
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fu a vederlo vi(gli) trovo dentro oltre gl’altri ornamenti 200 mille scudi contanti che il Bustangi 
haveva fatto riporre in certi armari nell’apprir de quali si rallegro molto la vista del Re et gliene 
dono 10 mille.” 
199 ASVe, SPAC, Registro. 18/VIII, no. 90 (dated February 5, 1621), fols. 36r-v: “tanto più sarà 
necessarie qualche provisione quanto che tenendosi per ferma la dessignatione del Bustangi Bassi 
huomo rapacissimo in Bassa del Cairo, che per ottenerla ha promesso al Re la meta di quel Casna 
d’un anno avvanti tratto, che importa 300 mille cecchini seguiterà l’esempio del presente che ha 
espilato dalli numeri mercanti 80 mille piastre senza speranza di ricuperarle, se non si vuol 
apertamente romper col detto Bassa… È stato per il passato quali sempre solito, che il Bassalaggio 
del Cairo principale di tutti gl’altri, et di gran provechio si conferisca al scilitar del Re, che è quello, 
che gli porta la spada, ma questa volta per riserbarlo al Bustangi il Re ha conferito all’altro quello di 
Buda, mosso dall’effetto verso esso Bustangi guadagnato con la forza dell’oro, che è il solo unico 
mezzo con Sua Maestà.” Bebr Mehmed Pasha departed from the capital on February 19, 1622. See 
ASVe, SPAC, Registro 18/VIII, no. 94 (dated February 19, 1622, m.v.) fol. 46r: “essende come 
predissi con le passate mie riverenti lettere a Vostra Serenita sequita l’elettione del Bustangi Bassi in 
Bassa del Cairo che sta di partenza.” 
200 Tezcan, “Searching for Osman,” p. 238. 
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Osman II was intenting to do a long hunting trip in and around Damascus after he 
would eliminate the army of Ibn Ma‘n in Tripoli.201  
 Osman II resumed the preparations for his Pilgrimage campaign shortly after the 
aforementioned marriages of his are completed in the Old Palace. As a last resort, the 
ruling viziers called Aziz Mahmud Hudai, a well-known sufi sheikh in the capital, to 
act as a mediator on their behalf before the sultan and to dissuade Osman from going 
to campaign. But Aziz Mahmud Hudai could not do much. He failed in his mission 
to deter Osman II from his plans.202 The bailo claims that all the government viziers 
and the Mufti Esad Efendi had to accept the sultan’s firmness in this matter. Just like 
in the case of his Polish campaign, Osman was truly fixated in realizing this 
Pilgrimage campaign, with the main aim of eliminating Ibn Ma‘n. According to his 
plans, Osman II would first stop Konya and then he would reach Damascus, which 
was also known as the first gathering station of the pilgrims to Mecca. In Damascus, 
he would also visit the well-known Islamic shrines.203  
On April 16, 1622, the Venetian bailo wrote to his Senate, informing them about 
the Pilgrimage campaign of Osman II in that the sultan would depart from the capital 
within a month and that the dismissed Grand Vizier Hüseyin Pasha and the sultan’s 
brother-in-law Vizier Recep Pasha would accompany him. Meanwhile, Osman II 
wanted his Grand Vizier Dilaver Pasha and Esad Efendi to stay in the capital. 
According to the bailo, it was uncertain whether or not the Deputy Grand Vizier 
Ahmed Pasha would be left in the capital as well. 204  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
201 Bostanzâde, p. 210. 
202 ASVe, SDC, filza 93, no. 114 (dated April 16, 1622), fols. 168v-r: “et pero si sono anche li Visiri 
valsi del mezo di Mahamut effendi Santon di Scuttari, sperando che le sue persuasioni, et auttorità 
potesse scioglier l’animo del Re da questo voto, ma non ha fatto effetto.” 
203 Ibid., fols. 167r-v: “Non ostante le efficaci dissuasioni di tutti i Visiri et del Mufti medesimo, nel 
suo fisso, et fermo proponimento al viaggio predetto, dal quale vedendo essi Vesiri, non ostante le 
tante considerationi di stato, et gl’interessi in contrario, non poter divertirlo hanno tra loro 
consultato di tentarlo, doppo che la Maestà Sua si sarà incaminata, sperando con la difficolta del 
camino in viaggio tanto lungo, et gli deserti che si hanno da passar, et per altri rispetti de incursioni 
de Arabi, et di altri mali incontri, molto pericoloso, et incommodo persuadergli quello, che non 
possono hora col fargli trovar meglio di andar a Cogna, citta in Natolia, poco discosto di qua, o pur 
in Damasco, dove si travano molti sepoleri de lor Santoni, poiche scoprono il pensiero del detto 
viaggio esser entrato nell’animo della Maestà Sua piu per stimolo di devotione.”  
204 Ibid., fols. 168r-v: “Dissegna la Maesta sua mettersi in viaggio fra un mese in circa, et condur 
seco per quanto si dice Cusseim, Rezep, et quale che altro Visir, et voleva lasciar qui al governo il 
Primo, egli temendo della sua absenza di restar scavalcato da Cusseim, ha fatto tanto, che lo 
condurrà anche, esso del Caimecan che dovera restar qui, non si sa ancora il certo, ma si parla di 
Caffis, novo cognato del Gran Signore, o di Cussiem, che vien dal Cairo, ambidoi absenti, non 
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Similarly, Osman II planned to leave his imperial army in Rumeli under the 
command of Dilaver Pasha in the face of potential threats from rival European 
powers. The imperial soldiers in Rumeli opposed the recruitment of new soldiers for 
the sultan’s pilgrimage campaign. The Venetian bailo notes that Osman II would not 
intentionally mobilize a large army so as not to make Abbas I, the Safavid shah, 
suspicious of his campaign, because it had already been speculated that the Safavid 
shah suspected a hidden agenda by the Ottoman sultan that he would attack Iran 
during his Pilgrimage campaign. In order to show goodwill and to quell the 
suspicions of the Safavid shah, Osman sent Abbas valuable gifts as well as noted that 
he only recruited a small army of 2000 Janissaries and 1000 sipahis for his 
campaign.205 Overall, the total number of people who would participate in this 
campaign was estimated to be around 10.000, including Osman’s two new wives.  
Osman planned to spend the Ramadan festival in Jerusalem. Moreover, as a ritual 
of every pilgrimage year, a new cover for the Ka‘aba was prepared with the sultan’s 
name on it. Traditionally, this cover was sent to the sheriffs of Mecca and Medina 
well before the pilgrimage season. This time, however, the cover would be delivered 
to the sultan before his planned departure from Jerusalem in October 1622. 
Afterwards, Osman II would pass to Mecca to make his pilgrimage together with 
other Muslims. After Mecca, the sultan would then visit the tomb of Prophet 
Muhammed in Medina.206 Accordingly, the imperial government worked diligently 
to finish all the necessary logistical and military preparations for Osman’s pilrimage !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
conosciuti da me, ma per quanto intendo di pessima natura, et inclinatizione, ma si crede che sopra 
intendente a questo et superior all’istesso Caimecan sia per lasciarvi il Mufti, la figlia del quale, o 
altre donne, non si sa ancora, se condurrà seco.” 
205 Ibid., fol. 168r: “Quando alle militie non dissegna di condur altri, che 2 mille Giannizzeri et mille 
spai, et cio per non insospettir il Persiano, che questa sua mossa sia contra di esso, seben d’alcuni si 
va speculando, che anzi il principale fine del Gran Signore sia questo per indur quel Ré, con tale 
timore a mandarli il presente delle sede.” 
206 ASVe, SDC, filza 93, no. 122 (dated May 14, 1622), fols. 267r-268v: “Mentre scrivo passano gran 
numero de cavalli, et camelli a Scutrai per il viaggio del Re, che dissegna condur seco 10 mille 
persone in tutto, cioè 2 mille Giannizari altre tanti spai, il resto gente di suo servitio, et dei grandi, 
che lo seguiterano, dicendosi anco, che condurra la figliola del Mufti, et un’altra sua moglie: si 
fermerà tutto il tempo del Ramasano, et del Bairan grande in Gieruselam vistando quei santi luochi, 
tenuti dal santo sepolero in poi, non credendo Turchi la morte di H.S, in molta venerate, dove, dio 
voglia, che sotto titolo di devotione non faccia qualche alterate a pregiudico di essi: partirà poi di la 
per la Meca, che sarà coperta per le mani del Ré, di un panno d’oro molto ricco, che a tal effetto 
porta seco, et che son soliti i Re Ottomani mandar ogn’anno alla Casa di detta Meca, dove dissegna 
trovarvisi al Bairan piccolo, che quest’anno cade al prossimo Ottobre, tempo proprio della visita di 
quel luoco, et nel quale tutti i pellegrini Mussulmani vi capitano, passando a Medina poiche giornate 
dicosto, dove è la sepoltura di Macometto, se ben vivono tuttavia i vesiri in speranza di poter per 
camino divertirlo ancora dal detto viaggio.” 
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campaign. Yet, these preparations were lessened by the Polish campaign. For 
instance, the sultan had to prefer a smaller royal tent and allocated fewer numbers of 
horses and camels.207  
 
3.3 Waiting for a Rebellion 
 
As noted before, various dissident views and voices had been already raised about 
Osman’s prospective journey. According to the Venetian bailo, 
The sultan is very much fixated on the idea of pilgrimage. It brings a 
dangerous consideration of his deposition that come from all aforesaid 
voices. The sultan has amused it since now. When it would be forcibly 
seen to do so, for the sake of Republic, it would conceive so great hatred 
and indignation against him that would be danger and wanted openly to 
end the campaign, and sent the sultan to the cage for which may have 
been forced to stop. Because, it has been agreed to make every effort to 
do every action for purging him from such impression. I have known 
very well that all viziers, the mufti, the sultan’s tutor and the chief 
eunuch [Süleyman Agha] and every other have been against the sole and 
unique object. They have to cancel the campaign.208 
This opposition came not just from the ruling viziers, but also from the sultan’s 
chief favorites and advisors, most notably, Hace Ömer Efendi, and Süleyman Agha. 
These power-brokers of the sultan were well aware of the growing uneasiness and 
the dissident voices against the sultanate of Osman II in the capital. However, they 
were clearly not successful in persuading Osman II to abort his campaign plans.209 
Moreover, they must have been aware of the alienation of the campaign-weary 
Janissaries and sipahis, as well as the people in the capital from Osman II. On May !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
207 ASVe, SDC, filza 93, no. 114 (dated April 16, 1622), fol. 169r: “Volendo il Gran Signore veder 
partita l’una, et l’altra Armata, ha sollecitato tanto Il Captain Bassa che quella per il Mar negro di 
17 galee non essendosi per la fretta potuto arrivar alle 20 è uscita da questo canale alli 11 del 
corrente transferendosi a Bisictas.” 
208 ASVe, SDC, filza 93, no. 120 (dated May 11, 1622), fol. 238r-v: “trovandosi il Re tanto fermo, et 
fisso nel pensiero del detto viaggio, che ruina consideratione é rispetto, ne il pericolo istesso della 
sua propria depositione che dalla voce di tutti gli vien predetta, ha potuto sin hora divertirlo, quando 
si vedesse constretto a farlo per causa della Republica, concepirebbe cosi grande odio e sdegno 
contra di lei, che sarà pericolo, che con aperta rottura volesse sfogarla, et mandar ad effetto la 
cagione, per la quale fosse stato sforzato a fermarsi, pero convenendosi far ogn’ opera per purgarlo 
da tali impressioni, et conoscendo molto ben io, haver in ciò tutti i Visiri, Mufti, Coza, Chislar, et ogni 
altro contrario per il solo, et unico oggetto, che hanno di distornar il detto viaggio.” See also Roe, 
Negotiations, p. 34. 
209 More interestingly, in spite of their opposition to the Pilgrimage campaign, most contemporary 
Ottoman authors accuse the sultan’s favorites of not diverting the mind of the sultan from this 
campaign as well as recruiting a new army. I will further discuss this problem in the next chapter. 
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11, 1621, the Venetian bailo wrote a detailed report about to this alienation of the 
imperial army and the common people in the capital. According to the Venetian 
bailo, the imperial soldiers detested the pilgrimage campaing. They began to speak 
freely of the Osman II’s deposition whether he carried the pilgrimage campaing out. 
The Venetian Bailo claims that they alinetaed from Osman II and his reign due to his 
tight fisted nature and his intervention to the social life such wandering incognito in 
the streets of the capital, giving assult to the taverns and castigating the Muslims.210 
On the other hand, the contemporary Ottoman writer Peçevi claims that, a few days 
before the rebellion, a rumor started to circulate in the streets of Istanbul in that the 
preparations for the sultan’s pilgrimage to Mecca was nothing but a deception and 
that the sultan in fact planned to relocate the capital from Istanbul to Cairo. This 
rumor deepened the alienation of the imperial army towards the sultan.211 Soon, all 
the accumulated grievances, discontent and alienation turned into a full storm, 
targeting directly Osman and his sultanate. On May 14, 1622, the Venetian bailo 
reported that, 
Some speak very freely from each other about a great revolution and 
about the sultan’s deposition for the usual difficulties in their 
payments.212 
Only four days after this dispatch, a massive rebellion erupted in the capital. At 
the beginning, though, the main target of the mutiny was the sultan’s royal favorites. 
 
 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
210 ASVe, SDC, filza 93, no. 120 (dated May 11, 1622), fol. 240r-v: “combattendo la sua sola fissa, et 
forma volonta contra quella di tutti gl’altri, cosi grandi, come piccioli, et di tutte le militie in 
partizione, li quali detestano esso viaggio, et liberamente parlano della sua depositione , se lo 
effettuerà, et non dimeno si mostra egli pertinace in esso, come in ogn’ altra cosa che gli cade 
nell’animo senza voler ascoltar alcuno, scoprendosi sempre più l’alienatione delle militie, del popolo 
da lui per la sua avarizia, et modi di proceder diversi da suoi passati, continuando più che mai a 
vagar ogni giorno incognito per la Citta a dar l’assalto alle taverne, et castigar i Musulmani che si 
trova in esso armato di certa coravina per dubbio della sua vita, et facendo altre cose tali, che lo 
rendono odioso et formidabili ad ogn’uno.” Also see Bostanzâde, p. 225; and Tûgi, Musîbetnâme . pp. 
13-14. 
211Peçevi, II, p. 380.  
212 ASVe, SDC, filza 93, no. 121 (dated May 14, 1622), fols. 259r-260v: “temendo tutti per la mala 
volontà delle militie verso il Re, et questo suo viaggio, che resterar quasi tutte qui, et per le solite 
difficolta nei loro pagamenti di qualche grande rivolutione, parlandosi, come ho scritto, molto 
liberamente da ogn’uno della sua della sua depositione.” See also Tûgi, Musîbetnâme , pp. 5-6. 
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3.4 The Three Days of the Rebellion 
 
At dawn on Wednesday, May 18, 1622, the Janissaries, the sipahis, and the people of 
the capital gathered at the Süleymaniye Mosque and rose in revolt. They then 
marched towards the neighborhood of Aksaray, where the Janissary barracks (Yeni 
Odalar) were located.213 On the way, most soldiers were convinced that the sultan’s 
advisors were guilty for they misguided him in imperial affairs. Moreover, some 
rebels claimed that the sultan had a hidden agenda to recruit a new army from 
Anatolia and Egypt under the cover of performing a pilgrimage.214 Meanwhile, the 
royal tent was ready to be moved to Üsküdar, where final provisions for the 
pilgrimage campaign had already been carried over the Bosporus. Shortly after the 
meeting at Janissary barracks, the imperial soldiers moved towards the Mosque of 
Sultan Mehmed so as to join with a large crowd composed of common people from 
every ranks. Thereafter, they marched along the district of Karaman, where a group 
of low-ranking ulema joined them. Then they all together came to the Hippodrome, 
which had been the ceremonial-social center of the capital, today known as the 
Sultanahmed Square. They then managed to prevent the provision boats from passing 
over Üsküdar.215  
Meanwhile, Dilaver Pasha asked the Agha of the Janissaries and other officers of 
corps to convince the angry crowd to end their mutiny. Yet, the crowd instead 
attacked them.216 The crowd decided to ask for a fetva from the Mufti Esad Efendi in 
order to legitimize their actions and demands regarding the execution of the sultan’s !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
213 Tûgi, Musîbetnâme , pp. 5-7. 
214ASVe, SDC, filza 93, no. 125 (dated May 20, 1622), fols. 281r-282v: “la cosa è passata con 
accidenti forse maggiori che mai nella Casa Osmano siano successi et in questo modo, che 
continuando Osman nella sua ordinata risolute(risolutine) al viaggio della Mecca contra la volonta 
delle militie, et dei professioni della legge in particolar mentre s’imbarcava sopra tre Galee i suoi 
padiglioni et gran quantità di sue robbe per passarla a scutari le militie cosi de sipahi come 
gianizzari unite in numero più di 30 mille et gran quantità di popolo mal disposto come ho più molte 
scritto verso di esso, anticipatamente impresse dai detti professioni o vero, o falso et fosse che egli 
portasse seco tutto il tesero con fine assoldar in Asia, et metter in piedi una nuova militia per 
licenziar et disfarsi di questa della qualsi trovava per la mala prova della guerra di Polonia.” Tûgī, 
Musîbetnâme , p. 9. Also see Bostanzâde, pp. 199-200; Roe, Negotiations, pp. 43-49; and Nuh 
Arslantaş and Yaron Ben Naeh, eds., Anonim Bir İbranice Kroniğe Göre 1622-1624 Yıllarında 
Osmanlı Devleti ve İstanbul (Ankara, Türk Tarih Kurumu, 2013), p. 32. Other writers, Hasan Beyzâde 
and Peçevi, did not mention anything about a plan for a new army. I will examine the rumors about 
the recruitment of a new army in the next chapter. 
215 Tûgi, Musîbetnâme , pp. 6-8. 
216 Ibid., p. 20. 
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advisors.217 Esad Efendi provided the legal opinion to the rebels in which he 
sanctioned the execution of the advisors. Then, the crowd moved against the house 
of Hace Ömer Efendi and told him to convey their petitions to the sultan, but the 
royal tutor had escaped from home. Upon this development, the crowd plundered his 
house.218  
Next, the rebels went to the house of Dilaver Pasha and similarly asked him to be 
their representative of grievances before the sultan. At this moment, they particularly 
demanded from the sultan to cancel his pilgrimage campaign and to punish all those 
responsible persons behind this plan. However, Dilaver Pasha ordered his guards to 
shoot at the rebels, which killed a few of them, but wounded many.219 Meanwhile, 
Osman II learnt about the uprising and declared that he cancelled his prospective 
campaign. Yet, he refused to deliver Süleyman Agha and Hace Ömer Efendi to the 
rebels as they asked for execution.220 The rebels decided to go to the public markets 
to take arms for themselves, but the artisans persuaded them not to steal their 
property. As it was getting dark, the mob decided to disperse only to gather again at 
the Hippodrome the following day.221  
On Thursday, May 19, 1622, the second day of the rebellion, the outnumbered 
rebels gathered with arms in the districts of Yeni Odalar and Etmeydanı. They 
marched once again towards the Mosque of Sultan Mehmed while sending delegates 
to the leading figures of the ulema, in order to invite or force them to join the 
rebellion. All the leading figures of the ulema came to the mosque so as to consult 
with the rebels. Afterwards, the rebels marched to the Hippodrome. Among these 
ulema were Mufti Esad Efendi, Nakibü’l-eşraf Şerif Gubari Efendi, Zekeriyyazâde !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
217 Ibid., p. 21. In fact, among the contemporary Ottoman authors, only Tûgī mentions the legal 
opinion of the Mufti during the rebellion. 
218 Ibid., pp. 23-24. See also Hasan Beyzâde, III, p. 939; Peçevi, II, pp. 381-383; and Roe, 
Negotiations, p. 46. 
219 Tûgi, Musîbetnâme , p. 25; Hasan Beyzâde, III, pp. 939-40; Peçevi, II, pp. 381-383; and 
Bostanzâde, p. 200. ASVe, SDC, filza 93, no. 125 (dated May 20, 1622), fols. 290r-v: “per altro 
grandemente disgustata facevo in modo et le dette militie aggiunta all’ordinario odio questa 
impressione tutte unite et accompagnate da quantità di popolo ridussero alla Piazza del Hippodromo, 
correndo nell’istesso tempo una parte d’esse alla Casa del Coza et vesto’ del tutto saccheggiata et 
egli di salvo’ con la fuga, et un’altra a’ guella del Primo Vezir, che fa diffesa dai suoi salvandosi a ne 
di essi, si andarono poi le dette militie tirando più vicino al Serraglio seguitate dal populo 
assicurando li bottegeni et altri, che posti in gran spavento chiusero.” 
220 Tûgi, Musîbetnâme , p. 33. 
221 Ibid,. pp.20-27; and Bostanzâde, p. 200. 
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Yahya Efendi, Kafzâde Faizi Efendi, Bostanzâde Mehmed Efendi, Azimzâde Haleti 
Efendi, Kethüda Mustafa Efendi, Ömer Efendi, who was the preacher of Ayasofya, 
Sivasi Efendi, who was the preacher of the Ahmediyye Mosque, İbrahim Efendi, 
who was the preacher of Cerrah Pasha Mehmed Mosque, as well as the Derviş 
Efendi, and Kadızade Efendi, who were the prominent sufi sheiks of the period.222 
These leading ulema asked the rebels what they expected from this massive 
rebellion.223 They replied that they demanded the execution of the those ruling elite 
of Osman II and said that their death list included the royal tutor, Hace Ömer Efendi, 
the chief eunuch of the imperial harem, Süleyman Agha, Grand Vizier Dilaver Pasha 
and his deputy Ahmed Pasha, as well as Baki Pasha, the Chief Treasurer, and Nasuh 
Agha, the head of the Janissaries.224 
After this meeting at the Hippodrome, a group of ulema chosen to represent the 
rebels appeared before Osman II at the Topkapı Palace. They conveyed the demands 
of the rebels to the sultan, but Osman II showed an obstinate refusal to their 
submissions.225 The delegation were convinced that the sultan would never execute 
his favorite men, so they left the presence of Osman II to inform the rebels about 
their failed mission.226 Upon hearing that their demands were not met by the sultan, 
the rebels attacked the Topkapı Palace. They were able to pass through the gates with 
the help of the guardsmen of the palace. They then divided themselves into three 
groups in order to find the six men in their death list.227 After a few hours of 
searching, the rebels broke into the imperial harem. Meanwhile, some of the rebels !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
222 Tûgi, Musîbetnâme , pp. 29-31. Unlike Tûgi, Hasan Beyzâde and Bostanzâde claims that the 
members of the ulema were forced to join to the rebellion, see Hasan Beyzâde, III, p. 941 and 
Bostanzâde, p. 201. 
223 “Gulüvv-i âmmden murâdunuz nedür?” Tûgi, Musîbetnâme , p. 38. 
224 According to Bostanzâde Yahya, there were some other high-ranking members of the government, 
such as the chief judges of Rumeli and Anatolia, initially in the death-list of the rebels, Bostanzâde 
speaks ill of them. See Bostanzâde, pp. 193-197. 
225 Tûgi, Musîbetnâme , p. 41; Hasan Beyzâde, III, pp. 941-42; and Peçevi, II, pp. 356-357. ASVe, 
SDC, filza 93, no. 125 (dated May 20, 1622), fols. 290r-v: “Tutte le bosteghe et case, che non li saria 
fatto mal alcuno come hano anche osservato: Osman che era nel Serraglio, sentito questo tumulto, et 
credendo nascer per la sua andata alla Mecca, procuro d’acquietarli, mandando fuori alle dette 
militie suo Katicumacum (?) col quale gli prometteva di desister dal viaggio predetto, ma esse non 
contente di questo dimandorno le teste del Primo Vesir, Coza, Chislar, et alcuni altri dal Consiglio de 
quali credevano proceder nel Re, sotto pretesto del Viaggio della Mecca, la macchinazione predetta, 
il Ré per natura fermo, et estimato nel suo proposito non volsi assentire a questa dimanda.” 
226 Tûgi, Musîbetnâme , p. 42. 
227 Ibid., pp. 44-45; Hasan Beyzâde, III, pp. 942-943; and Peçevi, II, p. 382. 
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found Mustafa I in a room, where he had been confined for the last four years, and 
freed him.228  
When Osman noticed that his uncle Mustafa was taken out from his room, he 
understood that he had no option but to turn over his favorite viziers and courtiers to 
the rebels. The sultan first sent Dilaver Pasha and Süleyman Agha, but he refused to 
give Hace Ömer Efendi, Baki Pasha, Ahmed Pasha and Nasuh Agha. Then, Osman II 
asked the rebels to bring Mustafa I back into the palace, but the rebels did not obey 
his orders. Instead, they took a step further and forced all the ulema to pledge 
allegiance to their new sultan, Mustafa I. In the midst of these events, Kafzade Faizi 
Efendi died of a heart attack. After this de facto enthronement of Mustafa I, the 
rebels transferred him to the Old Palace, where his mother, Halime Sultan, lived.229  
Upon this development, Osman II ordered his new Chief Gardener, Mahmud 
Agha, to immediately provide a ship and load it with some treasury, but Mahmud 
Agha informed the sultan that all the imperial gardeners had escaped from the palace. 
Meanwhile, a group of rebels freed prisoners from the prisons of Baba Cafer and 
Galata. Others plundered the houses of the chief treasurer, the judge of Istanbul and 
the royal tutor. Osman II made a move by appointing Kara Ali Agha as Agha of 
Janissaries, but the rebels in return attacked the house of Ali Agha in order to kill 
him and plunder his house. Ali Agha barely escaped from the rebels. 230  
On the other side of Istanbul, a rumor spread amongst the rebels that Osman II 
planned to attack the Old Palace in an attempt to kill his uncle Mustafa I. Thus the 
rebels took Mustafa I and Halime Sultan and transferred them to Orta Camii, a 
mosque near the Janissary barracks.231 In this mosque, Mustafa I also appointed Ali 
Agha as the Agha of the Janissaries, and this time the rebel soldiers accepted him. 
When Osman II was informed of the relocation Mustafa I at Orta Camii, he 
appointed Vizier Hüseyin Pasha as grand vizier. By this time, Hüseyin Pasha and 
Mahmud Agha had advised Osman to go to the headquarter of Janissaries, known as !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
228 Tûgi, Musîbetnâme , pp. 49-51; Hasan Beyzâde, III, p. 944; Peçevi, II, p. 382; Bostanzâde, p. 219; 
Roe, Negotiations, pp. 46-47; and Arslantaş and Naeh, İbranice Kroniğe, p. 33. 
229 Tûgi, Musîbetnâme , pp. 51-59 and p. 64 ; Hasan Beyzâde, III, pp. 944-945; Peçevi, II, pp. 382-
383; Roe, Negotiations, p. 47; and Arslantaş and Naeh, İbranice Kroniğe, pp. 34- 35. 
230 Tûgi, Musîbetnâme , p. 66 and pp. 80-81; and Arslantaş and Naeh, İbranice Kroniğe, pp. 35-37. 
231 Tûgi, Musîbetnâme , p. 69-70; Hasan Beyzâde, III, pp. 945-946; and Peçevi, II, p. 385. 
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the Ağakapısı, so that he could personally persuade Kara Ali Agha and other officers 
to cease their support from Mustafa I. When Osman met with Kara Ali Agha, the 
agha promised Osman that he would ask the imperial soldiers at Orta Camii to bring 
Sultan Mustafa I back to the Topkapı Palace.232 
On Friday, May 20, 1622, the third day of the rebellion, Kara Ali Agha was 
brutally killed in the courtyard of the Orta Camii while trying to persuade the 
rebellious soldiers to return Mustafa I to Osman II.233 In the following hours, 
Mustafa appointed his brother-in-law Davud Pasha as grand vizier and several 
trusted men of Davud Pasha to crucial positions in the imperial government. In 
particular, Mustafa I promoted ringleaders of the mutiny to the high-ranking offices 
in order to consolidate his power against Osman II.234 Afterwards, the rebels decided 
to bring Osman II and Hüseyin Pasha to the Orta Camii from Ağakapısı, but Hüseyin 
Pasha was killed while he was trying to escape. Osman II was forcefully brought to 
the mosque, where it was said that the rebels insulted psychically and even tortured 
him.235  
In the Orta Camii, Osman II tried his best to negotiate with his rebellious 
soldiers, but he failed to convince them to re-accept him as a sultan. Particularly, 
Davud Pasha, the grand vizier of Mustafa I, persuaded the rebels to take Osman to 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
232 Tûgi, Musîbetnâme , pp. 75-81; Hasan Beyzâde, III. p. 946; Bostanzâde, pp. 222-223; and ASVe, 
SDC, filza 93, no. 125 (dated May 20, 1622), fols. 290r-291v: “Ieri mattina al spuntar del giorno, 
armate di tutto punto, perché il giorno prima, parla maggior parte erano disarmate si ridussero alle 
ponte del Serraglio in maggior numero non essendo state bostanzi le persuasioni del loro Aga, a cui 
diedero delle sassate ne guelle di Cusseim Bassa che per ordine del Ré promise ai Giannizzeri 
presenti 300 cecchini di donativo acciò si disunissero dai sipahi di ritenerli, in modo che sfollate le 
porte di serraglio che fecero poca diffesa, entrarono nei cortili scrivo all’appartamento reale dove 
trovato il chislaragasi lo fecero in mille pezzi, come anco 15 altri eunuchi, che non li volsero insegnar 
dove si trovava Mustafa, risolute di farlo imperatore: uno de quali in fine li mostro una Cacca 
sotteranea quale Osman, sentito il tumulto l’havea fatto ripore, dove entrati con li spahi lo cavorno 
fuori, ridotto in tanta estenuatione per esser stato in quel luoco doi giorni senza cibo, et apena poteva 
formar parola ,et Re ricreatolo (?) con un poco di acqua ricercata da esso, lo gridorno imperatore , 
che lo condussero in Cocchio nel serraglio vecchio , dove si trovava sua madre, stando tutti li vesiri 
et grandi per timore delle loro teste dal furore populare retirati et rinchiusi, essendo stato prima da 
Scuttari dove era fuggito, ritento et condotto di qua Dilaver-Primo Vesir il quale dalle militie resto in 
un momento in mille parti sbrenato.” 
233 Tûgi, Musîbetnâme , pp. 81-82; Bostanzâde, pp. 223-224; Roe, Negotiations, p. 47; and ASVe, 
SDC, filza 93, no.125 (dated May 20, 1622), fols. 291r-v. 
234 Tûgi, Musîbetnâme , p. 84. 
235 Tûgi, Musîbetnâme , p. 87-88; Peçevi, II, p. 385; Bostanzâde, pp. 226-227; and Arslantaş and 
Naeh, İbranice Kroniğe, pp. 36-37. 
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the dungeon at Yedikule, where he was allegedly tortured to death.236 This tragic end 
of the young sultan has been reported by the bailo as follows: 
Today, there will be not the imperial council for quelling the tumults of 
the army and the people that demand other executions and it is said to be 
responsible for the death of Osman in motion, because they considered 
only his deposition, not his regicide.237 
According the bailo’s report on May 28, 1622, the imperial army and the people 
accused Davud Pasha of being behind the regicide of Osman II.238 Indeed, both the 
imperial soldiers and the common people did not consider their actions against 
Osman II as a regicide. They rather believed that they simply deposed a sultan and 
then pledged allegiance to a new one. In their eyes, the murder of Osman was a truly 
unexpected. It was evident for them that Davud Pasha could not have dared to order 
the murder of Osman II without the knowledge of Sultan Mustafa and Halime Sultan, 
who must have feared that the survival of Osman would mean another round of 
dynastic struggle over the Ottoman throne just like they had experienced back in 
1618. 
Conclusion 
 
When Osman II came back to Istanbul from his Polish campaign, he faced a growing 
discontent by the common people, because they had been experiencing famine and 
poverty. However, the sultan ignored this discontent and instead extended his 
interventions in the daily economic and social life of the people in the capital. His !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
236 Tûgi, Musîbetnâme , pp. 88-106; Hasan Beyzâde, III, pp. 947-948; Peçevi, II, pp. 387-388; 
Bostanzâde, pp. 227-229; Roe, Negotiations, pp. 47-48; Arslantaş and Naeh, İbranice Kroniğe, pp. 
37-38; and ASVe, SDC, filza 93, no. 125 (dated May 20, 1622), fol. 293v. 
237 ASVe, SDC, filza 93, no. 125 (dated May 20, 1622), fols. 293r-294v: “Hoggi non sarà divano per 
acquietar prima il tumulto delle militie, et populo che dimandano altre essecutioni, et che si dice esser 
per la morte di Osman in moto, perché era ben sua intentione che fosse deposto ma non privato di 
Vita.” 
238 SDC, filza 93, no. 126 (dated May 28, 1622), fol. 274r: “Osman appresso quella di Acmat suo 
padre con le cerimonie consuete, et con manifesti segni di dolor nei grandi et populo che 
l’accompagnavano con molte lacrime tanto piu che egli nella morte nostro la intrepidezza et vigoria 
solita diffendendosi dalla forza di dieci huomini destinati a questa quali furono necessitati a ferirlo 
con una piccata in testa altrimenti non potevano alterarlo et strangolarlo di quel modo, che i Prencipi 
di questa casa con soliti farsi morire: essendo grandemente: dispiaciuto al popolo et alle militie et 
doppo morto gli sia stat con tanto poco rispetto al sangue reale recisa una orecchia, et portatala a 
Mustafa per segno della sua morte come poi gli fa anco portato il cadavero per assicurarlo che fosse 
seguita; il che tutto viene attribuito a Daut Primo Vesir, sapendo le militie molto ben, che Mustafa, il 
quale per la sua insensagine.” See also Tûgi, Musîbetnâme , pp. 105-106; Peçevi, II, pp. 387-388; and 
Hasan Beyzâde, III, pp. 947-948. 
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prohibition of the use of tobacco and wine, the two basic and highly popular 
consumer products in the capital brought great shock more to the traders than the 
customers, since the markets had been suffering from an economic depression for 
almost a year. On the other hand, the sultan increased his direct involvements in the 
social life of the capital, especially after he unexpectedly lost his only son, the four-
month-old Prince Ömer. Upon this tragic loss, Osman frequently travelled incognito 
in the streets of the capital and punished many wrongdoers, including several 
Janissary officers and common people. Such aggressive and brutal actions by the 
sultan in turn increased the alienation of the imperial army and the common people 
towards himself. In a sense, the massive rebellion that cost his throne and his life was 
the final stage of this alienation. 
The failed siege of Hotin and the death of his son made Osman II more ambitious 
to lead another imperial campaign in person. He found this opportunity when he 
heard about the rebellion of Fakhr al-Din Ibn Ma’n. However, he neither wanted to 
command his imperial army in a second Polish campaign, nor he wished his imperial 
army to join his so-called Pilgrimage campaign, because he knew that his imperial 
army had been accusing him of mismanaging the fiscal and military affairs. In return, 
the sultan accused his imperial army of not showing notable performance during the 
siege of Hotin. Accordingly, the tension between the sultan and his imperial army 
escalated with every action of Osman II. In this regard, for instance, his marriages to 
free Muslim women were considered to be violations of the Ottoman dynastic 
tradition. With every such opposition or criticism, Osman II showed more arrogant 
and stubborn personality, which in turn diminished his sovereign legitimacy and 
authority in the eyes of his imperial army and the public. 
In undertaking the Pilgrimage Campaign, Osman's plan was to suppress the 
rebellion of Ibn Ma’n and then move towards Mecca to perform the pilgrimage. 
However, as seen from the dispatches of the Venetion bailo, such a campaign was 
estimated to take place for almost 20 months, which meant that the sultan would be 
away from the capital for a long time. This was a serious problem in that the payrolls 
of the imperial army left behind as well as the cash flow in the markets in the capital 
would be seriously affected in the absence of the sultan.  
Moreover, such a journey was risky for there had been reports about a serious 
military attack from the Habsburgs and Poland in the western frontiers. However, the 
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sultan seemed indifferent to these reports. Furthermore, he did not list to the 
objections raised by his ruling viziers and advisors who tried hard to convince him to 
cancel his pilgrimage and campaign plans based on the potential security and fiscal 
problems in the capital. Overall, the stubborn character of the sultan was once again 
evident.  
When Osman II accelerated his preparations for the pilgrimage campaign, more 
and more dissident voices were raised. The opposition to his campaign soon turned 
into a real threat towards his deposition. These opponents were chiefly from within 
the imperial army and the common people who now spoke openly about Osman's 
deposition in the public. The diverse rumors about the sultan’s secret agenda spread 
through the capital and convinced more soldiers and people to join the ranks of a 
rebellion.  
Shortly before the rebellion, at least two rumors spread to the capital. The first 
one was that the sultan was about to relocate the capital from İstanbul to Cairo. The 
second rumor was about the imminent executions of the sultan's uncle Mustafa I and 
his brother Prince Murad. Then, during the initial days of the rebellion, there was a 
talk among the imperial soldiers about a new army to be recruited in Anatolia. Upon 
these rumors, the imperial soldiers accused Osman II of having a secret plan under 
the pretext of performing a pilgrimage that he was going to abolish the existing 
imperial army and replace it with a new one. 
The regicide of Osman II has two different phases. In the first phase, the 
rebellion against his sultanate was mainly related to the mismanagement of fiscal and 
military affairs by Osman II, a problem which had been witnessed for over a year in 
the midst of a serious famine and a failed Polish campaign. However, the rebellious 
soldiers considered the rumors about the recruitment of a new mercenary army a 
much more serious offense and thus legitimized their opposition against the sultan by 
pointing out his eagerness to undertake the Pilgrimage campaign to Mecca.  
The second phase was solely about Osman II and his style of rule. The young 
sultan quickly became a target in the eyes of his imperial soldiers as they already 
considered his deposition a week before his regicide. However, at the beginning, the 
aim of their rebellion shifted from Osman II to his royal favorites who had been very 
influential in the business of rule. Particularly, his trusted advisors were accused of 
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supporting the sultan's idea to recruit a new army. In the end, the rebels turned 
against their ruler for good. They entered the palace and managed to enthrone 
Mustafa I. However, it was not their intention to kill Osman II when they took him to 
the dungeon at Yedikule. The Grand Vizier of Mustafa I, Kara Davud Pasha, they 
argued, in effect ordered the execution of the sultan. It is quite probably that Halime 
Sultan and Mustafa I also wanted this regicide as they were afraid of the possibility 
that Osman could still muster a force to take back his throne, which he occupied for 
only four years.  
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CHAPTER 4 
THE RECRUITMENT OF A NEW ARMY: 
SECRET PLAN OR RUMOR 
 
On Friday, May 20 1622, the Venetian bailo Giorgio Giustinian sent an immediate 
report to his senate about the regicide of Osman II:  
On Friday, the soldiers and the people deposed Sultan Osman from the 
imperial throne and enthroned his uncle Sultan Mustafa. I have written 
before to Your Serenity, the matter is perhaps passed with greater 
mishaps but these never happened in the house of Osman in this way. 
Sultan Osman continued against the will of soldiers and the ulema in his 
resolve order to the campaign of Mecca. In particular, while his pavilions 
taking on board of three galleys and passing the great number of his 
robes to Üsküdar impressed early the soldiers such as the Janissaries and 
the sipahis united 30 thousands soldiers, great number of people and the 
ulema that were ill-disposed against the sultan. Whether true or false he 
would take away all treasuries with him in order to recruit army in Asia 
and establish a new army so as to dismiss and dismantle those soldiers 
for their ill effort in the Polish war.239 
The rebellion finally took place in the capital. However, the Venetian bailo 
seems to have doubted the accusation of the recruitment of a new army. He had been 
reporting to his senate about the alienation of the imperial army and the people of the 
capital as well as the actions of Osman II regarding fiscal mismanagement in 
imperial affairs for months. But now, Osman II was accused of having a secret plan 
under the cover of the pilgrimage to Mecca to recruit a new army in Asia so as to 
eradicate the Janissaries and the sipahis. The bailo Giustinian seems to have been in 
doubt about the accusation as he was questioning “ whether true or false”. Indeed, it 
was not possible to verify the accusation made by the rebellious soldiers, because all 
the accused persons were killed in the rebellion. Yet, whether it was true or not, the 
literature on Osman II has been predominantly influenced by the accusation of the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
239 ASVe, SDC, filza 93, no. 125 (dated May 20, 1622), fols. 289r-290v. 5 years after the report, in 
1627, the bailo Guistinian represented a general report about his term in İstanbul to his Senate. He 
continued to his same arguments in his immediate reports about the rebellion. He still could not verify 
the accusation about the secret plan of Osman II, but differently he added with his new army, the 
sultan would have pursued of conquering all Europe, see Giustinian, pp. 553. 
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recruitment of a new army to eradicate the Janissaries and the sipahis in the 
empire.240  
This chapter examines the accusation of the so-called recruitment that circulated 
as a rumor in the capital against Osman II. Particularly, my discussion focuses on the 
paradoxes that the accusation, cited in different contemporary sources, contains. This 
chapter claims that the rumor about the unfounded accusation was probably 
fabricated on the eve of Osman II’s departure for the pilgrimage to provoke neutral 
soldiers and people of the capital to join the ranks of the rebellion. However, I 
observe that it also has inspired some contemporary authors such as Tûgī and The 
English ambassador Roe to change the axis of the opposition from the sultan to his 
favorites in their narratives. Most particularly, they brought the accusation of Osman 
II’s secret plan to the forefront due to the rebellion and wrote his favorites as the 
main supporters of the sultan’s secret plan. 
The first part of the chapter examines the accusation of the recruitment of a new 
army in Asia. It compares all contemporary authors who narrated the alleged secret 
plan of Osman II. The second part of the chapter analyzes the accusation as a rumor 
that supposedly provoked neutral soldiers in the imperial army and people of the 
capital to join the rebellion. This part also asks several questions about the sultan’s 
aim in leaving his imperial army at the capital, which essentially started the rumor on 
the eve of the Pilgrimage campaign. 
4.1 The Alleged Secret Plan 
 
The sources of the accusation regarding the recruitment of a new army were 
ambiguous. A rebellious retired soldier, Tûgī, was the leading accuser of the sultan’s 
alleged secret plan. He claims that the information about the so-called secret plan 
leaked from the imperial palace servants at the very beginning of the rebellion. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
240 The literature of Osman II embraced the accusation of the recruiting a new army from mercenary 
soldiers in Asia that would eradicate the Janissaries and the sipahis. The reason might be linked with 
the dominant source that was used by following writers. In this manner, one might assert that Tûgī 
influenced the leading historians such as Kâtib Çelebi and Naîmâ. Their writing on the regicide of 
Osman II was strikingly similar to the Tûgī’s narrative. These two very well known historians wrote 
their narrative on the regicide of Osman II under the influence of Tûgī’s account. On the other hand, 
the Ottoman official documents were all about the provision of the pilgrimage campaign to Mecca. 
Naturally the alleged secret plan of the sultan was not mentioned in these sources. However, Baki 
Tezcan asserts that one cannot expect the official documents reveal the secret plan of the sultan. It was 
written according to the secret plan under the cover of pilgrimage campaign. Naturally, It should not 
have mentioned of the secret plan, see Tezcan, “Searching for Osman,” pp. 382-383, n. 145. 
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According to Tûgī, a halberdier of the Old Palace, Eski Yusuf, was appointed to 
recruit this so-called new army for Osman II under the cover of providing provisions 
during the imperial pilgrimage to Mecca. In fact, Eski Yusuf was allegedly charged 
for recruiting Syrian and Turcoman mercenary soldiers for this new army of the 
sultan. Moreover, Tûgī claims that Osman II sent imperial orders to his governors for 
the recruitment of mercenary soldiers and the removal of the imperial soldiers in the 
province. With his new army of segban, composed of the mercenary soldiers, Osman 
II allegedly planned to return to the capital and eradicate the Janissaries and the 
sipahis.241  
For Osman II’s secret plan, Tûgī accused the Chief Eunuch Süleyman Agha of 
provoking the sultan to the secret plan. Süleyman Agha was the leading adviser for 
the new army in Anatolia. He induced the sultan about the failure of the siege in 
Hotin and accused the imperial army of showing poor performance during the Polish 
campaign. He advised the sultan to recruit a new army in Syria and Egypt because in 
these regions mercenary soldiers were known to be very good soldiers who could 
serve the desired glories of the sultan. Moreover, Tûgī accused Hace Ömer Efendi, as 
another leading figure in this recruitment process, but according to Tûgī, Hace Ömer 
Efendi also had a hidden agenda for the pilgrimage campaign. He allegedly wanted 
revenge on the Sheriff of Mecca, because he had exiled his brother from Mecca. Tûgī 
claims that because of this, Hace Ömer Efendi could have removed the Sheriff of 
Mecca. According to Tûgī’s manuscript, the third leading figure of the secret plan 
was Dilaver Pasha. Tûgī did not to accuse Dilaver Pasha directly of having a place in 
the recruitment process, but he rather portrayed him as an innocent figure. Because 
Dilaver Pasha was only obligated to accept the imperial demand due to the fear of 
losing his office position in the Grand Vizierate.242   
The English ambassador Thomas Roe brought Dilaver Pasha as a forefront figure 
on his accusation of recruiting a new army in Asia. According to the English 
ambassador Roe reported to his king a very different story from that of Tûgī. 
According to Roe, Dilaver Pasha spent years in action outside the capital. 
Accordingly, he did not establish any network of patronage in the imperial court. He 
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241 Tûgī, Musîbetnâme, pp. 18-19. 
242 Ibid., pp.10-13 and p. 32. 
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was allegedly independent from any faction. 243 Nevertheless, the Venetian bailo 
Giustinian claims that on July 14 1620, the Deceased Grand Vizier Ali Pasha 
dismissed Dilaver Pasha from the governorship of Diyarbakır, because he was the 
courtier of the former Chief Eunuch El-Hac Mustafa Agha.244 Indeed, it may have 
been difficult to govern one of the important provinces without being supported by 
any factions in the imperial government. 
The English ambassador Roe insistently accused Dilaver Pasha of provoking 
Osman II to recruit a new army. According to Roe, Dilaver Pasha told Osman II that 
it was not possible to consolidate his power in the empire while the Janissaries held 
their existing power in imperial affairs. He could not be a real emperor under the 
shadow of the Janissaries. Moreover, the English ambassador claims that the 
Janissaries lost their ancient powers and became very notorious for their poor 
performance during imperial campaigns. Roe reported that Dilaver Pasha advised the 
sultan to recruit a new army in Damascus and also from the Kurdish population who 
have a reputation of being courageous mercenaries on the frontier. He claims that the 
sultan was convinced about the advice given by Dilaver Pasha. Accordingly, Osman 
II sent orders to all warriors and viziers who were linked to Asia to recruit a new 
army. Thousands of Kurd and Syrian mercenaries were recruited under the cover of 
the invasion of Persia. Fakhr al-Din Ibn Ma’n also recruited 20 thousand soldiers on 
the pretext of the rebellion against Osman II; he was allegedly allied with the sultan 
in his secret plan. According to the English Ambassador, the sultan pretended to 
undertake the pilgrimage to Mecca all the while recruiting a new army in Asia. In 
reality, he would stay in Damascus. Then with his new army, he would return to the 
capital to eradicate all Janissaries and sipahis. 245  The English ambassador !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
243 Roe, Negotiations, p. 43: “This man was neuer bredd here, but had liued in action for many yeares, 
and fo had no faction, nor dependence in court, but stood vpon himfelfe, and being now vnlooked for 
advanced to this high dignity, he wrought vpon the kings difcontent, and nourifhed yt, and in 
conlufion told him, it was true, he was no emperor, nor could bee, while the Janizaries had the power 
which had lately vfurped: that they were corrupted from their ancient inftitution, and were lazy 
cowards, vnworthy of bread. But if he would follow his advice, he could prouide him a newe foldioury 
about Damafcus, and from the Coords, of meneuer bredd in the frontier warre, and of great courage, 
and that of them he fhould erect a newe militia, that fhould wholy depend of him only enterteyning 
40000 in pay, which fhould allway be his guard.” 
244 ASVe, SPAC, Registro 15, no. 140 (dated July 14, 1620), fols. 434r-442r. 
245 Roe, Negotiations, p. 44: “The king, with his councell, gaue all to the viziers direction, who was 
true foldiour, and a very wife man, able, by his credit in Afia, to performe this and more; for he wasin 
the laft rebellion. Upon this conclufion betweene them, he sent his letters to his friends, and prouided 
10000 thereabouts, and 10000 from the Coords all vpon pretence of invading Perfia; and had caufed 
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approached all-figures of the imperial agenda as allied figures of the conspiracy of 
the secret plan. He even accused Fakhr al-Din Ibn Ma’n of supporting the secret plan 
of Osman II.  According to Roe, Fakhr al-Din Ibn Ma’n provided an opportunity to 
Osman II to go to Damascus to suppress the so-called rebellion, however Osman II 
would allegedly gather his new army and forces from Fakhr al-Din Ibn Ma’n in 
Damascus. 
 Bostanzade Yahya Efendi constructed his narrative about the sultan’s aim in the 
pilgrimage campaign. He blamed Hace Ömer Efendi for being the main adviser of 
“the ill-motived pilgrimage campaign” of Osman II. He portrayed Hace Ömer Efendi 
as an evil-minded man.246 Bostanzade had been waiting an appointment to a high-
ranking post since his dismissal in 1614. His major income, arpalık revenue was cut 
off by Osman II upon the Polish campaign. After the rebellion he was appointed as 
the chief judge of Anatolia. Under the consideration of his stance, Bostanzade 
accused Hace Ömer Efendi of intriguing against the viziers and the ulema by 
provoking Osman II to get rid of them. According to Bostanzade, Hace Ömer Efendi 
told Osman II that undertaking the pilgrimage to Mecca and the holy places would 
assist God forgiving his sins. Moreover, due to the pilgrimage campaign, he could 
visit various countries in his empire that would increase his reputation. Accordingly, 
it could also be possible to extend the territories of the empire. In addition, 
Bostanzade described Süleyman Agha, the Chief Judge of Rumeli Sünbül Efendi, 
and the Chief Judge of Anatolia Hekimbaşı Musa as “evil-minded figures” and allies 
of Hace Ömer Efendi. According to Bostanzade, they used to rule the imperial 
government behind the scenes in so much that even Dilaver Pasha could not talk 
directly to Osman II regarding imperial affairs. They enabled the sultan to appoint 
their courtiers to high-ranking positions in the imperial government.247 Bostanzade 
claims that Hace Ömer Efendi and Süleyman Agha convinced Osman II to undertake 
the pilgrimage campaign in order to preserve their powerful position in imperial 
affairs. Soon afterwards, Dilaver Pasha joined the plan to persuade Osman II to go on !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
the Emir de Saida to raife 20000, which was called a reuolt, bu was indeed in ayd of the king’s 
purpofes, who pretended goe priuately to Mecha, but his end was to meete thofe foldiorus, and to ftay 
a yeare at Damafcus vntill he had regulated his new army, and then to retorne to Conftantinople, and 
root out and diffolue all the chambers of the Janizaries and caft the Spahees and Timariotts, and to 
exauctorate all their captaynes, who cate vp his country.” 
246 Bostanzâde, p. 193. 
247 Ibid., p. 204 and pp. 194-199. 
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the pilgrimage campaign. He was charged with providing the provisions for the the 
campaign. According to Bostanzade, Osman II sent his officials to recruit 
distinguished soldiers for his pilgrimage campaign. 248  Nevertheless, within the 
context of Bostanzade’s narrative, this recruitment was for the security of the 
pilgrimage routes, rather than recruitment. Hace Ömer Efendi and Süleyman Agha 
were eager to undertake the imperial pilgrimage to Mecca in order to maintain their 
powerful status quo in the imperial government.  
Bostanzade interjected the recruitment in his writings. He wrote the crowd 
believed a rumor that a recruitment of a new army in Anatolia was planned in 
Anatolia due to their poor performance of the imperial army during the Polish 
campaign. For this reason, an old halberdier Eski Yusuf was sent to Anatolia in order 
to recruit a new army for the sultan. On the way of the sultan’s pilgrimage campaign, 
Eski Yusuf and the new army joined Osman II. Accordingly, the sultan could 
eradicate the Janissaries and the sipahis. Yet, Bostanzade conveyed the accusation as 
a rumor; he mentioned only once about the recruitment, although he was a member 
of the ulema that mediated between the sultan and the rebels. After the rebellion, 
Bostanzade was appointed as chief judge of Anatolia. As a member of the imperial 
government, he should have learned in detail about the accusation of the recruitment, 
but Bostanzade never stressed it in his writing about the regicide of Osman II. He 
approached the sultan’s aim to undertake the pilgrimage campaign to Mecca as a 
forefront because of the rebellion.249  
Bostanzade asserts while the imperial government was interested in the 
pilgrimage campaign, the people were still experiencing elevated food staple prices 
and famine. The provision of the pilgrimage campaign was confronted with scarcity 
of food and beverages. According to him, the famine and expensiveness caused 
considerable unrest directed at the imperial government. In order to prevent the 
hostile environment, leading figures of the ulema, the sufi sheikhs, and benevolent 
persons wrote a letter to Osman II. They warned the sultan that the timing of the 
pilgrimage campaign was not appropriate, since it was taking place immediately after 
the Polish campaign.  They claim that everyone would grieve for undertaking a new 
campaign under these circumstances. But, the sultan decreed the appointment of the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
248 Ibid., pp. 197-198. 
249 Ibid., pp. 199-203. 
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commander in chief of the imperial army; thus the capital would be confronted with 
incursion while he was away from the capital. This was a clear sign that Osman II 
was fixated on completing the pilgrimage to Mecca.250 Bostanzade wrote that on 
Wednesday, May 18 1622, leading figures of the army and the crowd consulted one 
another about the sultan’s aim to the pilgrimage campaign. After the meeting, they 
arrived at the Topkapı Palace. They first demanded the sultan cease his will to 
complete the pilgrimage campaign, and send away inciters of the campaign such as 
Dilaver Pasha, Hace Ömer Efendi, the chief treasurer Baki Pasha, and Süleyman 
Agha.251 
According Bostanzade, Osman II told the mediators from the ulema, including 
him, that it was not certain the undertaking of the pilgrimage to Mecca would 
happen; perhaps he could go on a hunting trip to the region and remove the 
rebellious Fakhr al-Din Ibn Ma’n as the enemy of state while on his route.252 Yet, 
Bostanzade conveyed that during the rebellion, the rebels caught Osman II in the 
house of the Agha of the Janissaries and insulted him with obscene words, and 
assaulted the janissary officers along with any women who were at the scene as well, 
they punished the sipahis, who were to undertake the campaign. In these accusations, 
Bostanzade did not address the accusation of the recruitment.253 Moreover, in spite of 
his hatred towards Hace Ömer Efendi, Bostanzade did not mention Tûgī’s accusation 
of the hidden plan of Hace Ömer Efendi to take revenge on the Sheriff of Mecca.  
The accusation of the recruitment was not mentioned in contemporary writings. 
Whether consciously or not, Hasan Beyzâde did not write about the accusation but 
rather asserted that after the failure of the Hotin Siege, Osman II alienated his 
imperial army due to their poor performance during the Polish campaign. Although 
the sultan returned to the capital, he did not feel at ease with the failure of the siege. 
Then, he became resolve for leaving the capital whether by visiting Damascus or 
Mecca. Eventually, he decided to go on the pilgrimage to Mecca. When his royal tent !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
250 Ibid., pp. 198-199. 
251 Ibid., p. 198-200. On the other hand, the rebels demanded also the execution of the Chief Treasurer 
Baki Pasha. In fact, it was not directly related to the pilgrimage campaign or alleged provocation of 
the recruiting a new army. He was accused of delivering broken and red coins to the soldiers, see 
Tûgī, Musîbetnâme , p. 39. 
252 Bostanzâde, p. 210. 
253 Ibid., p. 225.  
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was moved to Üsküdar, it was received as a clear message that he was planning to 
leave. The imperial soldiers lost their hope to gain the gratefulness of the sultan 
again, and evidently opposed Osman II’s eagerness to undertake the pilgrimage to 
Mecca.254 They resorted to Dilaver Pasha and Hace Ömer Efendi to persuade Osman 
II to cancel his pilgrimage campaign. Hasan Beyzâde asserted the imperial soldiers 
excused them of the harsh conditions in the desert, considering in particular the lack 
of water, and claimed there was no doubt that even camels could not bear the 
conditions during the long of pilgrimage campaign.255 
Similar to Hasan Beyzâde, Peçevi claims that the poor performance at the siege 
of Hotin alienated Osman II from his imperial army.  The sultan was very 
disappointed about the failure of the Polish Campaign. Osman II’s mood caused him 
to want to go to the pilgrimage to Mecca. He was also alienated because of his 
misbehavior against the imperial soldiers during the Polish campaign.256 According 
to Peçevi, during the Polish campaign, the sultan called the imperial soldiers to pay 
their donation in the district of Isakçı, today known as Isaccea in modern Romania. 
The imperial soldiers walked in front of the sultan and took their donation group by 
group, but the way of giving the donations offended the imperial soldiers. They 
understood that it was a military census under the pretext of a donation.257 It was a 
sign of the mistrust of the sultan. Moreover, according to Tûgī, in terms of the 
donations in Isakçı, Osman II refused to pay the soldiers who came late to the 
military camp. Accordingly, during the siege of Hotin, the soldiers, who had not 
received their donations, refused to fight to death against Poland. They notified their 
commanders that the soldiers, who received donations, must have fought against the 
Poles, not the soldiers who had not received the donation yet.258 Furthermore, Peçevi 
claims that after the death of Karakaş Pasha during the Siege of Hotin, Osman II 
allegedly spoke ill of his imperial army due to the mistakes of the sipahis. Peçevi 
claims in the midst of a bilateral alienation some propagated a rumor that Osman II 
had an alleged secret plan to change the capital of the empire from İstanbul to Cairo. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
254 Hasan Beyzâde, p. 937. 
255 Ibid., pp. 938-939. 
256 Peçevi, II, p. 380. 
257 Ibid., p. 380. 
258 Tûgī, Musîbetnâme , p. 15. 
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According to the propagandists, Süleyman Agha was the one to talk Osman II into 
moving the capital from İstanbul to Cairo. 259  Although Peçevi witnessed the 
rebellion of 1622, he never wrote about such alleged secret plan. 
It was not only the main advisers of the so-called secret plan that were changing 
from source to source, but also the accusation of the secret plan was not given place 
in all of the contemporary sources. The accusation was not possible to be verified, 
because all the accused leading figures of the imperial government were killed 
during the rebellion.  
 
4.2 The Rumor 
 
The accusations were predominantly linked to the decision of Osman II to 
undertake the pilgrimage campaign without his imperial army. He would leave his 
imperial army at the capital, and only two thousands newly graduated Janissaries and 
one thousand sipahis would accompany him during the campaign.260 A few questions 
need to be asked regarding the contemporary sources in order to examine the 
accusation of the so-called secret plan. First, why did Osman II leave his imperial 
army in the capital? Second, why did the imperial army oppose the pilgrimage 
campaign? Third, why was Osman II so eager to undertake the pilgrimage to Mecca 
in spite of the great opposition?  
As seen in the previous chapter, the imperial army of the capital evidently 
opposed the pilgrimage campaign to Mecca. All contemporary sources had the same 
reason that after the extremely exhausting Polish campaign, the Janissaries and the 
sipahis riotously opposed to being sent immediately to another military campaign. 
During the Polish campaign, they witnessed not only heavy weather conditions and 
lack of provision, but also the tight-fisted nature of the sultan. The imperial soldiers 
returned in misery to the capital from the border of Poland. Undertaking a new 
campaign immediately after the Polish campaign meant the Janissaries and the 
sipahis would once again register the same grievances. The pilgrimage campaign !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
259 Peçevi, p. 380. 
260 ASVe, SDC, filza 93, fol. 274r, no. 114 (dated April 16, 1622), fol. 279r: “Quando alle militie non 
dissegna di condur altri, che 2 mille Giannizzeri et mille spai, et cio per non insospettir il Persiano, 
che questa sua mossa sia contra di esso, seben d’alcuni si va speculando, che anzi il principale fine 
del Gran Signore sia questo per indur quel Ré, con tale timore a mandarli il presente delle sede.” 
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would last longer, taking almost twenty months.261 According to Bostanzâde, famine 
and expensiveness prevailed in the capital. As noted in the third chapter, Osman II 
undertook the military campaign against Poland in midst of the provision crisis and 
scarcity of money in the capital. The crisis struck the markets and the daily economic 
life of the capital.  
First, Osman II seemed to be eager to spend the winter in Edirne to undertake a 
new campaign against Poland. However, he witnessed great opposition not only from 
the imperial army, but from his viziers and the people in the capital as well. In 
particular, the guilds considered another imperial military campaign to be 
devastating and the markets of the capital could not afford another campaign. They 
all opposed Osman II’s plan to spend the winter in Edirne in order to lead his 
imperial army again to Poland.262 Nevertheless, immediately after his return to the 
capital, Osman II became eager to undertake the pilgrimage campaign. People were 
determined to oppose any addition of the Polish campaign, not only to Mecca. They 
strongly demanded the sultan stay in capital until everyone had recovered from the 
exhaustion, provision crisis and any other fiscal troubles in imperial affairs.  
As noted in the second chapter, the alienation of the imperial army from Osman 
II emerged before the Polish campaign and increased during the campaign. The first 
evident plot against Osman II occurred during the Polish campaign on November 23 
1621, six months before his regicide. The Janissaries and the sipahis rose to revolt in 
front of the tent of the incumbent Grand Vizier Hüseyin Pasha due to unpaid salaries. 
In the midst of the rebellion, they celebrated the rumor of the enthronement of 
Mustafa I at the capital. Accordingly, they showed their support to Mustafa I for the 
possible deposition of Osman II, rather than supporting his brother Prince Murad. 
This could be seen as a first test leading to the rebellion in İstanbul on May 18 1622.  
It was evident Osman II would leave his imperial army at the capital. Besides 
their unwillingness to join the pilgrimage campaign, he could have acknowledged the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
261 ASVe, SDC, filza 93, no. 108 (dated April 1, 1622), fol. 274r. 
262 ASVe, SPAC, Registro 18/VII, no. 66 (dated October 26, 1621), fols. 9r-10v:”Questa rissolutione 
del Gran Signore di svernar egli in Adrinopoli, et l’essercito nei Paesi avisati dispiace qui 
generalmente ad ogn’uno, provandosi per la sua absenza una carestia de viveri intolerabile, et 
molt’altri inconvenienti et temendo i numeri mercanti la total rovina del negozio, che non facendo gia 
molti mesi cosa alcuna, sperano col ritorno della Corte et dell’esercito di restorarlo alquanto” Also 
see Roe, Negotiations, p. 12. 
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warnings of the external military threats to Rumeli, the Western front of the empire. 
The viziers, ulema, and the leading figures of the empire warned Osman II while he 
was far from the capital, and the imperial government would confront the Spanish or 
the Habsburg attacks to the Mediterranean, or the Cossack’s attack to the coastal side 
of the Black Sea. For this reason, according to the Venetian bailo, Osman II decided 
to leave his imperial army in Rumeli. The sultan did not call the imperial army to his 
campaign of the pilgrimage to Mecca. During his absence, he declared his Grand 
Vizier Dilaver Pasha would be his deputy and commander in chief of the imperial 
army (serdar-ı ekrem) in the capital. Accordingly, the imperial army under the 
commandership of Dilaver Pasha could repel any attack from the Western front of 
the empire.263 Osman II also ordered the Grand Admiral Halil Pasha to build eighty 
warships for the potential threat coming from the Mediterranean and Black Sea. 
Hence, leaving his imperial army at the capital could be seen as a precaution against 
any possible external threat from the Western front of the empire. Osman II most 
probably wanted to recruit soldiers for providing the security of the pilgrimage 
campaign from the ones who did not attend the Polish campaign. For this reason, it 
was highly probable the imperial government could have wanted to recruit 
mercenary soldiers from Anatolia with the sole purpose of providing the security of 
the routes during the campaign.  
On the other hand, the Venetian bailo claims that recruiting imperial soldiers for 
the pilgrimage campaign would cause the Safavid shah to suspect of being Osman 
II’s real target under the cover of the Pilgrimage to Mecca. Taking only 10 thousand 
persons on his imperial retinue was meant to decrease the anxiety of the Safavid 
shah, because the usual military campaigns against the Safavids used to recruit a 
significant number of imperial soldiers to the army. Moreover, according to the 
Venetian bailo, Osman II sent gifts to the Safavid shah in order to demonstrate his 
goodwill to quell the shah’s fear of the Ottoman military campaign against his 
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263 The Venetian bailo reported that the sultan would leave the Grand Vizier Dilaver Pasha to the 
capital due to external threat from the West, see ASVe, SDC, filza 93, no. 114 (dated April 16, 1622) 
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lands.264 Osman II preferred to take his smaller royal tent and allocated a lesser 
number of horses and camels for his pilgrimage campaign than any other imperial 
military campaign.265  
It was evident Osman II was reluctant to recruit his imperial soldiers to the 
pilgrimage campaign because he was not satisfied with their performance during the 
Polish campaign. He might have considered the imperial army of the Polish 
campaign could not bear another long-military campaign to the Eastern front of the 
empire. It was risky to take them on the pilgrimage campaign, because Osman II 
perhaps would witness once again the military rebellion that he faced during the 
Polish campaign on November 23 1621.266 The opponent soldiers threatened Osman 
II to go to Asia to join the rebellious army of Fakhr al-Din Ibn Ma’n in Tripoli. This 
was a paradoxical threat to the sultan because during the rebellion, the sultan was 
accused of having the so-called secret plan.267 
It is crucial to ask the reason of Osman II’s eagerness to undertake the pilgrimage 
to Mecca in spite of the great opposition to his will. The sultan was informed about 
the rebellion of the Druze Emire Fakhr al-Din Ibn Ma’n Emir in Tripoli at the 
military camp of the Polish campaign on August 28 1621. According to the Venetian 
bailo, Osman II sent immediately an army to suppress the rebellion. On January 29 
1622, the Venetian bailo reported that the sultan ordered the extraordinary imperial 
council to assemble for a possible imperial military campaign against Fakhr al-Din 
Ibn Ma’n. After the extraordinary imperial council, nearly 150 thousand gold coins, 
which is a small amount for the expense was allocated from the imperial treasury, 
but this was not a suited amount for this long military campaign. In the same report, 
the Venetian bailo informed the Senate the first time about Osman II’s eagerness to 
go to Mecca after Tripoli.  
However, on February 1 1622, four months-old Prince Ömer, son of Osman II 
was accidently killed while the sultan were watching a play of the Polish campaign !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
264 ASVe, SDC, filza 93, no. 114 (dated April 16, 1622), fol. 168r: “Quando alle militie non dissegna 
di condur altri, che 2 mille Giannizzeri et mille spai, et cio per non insospettir il Persiano, che questa 
sua mossa sia contra di esso, seben d’alcuni si va speculando, che anzi il principale fine del Gran 
Signore sia questo per indur quel  Ré, con tale timore a mandarli il presente delle sede.” 
265 ASVe, SDC, filza 93, no. 114 (dated April 16, 1622), fol. 274r. 
266 ASVe, SPAC, Registro 18/VII, no. 73 (dated November 23, 1621), fol. 30v. 
267 ASVe, SPAC, Registro 18/VIII, no. 86 (dated January 20, 1622, m.v.), fol. 22r. 
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with his household in the Topkapı Palace. According to the Venetian bailo, this was 
a severe trauma for Osman II. He did not speak for three days with anyone until the 
royal funeral of Prince Ömer was held. From then on, Osman II travelled incognito 
to the capital and castigated transgressors.268 Under the light of this trauma, as noted 
previously, one could speculate about the claim of Hasan Beyzâde that Osman II, 
because of his sorrow due to the failure of the Hotin Siege wanted to leave the 
capital.  The accidental death of Prince Ömer could also have increased the sultan’s 
desire to exit the capital. Hence, leaving could consolidate his eagerness to undertake 
the pilgrimage campaign to Mecca. Most particularly, during the last two years of his 
imperial government, serious calamities, economic crisis and the military failure 
were witnessed. The death of his son could be received as the deciding factor to 
leave Istanbul. From then on, the axis of the campaign shifted more likely from 
Fakhr al-Din Ibn Ma’n to the pilgrimage to Mecca. 
As noted above, Bostanzâde claims that Hace Ömer Efendi and Süleyman Agha 
suggested to the sultan that God would forgive his sins thanks to the pilgrimage 
campaign. In terms of the sins of the sultan, they might be referred to the fratricide of 
his brother Prince Mehmed. They might also be linked to the fratricide with the 
accidental death of his son, or the many calamities of the last two years. Tûgī 
conveyed that the Sufi Sheikh Aziz Mahmud Hudai interpreted a dream of Osman II. 
Aziz Mahmud Hudai suggested the sultan visit the holy shrines of the capital and 
sacrifice animals for God. For a while, Osman seemed to follow Hudai’s advice 
about sacrificing animals to seek forgiveness from God. However, after he visited the 
holy shrines, Osman II decided to undertake the pilgrimage to Mecca.269  
Osman II was fascinated with traveling to the hunting grounds in the vicinity of 
the capital. As noted above, Bostanzâde conveyed his talk with the mediators of the 
ulema, where Osman II told them he would travel to the hunting grounds in the 
regions, while castigating Fakhr al-Din Ibn Ma’n. Accordingly, Osman II appointed 
his brother in law Chief Falconer Murtaza Pasha to the governorship of Damascus.270 
However, Baki Tezcan asserted the appointment of Murtaza Pasha to the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
268 ASVe, SPAC, Registro 18/VIII, no. 92 (dated February 5, 1622, m.v.), fol. 40v-r. 
269 Tûgī, Musîbetnâme , p. 30. 
270  ASVe, SDC, filza 93, no. 108 (dated April 1, 1622), fol. 106r. See also Tezcan, “Searching for 
Osman,” p. 334, n. 58. 
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governorship of Damascus and Bebr Mehmed Agha to the governorship of Egypt as 
an indication for the secret plan of the sultan. According to Tezcan, with these 
appointments, Osman II most probably aimed to set up a secure zone for himself in 
Egypt and the Levant.271 However, the appointments could be also related with the 
personality of Osman II: his fascination with gold and hunting. As noted in the 
previous chapter, Osman II appointed Bebr Mehmed Agha to the governorship of 
Egypt in the aftermath of his promise to send 300 thousand gold coins as an advance 
from the annual payment of Egypt to the personal treasury of Osman II.272 Moreover, 
one of the main reasons for the appointments of Murtaza Agha to the governorship of 
Damascus could be also related to Osman II’s eagerness to travel to hunting grounds 
in the region.  
As noted in the fourth chapter, a great number of the imperial soldiers and the 
people of the capital evidently detested the sultan’s eagerness to undertake the 
pilgrimage to Mecca. Soon after, their voice of opposition turned into a voice of 
deposition of the sultan. Yet, not only the Grand Vizier Dilaver Pasha and the Mufti 
Esad Efendi, but also his favorites such as the Sultan’s Tutor Hace Ömer Efendi and 
the Chief Süleyman Agha strove to dissuade Osman II from his pilgrimage campaign 
in midst of the of the deposition. They must have been aware of the upcoming storm, 
however the sultan ignored all opposition and showed his resolve to undertake the 
pilgrimage campaign to Mecca.273 During the three-day rebellion, the uncontrollable 
rumors succeeded in gathering a great number of soldiers and people in the capital. 
In the end, the new court faction of Mustafa I committed the regicide of Osman II in 
the dungeon of Yedikule on Friday, May 20 1622. 
 
 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
271 Tezcan, “Searching for Osman,” p.  228. 
272ASVe, SPAC, Registro 18/VIII, no. 90 (dated February 5, 1621), fol. 36r-v. 
273 ASVe, SDC, filza 93, no. 120 (dated May 11, 1622), fol. 238r-v: ”trovandosi il Re tanto fermo, et 
fisso nel pensiero del detto viaggio, che ruina consideratione e rispetto, ne il pericolo istesso della 
sua propria depositione che dalla voce di tutti gli vien predetta, ha potuto sin hora divertirlo, quando 
si vedesse constretto  a farlo per causa della Republica,  concepirebbe cosi grande odio e sdegno 
contra di lei, che sarà pericolo, che con aperta rottura  volesse sfogarla, et mandar ad effetto la 
cagione, per la quale fosse stato sforzato a fermarsi, pero convenendosi far ogn’ opera per purgarlo 
da tali impressioni, et conoscendo molto ben io, haver in ciò tutti i Visiri, Mufti, Coza, Chislar, et ogni 
altro contrario per il solo, et unico oggetto, che hanno di distornar il detto viaggio.” See Roe, 
Negotiations, p. 34. 
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Conclusion 
 
As discussed above, the rumors were probably related to Osman II’s decision not to 
take his imperial army to the pilgrimage campaign. He would only recruit three 
thousand newly graduated and inexperienced Janissaries and one thousand sipahis. 
The rest of the imperial soldiers would stay in the capital. There were several reasons 
for him leaving the imperial army in the capital that triggered the rumor that spread 
all over the capital.  
First, the imperial army evidently opposed not only the pilgrimage campaign, but 
any campaign in the aftermath the Polish campaign. They were determined to stay in 
the capital until they were fully recovered from the effects of the Polish campaign, 
provision crisis and any other fiscal troubles in imperial affairs. Moreover, the 
imperial army alienated itself from Osman II, because of his aggressive fiscal 
policies and fiscal mismanagements in the imperial government. They had already 
witnessed several payment and provision crises during the Polish campaign. 
Immediately leaving for a new campaign would cause them to face the same crises 
they previously had experienced. 
Second, it was clear Osman II paid attention to the warnings of the potential 
Spanish and the Cossack threats on the Mediterranean and the Black Sea. He would 
leave his army under the commander of his Grand Vizier Dilaver Pasha at the capital 
and he ordered the Grand Admiral Halil Pasha to build eighty-war ships in following 
coming years. Accordingly, the imperial army could repel any attack from the West 
and provide security over the empire. Moreover, according to the Venetian bailo, the 
recruitment of the imperial soldiers for the pilgrimage campaign could make the 
Safavid Shah doubt the sultan’s aim. The shah could assume he is the real target of 
the pilgrimage campaign. Osman II sent gifts to the shah in order to demonstrate his 
goodwill and quell the shah’s fear for the imperial military campaign against the 
Safavids. Third, Osman II was evidently reluctant to recruit the imperial soldiers to 
the pilgrimage campaign to Mecca. He had been dissatisfied with their efforts during 
the Polish campaign. He most likely wanted to restore his reputation without 
recruiting the imperial soldiers during the pilgrimage campaign. Moreover, the sultan 
may have considered that the imperial army could not bear another long military 
campaign immediately after the Polish campaign. This would be perilous for the 
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sultan, because he had faced a serious military rebellion during the Polish campaign.  
The opponent soldiers began to pose a threat to the sultan that they wanted to go to 
Asia in order to join the ranks of the rebellion of the Fakhr al-Din Ibn Ma’n in 
Tripoli.  
All the evidence shows the rumor of the recruitment of a new army circulated in 
the capital during the rebellion that accused Osman II of having a secret plan under 
the cover of the pilgrimage campaign. His plan would recruit a new segban army in 
Asia to eradicate the Janissaries and the sipahis in the empire. The unverifiable 
accusation was most probably fabricated during the rebellion to provoke the neutral 
soldiers and people to join the ranks of the rebellion in the capital. The rebellion 
escalated easily because over the last two years a great number of the imperial 
soldiers and the people of the capital had already alienated Osman II due to his fiscal 
mismanagement in the imperial affairs. However, the axis of the opposition changed 
from Osman II’s fiscal mismanagement to the ill motives of his favorites Dilaver 
Pasha, Hace Ömer Efendi, Süleyman Agha and Baki Pasha. The dispersed rumor 
strategically created doubts about Osman II’s aim to undertaking of the pilgrimage to 
Mecca. Accordingly, Osman II could have prevented performing his religious duties, 
because he had a secret plan under the cover of the imperial pilgrimage to Mecca. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
In this thesis, I have attempted to illustrate the changing dynamics of practical 
politics and power relations at the Ottoman imperial court under Osman II. By 
utilizing hitherto unexamined ambassadorial reports from the Venetian State 
Archives, I have tried to shed new light on the historical problems, events and actors 
behind the dethronement and murder of Osman II in May 1622. In this respect, I 
have examined the roles of the sultan’s favorite courtiers and viziers in daily court 
politics at a time when the Ottoman Empire was facing a severe economic crisis.  
When he ascended to the throne in 1618, Osman II found himself in a court 
divided by complex network of alliances and factionalism. As a young and 
inexperienced sultan, Osman II was only one of the contenders for power among his 
ruling elites. Nonetheless, just like his immediate predecessors, namely Murad III, 
Mehmed III and Ahmed I had done before him, Osman soon adopted the strategy of 
ruling through his favorites so as to reconfigure the existing power and patronage 
relations within the Ottoman political body to his advantage as well as to consolidate 
his sovereign authority against any alternative foci of power in Istanbul. His style of 
rule by favorites was actually a highly assertive one. For instance, he empowered the 
dismissed grand admiral Ali Pasha as his new grand vizier and allowed him to wield 
enormous power as the minister-favorite. As long as his favorite remained unrivalled 
in his position, Osman II was able to exert more direct influence over the business of 
rule.  
On the other hand, once Ali Pasha discovered the tight-fisted nature of the sultan, 
he regularly sent Osman II valuable gifts in order to maintain his royal favor while 
enhancing his own powers in the business of rule. He mostly financed these gifts 
through taking bribes and making confiscations from other ruling grandees. In the 
meantime, the sultan followed an aggressive fiscal policy that he accordingly 
collected money from the ruling elite and grandees by taking regular payments, 
making confiscations and abolishing retired salaries of imperial soldiers and high-
ranking ulema’s such as oturaklık and arpalık as he kept most of it to himself. This 
aggressive fiscal policy created much alienation among the sultan’s imperial army 
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and court. When Osman II and his government mismanaged fiscal and military 
affairs, the alienation of the imperial soldiers triggered a direct criticism against the 
sultan, as seen in the first rebellion of soldiery before and during the Polish 
campaign. In the end, Osman II’s fiscal policies and the provision crisis deepened the 
general alienation of soldiers and people in the capital.   
The sultan’s eagerness to go to war against the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth 
challenged the powerful position of Ali Pasha at the imperial court. Unlike the 
sultan, Ali Pasha was in favor of the idea of signing a peace treaty with the Poles, 
because he did not have enough experience in land warfare. Despite this problem, 
Osman II kept Ali Pasha as grand vizier, for he was an ardent supporter of the 
sultan’s fiscal policies, while Osman II tried to shift the balance of power at his court 
by empowering his royal tutor Ömer Efendi as his new chief power-broker in the 
business of rule.  
Upon the execution of Prince Mehmed on the eve of Osman II’s Polish campaign 
as well as the death of Ali Pasha in 1621, Osman II became more visible and 
dominant in court politics, only to receive more direct criticism from his imperial 
soldiers and the people of Istanbul pertaining to his style of rule.  
The provision and fiscal crises on the eve of the Polish campaign were in fact 
visible failures of Osman’s personal rule. The extreme winter conditions in 1621-22 
cut the capital’s crucial logistical links with its hinterland, disabling all daily 
economic activities in the capital for months. While Istanbul was suffering under 
these dire circumstances, its grain provisions were ordered to be transferred to the 
Poland frontier as required for the forthcoming imperial campaign. During this 
period, the famine hit hard particularly the poor people of the capital, who in turn 
protested Osman II in a ‘bread riot’ during a Friday prayer. Moreover, this provision 
crisis had also some serious effects on the imperial soldiers for they were not paid 
their regular salaries. Overall, the failed Polish campaign further increased the 
discontent among the imperial soldiers against their sultan, as they constantly had 
troubles or long delays in receiving their salaries and provisions due to the fiscal 
problems and climatic abnormalities of the period. In this context, the idea of 
deposing Osman II was hatched in the minds of the imperial soldiers and common 
people seven months prior to his regicide. 
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In the last two years of his reign, almost every action of Osman II escalated the 
tension between himself and his imperial soldiers and other people residing in the 
capital. Osman II in fact cared little about the discontent of the people who had been 
suffering under the cold weather, provision crisis and military problems. The sultan 
instead expanded his intervention in the economic and social standing of his ruling 
elite. During the Polish campaign, most notably, the sultan abolished the arpalıks, 
the revenues of the high-ranking members of the ulema that they were entitled to 
receive after retirment. Likewise, immediately after the campaign, Osman II cut off 
the salaries of the retired Janissaries known as the oturak. Moreover, he prohibited 
the use of tobacco and wine in the capital. In the midst of a severe provision and 
monetary crisis, the prohibition of these two consumer products shocked the traders 
more than their consumers. Furthermore, upon the death of his son, Prince Ömer, 
Osman II increased his interventions in the social life of Istanbul by traveling 
incognito and by punishing any wrongdoer in person. In addition, his marriage with 
the daughter of Esad Efendi, the Mufti, was considered to be a direct violation of the 
Ottoman tradition of royal marriages only with non-Muslim born concubines. All of 
these actions of Osman II made him loose his legitimacy and authority in the eyes of 
the imperial soldiers and common people, thus their alienation from himself and his 
reign.  
 Throughout his short four-year reign, Osman II inserted new agents of power in 
the business of rule, most notably the Chief Eunuch of the Imperial Harem, 
Süleyman Agha, and the Chief Gardener, Bebr Mehmed Pasha. These figures played 
important roles both during and aftermath of the Polish campaign. In particular, after 
the death of Ali Pasha, Süleyman Agha and Bebr Mehmed Pasha increased their 
power and influence in imperial and dynastic matters. Yet, their overwhelming 
control of daily affairs brought upon them direct criticism during and after of the 
rebellion of May 1622.  
Despite all the aformentioned political and economic problems, Osman II paid 
little attention to the warnings of his viziers, grandees, as well as his favorites, 
particularly when he decided to make his Pilgrimage as discussed in the previous 
chapter. His advisors found it very dangerous for the sultan to leave Istanbul without 
first solving the provision and fiscal problems of his soldiers and other residents of 
the capital. Yet, the sultan insisted to undertake the long journey to Mecca and 
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Medina. When his imperial tent was put in Üsküdar, a clear sign of the sultan’s 
departure in short time, the long accumulating military and public opposition against 
his sultanate evolved into a direct voice of deposition, thus the rebellion began.  
During the rebellion, the target of the rebellious soldiers and people changed 
from Osman II to his favorites, most notably, Süleyman Agha, Hace Ömer Efendi, 
Dilaver Pasha, Baki Pasha and Nasuh Agha, while some rumors began to circulate in 
the capital about Osman II’s secret plan to recruit a new army to replace the existing 
one. The rumors were most probably fabricated to provoke all those soldiers and 
people who thus far remained aloof from the political developments and made them 
join the ranks in the rebellion. Meanwhile, as more and more soldiers and people 
accused the sultan of the his secret plan, his royal favorites turned into a target for 
they were considered to misguided the inexperienced young sultan on this matter. 
In this thesis, I tried to demonstrate these major problems and events regarding 
the reign and regicide of Osman II in the light of new information grasped from the 
dispatches of the Venetian bailo. These reports, which were written by the most 
vigilant contemporary observers of the Ottoman court in Istanbul, Giorgio 
Giustinian, are valuable and significant to delineate different aspects of the changing 
dynamics in power relations and factional politics at the court of Osman II. By 
means of Giustinian’s reports, is it possible to find out some unknown issues present 
in the daily politics at the imperial court as well as checking the validity of the 
arguments used by contemporary Ottoman writers on Osman II’s reign and regicide. 
Particularly, I attempted to elaborate on the overlooked issues such as provision 
crisis and climatic imbalance during Osman II’s reign. Moreover, I kept track of 
rumors and debates regarding the sultan’s actions both among the ruling elites and 
the imperial soldiers as well as common people. Furthermore, in the light of these 
sources, I tried to suggest the portrait and perception of Osman II at the imperial 
court and in the capital at a time he was trying to confront the climatic, fiscal and 
military crisis immediate before his regicide. I hope to partially fulfill this gap in 
recent Ottoman historiography.  
I also discussed some views with the arguments of the recent literature on Osman 
II and his reign. First, in parallel with Tezcan’s claim, I find that Osman II pursued 
an assertive policy that tried to reconfigure the dynamics of the practical politics and 
power relations in favor of his personal rule. Second, I observe that the reign of 
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Osman II influenced from the process of monetarization in Ottoman economy. I offer 
a detailed examination on the fiscal mismanagement of Osman II that alienated his 
soldiers and common people from his sultanate. On the other hand, in terms of 
Tezcan’s separation of two main political groups as ‘constitutionalists’ and 
‘absolutists’, I find that factionalism and practical politics at the imperial court under 
Osman II was not static and one-dimensional. Rather, it seems to have more dynamic 
and multi-dimensional aspects. Researchers should also count climatic imbalance, 
provision crisis, military and public grievances for fiscal policies of the sultan. I 
suggest that detailed climatic, fiscal and monographic researches on the leading 
issues and figures of the period will contribute much to our understanding of 
factionalism and daily politics of the era. 
I hope that, this study will become more meaningful with complementary studies 
comparing Ottoman rebellions with that of the global rebellions, which became trend 
during the seventeenth century. By doing so, it will help to contextualize Ottoman 
rebellion history concerning global trends in world history.!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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